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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS N. TOWNSEND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43553 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date: 10/29/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :08 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 4 Case: CR-MD-2013-000411 O Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Defendant: Townsend, Thomas N 
State of Idaho vs. Thomas N Townsend 
Date Code User Judge 
3/28/2013 NCRM PRADAMKD New Case Filed - Misdemeanor Magistrate Court Clerk 
PROS PRADAMKD Prosecutor assigned Ada County Prosecutor Magistrate Court Clerk 
HRSC TCWADAMC Hearing Scheduled (CA- Clerk Bond Out Magistrate Court Clerk 
Appearance 04/15/2013 03:00 PM) 
BNDS TCWADAMC Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 500.00 ) Magistrate Court Clerk 
PCFO · PRADAMKD Charge Filed - Cause Found on charges 1 and 2 Magistrate Court Clerk 
4/1/2013 AFPD TCTORRGR Application For Public Defender Magistrate Court Clerk 
CLAP TCPOSELM Hearing result for CA- Clerk Bond Out Magistrate Court Clerk 
Appearance scheduled on 04/15/2013 03:00 PM: 
Clerk Appearance 
CHGA TCPOSELM Judge Change: Administrative John Hawley Jr. 
ORPD TCPOSELM Order Appointing Public Defender Ada County John Hawley Jr. 
Public Defender 
HRSC TCPOSELM Hearing Scheduled (AC Pretrial Conference John Hawley Jr. 
05/01/201310:15 AM) 
HRSC TCPOSELM Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/29/2013 08:15 John Hawley Jr. 
AM) 
PLEA TCPOSELM A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (118-8004 {M} John Hawley Jr. 
Driving Under the Influence) 
PLEA TCPOSELM A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (149-301 John Hawley Jr. 
Drivers License or Commercial Drivers License 
Violation) 
NHPD · TCPOSELM Notice & Order Of Hearing/appointment Of Pd John Hawley Jr. 
4/4/2013 RQDD TCTONGES Defendant's Request for Discovery John Hawley Jr. 
4/17/2013 RSDS TCTONGES State/City Response to Discovery John Hawley Jr. 
RQDS. TCTONGES State/City Request for Discovery John Hawley Jr. 
4/25/2013 MOTS TCCHRIKE Motion to Suppress Evidence and Supporting John Hawley Jr. 
Memorandum 
4/30/2013 RSDS TCCHRIKE State/City Response to Discovery/ Addendum John Hawley Jr. 
5/1/2013 PTMM TCFINNDE Pretrial Memorandum & Notice John Hawley Jr. 
HRVC TCFINNDE Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on John Hawley Jr. 
05/29/2013 08: 15 AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRHD TCFINNDE Hearing result for AC Pretrial Conference John Hawley Jr. 
scheduled on 05/01/2013 10:15 AM: Hearing 
Held- Set Suppression Hearing 
5/2/2013 HRSC TCFINNDE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/24/2013 03:30 John Hawley Jr. 
PM) 
5/7/2013 RSDS TCTONGES State/City Response to Discovery/ second John Hawley Jr. 
addendum 
6/13/2013 OBJE TCTONGES Objection to Motion to Suppress and Brief in John Hawley Jr. 
Response 
6/24/2013 HRHD TCFINNDE Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John Hawley Jr. 
06/24/2013 03:30 PM: Hearing Held 
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Date: 10/29/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :08 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 4 Case: CR-MD-2013-000411 O Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Defendant: Townsend, Thomas N 
State of Idaho vs. Thomas N Townsend 
Date Code User Judge 
6/26/2013 MOTS TCTONGES Material in Support of State's Responses to John Hawley Jr. 
Motion to Suppress 
7/24/2013 MEMO TCFINNDE Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to John Hawley Jr. 
Suppress Evidence 
CERT TCFINNDE Certificate Of Mailing John Hawley Jr. 
MOTN TCFINNDE Motion to Suppress Denied John Hawley Jr. 
9/23/2013 BAAT PDPRECJR ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) Nicole Owens, 
7679 removed. PD HAWLEY #17 assigned. 
BAAT PDPRECJR ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) PD HAWLEY #17 
removed. Heidi M Tolman, 8478 assigned. 
10/21/2013 HRSC, TCFINNDE Hearing Scheduled (AC Pretrial Conference John Hawley Jr. 
11/05/2013 09:15 AM) 
HRSC TCFINNDE Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/04/2013 08:15 John Hawley Jr. 
AM) 
NOTH TCFINNDE Notice Of Hearing John Hawley Jr. 
11/5/2013 PTMM TCFINNDE Pretrial Memorandum & Notice John Hawley Jr. 
HRVC TCFINNDE Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on John Hawley Jr. 
12/04/2013 08:15 AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRHD TCFINNDE Hearing result for AC Pretrial Conference Gregory Kalbfleisch 
scheduled on 11/05/2013 09:15AM: Hearing 
Held- Set for SH 
HRSC TCFINNDE Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 12/10/2013 John Hawley Jr. 
09:30 AM) 
12/10/2013 HRHD TCFINNDE Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on John Hawley Jr. 
12/10/2013 09:30 AM: Hearing Held 
PLEA TCFINNDE A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (118-8004 John Hawley Jr. 
{M}{2} Driving Under the lnfluence-(Second 
Offense)) 
FIGT TCFINNDE Finding of Guilty (118-8004 {M}{2} Driving Under John Hawley Jr. 
the lnfluence-(Second Offense)) 
REDU TCFINNDE Charge Reduced Or Amended (118-8004 {M}{2} John Hawley Jr. 
Driving Under the lnfluence-(Second Offense)) 
OSOL TCFINNDE Order Suspending Drivers License Driver License John Hawley Jr. 
1 Years 
JAIL TCFINNDE Sentenced to Jail or Detention (118-8004 {M}{2} John Hawley Jr. 
Driving Under the lnfluence-(Second Offense)) 
Confinement terms: Jail: 365 days. Suspended 
jail: 345 days. Credited time: 1 day. 
PROB TCFINNDE Probation Ordered (118-8004 {M}{2} Driving John Hawley Jr. 
Under the lnfluence-(Second Offense)) Probation 
term: 2 years O months O days. (Misdemeanor 
Supervised) 
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Date: 10/29/2015 
Time: 11 :08 AM 
Page 3 of 4 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-MD-2013-000411 O Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Defendant: Townsend, Thomas N 
User: TCWEGEKE 
State of Idaho vs. Thomas N Townsend 
Date Code · User Judge 
12/10/2013 PLEA TCFINNDE A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (149-301 John Hawley Jr. 
Drivers License or Commercial Drivers License 
Violation) 
FIGT TCFINNDE Finding of Guilty (149-301 Drivers License or John Hawley Jr. 
Commercial Drivers License Violation) 
STAT TCFINNDE STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action John Hawley Jr. 
SNPF TCFINNDE Sentenced To Pay Fine 1197.50 charge: 118-8004 John Hawley Jr. 
{M}{2} Driving Under the lnfluence-(Second 
Offense) 
osoo TCFINNDE Other Sentencing Option Ordered: Alcohol John Hawley Jr. 
Evaluation within 90 days - follow 
recommendations 
osoo TCFINNDE Other Sentencing Option Ordered: Victims Panel John Hawley Jr. 
SNPF TCFINNDE Sentenced To Pay Fine 302.50 charge: 149-301 John Hawley Jr. 
Drivers License or Commercial Drivers License 
Violation 
TCFINNDE Supervised Misdemeanor Probation Order John Hawley Jr. 
STIP TCFINNDE Stipulation to Enter Condition Plea of Guilty John Hawley Jr. 
NDRS TCBROWJM Notice of Defendant's Responsibilities after John Hawley Jr. 
Sentencing 
12/12/2013 NOSP TCMORGAM Notification Of Subsequent Penalties*DUI* John Hawley Jr. 
APDC TCLANGAJ Appeal Filed In District Court John Hawley Jr. 
CAAP TCLANGAJ Case Appealed: John Hawley Jr. 
STAT TCLANGAJ STATUS CHANGED: Reopened John Hawley Jr. 
MOTN TCLANGAJ Motion for Stay of Execution of Sentence Pending John Hawley Jr. 
Appeal 
1/6/2014 HRSC · TCEDWAAM Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/07/2014 11 :45 Michael McLaughlin 
AM) Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence 
Pending Appeal 
NOTH TCEDWAAM Notice Of Hearing Michael McLaughlin 
1/7/2014 DCHH TCEDWAAM Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael McLaughlin 
01/07/2014 11 :45 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
ORDR TCEDWAAM Order of Release John Hawley Jr. 
1/27/2014 VPC TCLANGAJ Victim's Impact Panel Completed John Hawley Jr. 
2/11/2014 ORDR TCEDWAAM Order Staying Execution of Sentence Pending John Hawley Jr. 
Appeal 
6/18/2014 CHRE CCNELSRF Change Assigned Judge: Reassignment (should Michael McLaughlin 
have been done on 12/12/2013 When Notice of 
Appeal was filed) 
6/19/2014 NOPA TCOLSOMC Notice of Preparation of Appeal Transcript Michael McLaughlin 
6/24/2014 NOTR CCNELSRF Notice Of Reassignment Gerald Schroeder 
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Date: 10/29/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 11 :08 AM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 4 Case: CR-MD-2013-0004110 Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Defendant: Townsend, Thomas N 
State of Idaho vs. Thomas N Townsend 
Date Code User Judge 
7/21/2014 NOTC TCOLSOMC Notice of Lodging Appeal Transcript Gerald Schroeder 
7/31/2014 NOTC CCNELSRF Notice of Filing Transcripts Gerald Schroeder 
ORDR CCNELSRF Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
8/4/2014 MOTN TCCHRIKE Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule Gerald Schroeder 
8/20/2014 ORDR CCNELSRF Order Suspending Briefing Schedule Gerald Schroeder 
9/22/2014 BAAT PDPRECJR /' ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) Heidi M Johnson, 
8478 removed. PD HAWLEY #17 assigned. 
BAAT PDPRECJR AITORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) PD HAWLEY #17 
removed. Elizabeth H Estess, 5646 assigned. 
3/20/2015 ORDR· CCNELSRF Order Vacating Stay (Briefing Schedule) Gerald Schroeder 
ORDR CCNELSRF Amended Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
4/20/2015 BREF TCCHRIKE Appellant's Brief Gerald Schroeder 
5/13/2015 BREF TCWRIGSA Respondant's Brief Gerald Schroeder 
6/10/2015 HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
07/16/2015 02:30 PM) 
7/16/2015 CONT CCNELSRF Continued (Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
07/30/2015 03:00 PM) 
NOTH CCNELSRF Notice Of Hearing 07 /30/15 @ 3 pm Gerald Schroeder 
7/30/2015 DCHH CCSCOTDL Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
scheduled on 07/30/2015 03:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
8/27/2015 DEOP DCABBOSM Opinion on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
9/11/2015 NOTA TCOLSOMC NOTICE OF APPEAL Gerald Schroeder 
APSC TCOLSOMC Appealed To The Supreme Court Gerald Schroeder 
9/16/2015 BAAT PDVANVKE ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) Heidi M Johnson, 
8478 removed. PD SWAIN #4 assigned. 
BAAT PDVANVKE AITORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) PD SWAIN #4 
removed. Mark P Coonts, 7689 assigned. 
10/28/2015 NOTC TCWEGEKE Notice of Transcript of 22 Pages Lodged - Gerald Schroeder 
Supreme Court No. 43553 
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ADA COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S Ok .:E 
Contract cities of: 472355 
C Eagle D Star D Kuna · 
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Vio.#2 
Officer 
Code Section 
iJol~ R. 7 T tJ 
ADA County, Idaho. 
5=17,&. 
Serial #/Address 
ADA COUNTY 
SHERIFF 
Dept. 
/] 
NOTICE: See reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions. 
COURT COPY VIOLATION #1 ~~ ~ \ 1:J "'~ \ \ 0 
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. ' 
ADA COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
Contract cities of: 
.:::::J Eagle D Star D Kuna 
472356 
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS 
CD .,-,- vs. J / D Infraction Citation 
L1) ' J O WA 5.e.l\.q ) 00 Misde~~anor Citation 
M U1 Last Name ) D , N , I ) D Accident Involved 
t-- -~ ;1/LC(_) /V ) Commercial Vehicle Driven by Jhis Driver 
¢ First Name Middle Initial (,,,J J \'.,1\.1 way 0"'- .S-t'rt.1 ,€ 
IPUC # USDOT TK Census# ________ _ 
D Operator D Class A D Class B D Class C D Class D ~ Other ;r7 rJ 
D GVWR 26001 + D 16 }J Persons 
Home Address ('.) 1 O'\ D .:> e.. ~ 
Business Address 
THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICER (PARTY) HEREBY CERTIFIES AND SAYS: 
I cer nd believe the above-named Defendant, 
DL or SS# State i!ff Sex: M M D F 
Height Z: Wt. Hair Cz& Eyes JB DOB 
Veh. Lie.# /A U 2 / p/j State .;.::t;a Yr. of Vehicle ~ 'B' Make
Model S '-. U Color j / l-. 
Did commit the following act(s) on 20 / J 
r { , at 12!:t o'clock A M. ~ ~ Vio. #1 t CJ../ e. c1'Jet'-> t- 'lQA e. 4({"-Jo1r,) 
Code Section 
Vio. #2 
'"" 
Code Section 
~I- Location G /e(lw8o& /!:,-fife Ao,~!> e ;rz} 
'<) en ' ADA ' ~ !f Hwy. Mp. ___________ County, Idaho. 
LL 3/;cj {13 °C l)Je//e::, D7L ADA COUNTY SHERIFF 
Date W ~ .91 Officer/Party ~ C) 0 
0 Date= :;: ~ Witnessing Officer Serial #/Address Dept. 
· Serial #/Adaress Dept. 
~ W C"JTHE5fATE Of: IDAHOTOTHE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT: 
~ 1- 0 YOQ:f)re ht'sby summoned to appear before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court of the 
I Q ~ Distril:,U'.;our~ ADA County, BOIS,E , Idaho, 
r- locatSiat 200 . FRONT STREET on or after l..£ ,~ / 20 J...]_ 
Q) 
E 
ctl 
z 
!Jl 
c 
ctl 
'C 
C: 
2 
Q) 
0 
but on or before 20 i 3 ' between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. 
rse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions. 
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• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
PROBABLE CAUSE FORM 
STATE OF IDAHO 
vs. 
PROSECUTOR ______ l..A__>~ __ ...... /,A_j-=-e._-~_C_~_H _____ ~ 
COMPLAINING WITNESS __ /\_b_b,. ______ _ 
JUDGE 
D BIETER D MANWEILER 
D CAWTHON D McDANIEL 
D COMSTOCK D MINDER 
D DAY D OTHS 
D DENNARD D REARDON 
~ GARDUNIA Pl SCHMIDT 
D HANSEN D SWAIN 
D HARRIGFELD D WATKINS 
D MacGREGOR-IRBY 
D 
D 
COMMENTS 
PROBABLE CAUSE FORM 
CASE NO. _____ {Y/b ______ /_3_-_L.l,_I }_O __ _ 
CLERK~~-.!3-~------~ 
DATE _0_3..,,.v';'--::>--=8,,r<--~-/......;;3'---__ TIME __ _ 7 , 
TOXIMETER __________ _ 
CASE 10.bb..~1.'1.· f1/I tLlS BEG.f33'r5o 
--- - - -- -ENr,[5:ll_!J8J_. 
STATUS 
IE "51b,.~ SWORN 
-~ PCFOUND _________ _ 
0 COMPLAINT SIGNED 
0 AMENDED COMPLAINT SIGNED 
0 NO PC FOUND _____ -,--__ _ 
0 EXONERATE BOND 
0 SUMMONS TO BE ISSUED 
0 WARRANT ISSUED 
0 BONDSET$ ________ _ 
0 NO CONTACT 
D.R.# __________ __ 
0 DISMISS CASE 
0 IN CUSTODY 
[REV 8-2006] 
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IN THE DISTRICT cour-T OF THE FOURTH JUDI,' \L DISTRICT OF THE ,, 
, STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJI\JTY OF ADA. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NOTICE OF COURT DATE 
TOWNSEND THOMAS NELSON 
Defendant 
AND NO. 7(1,,() FILED 
BOND RE~IPT<tr' P.M ___ _ 
MAR 2 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you must appear before the Court c1J'rk~HE~;~;~DAMS 
between 08 April 2013 and 15 April 2013 excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays, 
/ from 09:00AM to 03:00PM at the: Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, 83702 
If you have been arrested for a Citation, This Notice of Court Date Supersedes any other Court 
Date for this case. If you have been given a date by the court you must keep those appearances, 
failing to do so will cause a warrant for arrest and forfeiture of bond. 
1You are further notified that if you fail to appear as specified herein, your bond 
will be forfeited and a Warrant of Arrest will be issued against you. 
BOND RECEIPT No: 897359 
Charge: 18-8004 {M} DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
Bond Amount: $ 
Case# 
500.00 
Bond# 
Bond Type: 
Warrant#: 
Agency: 
lnsu ance: 
Bo sman: 
Ad 
DN5-2800004 
Surety 
Aladdin/Anytime 
Danielson National Insurance Company 
MILLER ADAM 
80 N. Cole Rd 
Boise, ID 83704 
This is to certify that I have received a copy of this NOTICE TO APPEAR. 
I understand that I am being released on the conditions of posting bail and 
' my promise to appear in the court at the time, date, and place described in this notice .. 
DATED: 3/23/2013 
DEFENDANT 
Printed - Saturday, March 23, 2013 by: S04619 
\\countyb\DFSSHARE\INSTALLS\lnHouse\Crystal\Analyst4\Sheriff\SHF BondOutReceipt.rpt - Modified: 08/05/2011 
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FILED /~/ 
AM. P.M. -''--'J"*'~'--""'-'--
rv1or,day, April 01, 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY: LISA POSEY 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
) STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. ~ Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110 
) NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Thomas N Townsend 
409 Rose Lake Drive 
Middleton, ID 83644 l' Ada D Boise D Eagle D Garden City D Meridian ) iD SETTING CASE FOR HEARING · 
Defendant. ) 
---------------------
TO: Ada County Public Defender 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you are appointed to represent the defendant in this cause, or in the District Court 
until relieved by court order. The case is continued for: 
AC Pretrial Conference .... Wednesday, May 01, 2013 .... 10:15 AM 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
Jury Trial. ... Wednesday, May 29, 2013 .... 08:15 AM 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
BONDAMOUNT: ____ _ The Defendant is: D In Custody D Released on Bail D ROR 
TO: The above named defendant 
IT HAS BEEN ORDERED BY THIS COURT that the defendant is to contact the Ada County Public Defender's 
Office at 200 W. Front Street, Room 1107, Boise, Idaho 83702. Telephone: (208) 287-7400. If the defendant is unable to 
post bond and obtain his/her release from jail, that the proper authorities allow the defendant to make a phone call to the 
Ada County Public Defender. 
IT HAS BEEN FURTHER ORDERED: That the parties, prior to the pre-trial conference, complete and comply 
with Rule 16 1.C.R. and THAT THE DEFENDANT BE PERSONALLY PRESENT AT BOTH THE PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE AND/ OR THE JURY TRIAL: FAILURE TO APPEAR AT EITHER THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE OR 
THE JURY TRIAL WILL RESULT IN A BENCH WARRANT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST. 
I hereby certify that copies of this Notice w/ served as follows 
Defendant: Mailedlic Hand Delivered --1Signatur~~~~~~~~~~~~-
_______ 4-_\ ....... 1 Phone.t?f2eiz2l.2-... Z.b./f 
C er I date 
Prosecutor: Interdepartmental Mail ~ 
Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail + 
Cite Pay Website: https://www.citepayusa.com/payments 
Supreme Court Repository: https://www.idcourts.us 
NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENDER 
000011
., 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC ..... EFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant NO. FILED vf 200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 A.M. ____ _.--.M---J\r.----
Boise, Idaho 83702 ' 
APR O 4 2013 Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUD1an~fflErlfF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY vs. 
THOMAS N TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff, and to ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned, pursuant to ICR 16, requests discovery 
and photocopies of the following information, evidence, and materials: 
1) All unredacted material or information within the prosecutor's possession or 
control, or which thereafter comes into his possession or control, which tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or tends to reduce the punishment thereof. ICR 
16(a). 
2) Any ·unredacted, relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, 
or copies thereof, within' the possession, custody or control of the state, the 
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the 
exercise of due diligence; and also the substance of any relevant, oral statement 
made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer, 
prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney's agent; and the recorded 
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense 
charged. 
3) Any unredacted, written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the 
substance of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before 
or. after arrest in response to interrogation by any person known by the co-
defendant to be a peace office or agent of the prosecuting attorney. 
4) Any prior criminal record of the defendant and co-defendant, if any. 
5) All unredacted documents and tangible objects as defined by ICR 16(b)(4) in the 
possession or control of the prosecutor, which are material to the defense, 
intended for use by the prosecutor or obtained from or belonging to the defendant 
or co-defendant. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY, Page 1 
000012
\" .. ,. 
6) AP reports ot ~physical or mental examinations anu of scientific tests or 
experiments within the possession, control, or knowledge of the prosecutor, the 
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecutor by the exercise of 
due diligence. 
. 7) A written list of the names, addresses, records of prior felony convictions, and 
written or recorded statements of all persons having knowledge of facts of the 
case known to the prosecutor and his agents or any official involved in the 
investigatory process of the case. 
8) A written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce 
pursuant to rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or 
hearing; including the witness' opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and 
the witness' qualifications. 
9) All reports or memoranda made by police officers or investigators in connection 
with the investigation or prosecution of the case, including what are commonly 
referred to as "ticket notes." 
I 0) Any writing or object that may be used to refresh the memory of all persons who 
may be called as witnesses, pursuant to IRE 612. 
11) Any and all audio and/or video recordings made by law enforcement officials 
during the course of their investigation. 
12) Any evidence, documents, or witnesses that the state discovers or could discover 
with due diligence after complying with this request. 
The undersigned further requests written compliance within 14 days of service of the 
within instrument. 
DATED, Thursday, April 04, 2013. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on Thursday, April 04, 2013, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
Counsel for the State of Idaho 
by placing said same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY, Page 2 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Robert M. Bleazard 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Magistrate Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
NO.------.:iF1iLi:'~oo -~z-;,7-
A.M.----P,.M-__s.---
APR 1 7 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, ~!erk 
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN 
DEPUTY 
, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Thomas Nelson Townsend, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
Case No. CRMD20130004110 
STATE'S DISCOVERY 
RESPONSE TO COURT 
COMES NOW, Robert M. Bleazard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County 
of Ada, State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has complied with the Defendant's 
Request for Discovery. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1-=t day of April 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Robert M. Bleazard 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT Thomas Nelson Townsend CRMD20130004110 
Page 1 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Robert M. Bleazard 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Magistrate Division 
200 W. Front Street, Room 366 
Boise, Id. 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
NO.-----:;:Fl;;"i;Ll:;:;-0 -7e---A.M., ____ .M-__;;----
APR 1 7 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA CHRIS'l"ENSEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Thomas Nelson Townsend, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT: 
Case No. CRMD20130004110 
STATE'S REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal 
Rules, requests Discovery and inspection of the following: 
(1) Documents and Tangible Objects: 
Request is hereby made by the prosecution to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, 
documents, photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which are within the 
possession, custody or control of the defendant, and which the defendant intends to introduce in 
evidence at trial. 
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(2) Reports of Examinations and Tests: 
The prosecution hereby requests the defendant to pennit the State to inspect and copy or 
photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or 
experiments made in connection with this case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control 
of the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were 
prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports 
relate to testimony of the witness. 
(3) Defense Witnesses: 
The prosecution requests the defendant to furnish the State with a list of names and 
addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial. 
(4) Expert Witnesses: 
The prosecution requests the defendant to provide a written summary or report of any 
testimony that the defense intends to introduce pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c)(4), including 
the facts and data supporting the opinion and the witness's qualifications. 
(5) Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-519, the State hereby requests that the defendant 
state in writing within ten (10) days any specific place or places at which the defendant claims to 
have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon 
whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi. 
DATED this __ 19-_day of April 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '(l day of April 2013, I caused to be served, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document to: Nicole Owens, Ada County Public Defender, 
200 West Front St., Ste 1107, Boise, ID 83702, by the method indicated below: 
NOTIFIED AVAILABLE FOR PICK UP 
__ U.S. MAIL (Postage Prepaid) 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
--
x HAND DELIVERY 
---
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NO·---~ii'in---,~1-/-/_ 
AM., ____ Fl...r'Ll~ •• t __ ---;Vilf..-=-
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
APR 2 5_ 2013 
1 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN 
DEPUTY 
...... 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS N TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________ ) 
Criminal No. CR-MD-2013-4110 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM 
The above-named defendant, Thomas N Townsend, by and through his Attorney of 
Record, the Ada County Public Defender's Office, Nicole Owens, handling attorney, hereby 
moves this Honorable Court for the suppression and exclusion of all evidence, physical and 
testimonial, obtained or derived from, through, or as a result of law enforcement's unlawful 
detention, search, seizure, interrogation, and arrest of Mr. Townsend that occurred on or about 
March 23, 2013. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, Page 1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On March 23, 2013, at approximately 0134 hours, Mr. Townsend was making au-tum on 
State Street. Accordi11:g to the report of Officer Bill Weires, Mr. Townsend drove on the raised 
median that divided the east and westbound traffic. Officer Weires activated his overhead lights 
and Mr. Townsend pulled over into the Walmart parking lot. The officer requested that Mr. 
Townsend submit to field sobriety tests. According to the officers, Mr. Townsend submitted to 
the tests, and failed each of them. Mr. Townsend was then placed under arrest for suspicion of 
Driving Under the Influence. Mr. Townsend refused the breath test. When advised that the 
officers were going to take a blood draw, Mr. Townsend refused to allow the draw. Officers 
used force to allow Ada County paramedic Supervisor C. Wolf to take Mr. Townsend's blood. 
This blood draw was conducted without a warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
A search without a warrant is presumptively invalid, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 437 
U.S. 385,390 (1978), and a "warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within 
a recognized exception" to the warrant requirement, Missouri v. McNeely, -- S. Ct.--, 2013 WL 
1628934, at *5 (Apr. 17, 2013). "That principle applies to the type of search at issue in this case, 
which involved a compelled physical intrusion beneath [Mr. Townsend's] skin and into his veins 
to obtain a sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation." Id. Indeed, such 
an "invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual's 'most personal and deep-rooted 
1 The "facts" recited herein are derived from the police reports and other discovery that to date 
has been disclosed to Mr. Townsend by the State. Mr. Townsend in no way concedes that these 
"facts" are accurate or true, and recites them solely for the purpose of providing background for 
this motion to suppress. Moreover, additional grounds for suppression may become clear as Mr. 
Townsend receives additional discovery from the State. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, Page 2 
000019
expectations of privacy."' Id. (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)). 
Exigent circumstances is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and is 
presumably the exception on which the State relied in conducting the forced blood draw.2 
Exigent circumstances exist "when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law 
enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable," Id. (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). To determine whether an exigency exists justifying acting without a 
warrant, courts are to look to the totality of the circumstances, evaluating "each case of alleged 
exigency.based on its own facts and circumstances." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Although destruction of evidence is a well-recognized exigent circumstance that may 
support a warrantless search, as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in McNeely, "[t]he context 
of blood testing is different in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which 
the police are truly confronted with a 'now or never' situation." Id. at *8 First, "BAC [Blood 
Alcohol Content] evidence from a drunk-driving suspect naturally dissipates over time in a 
gradual and relatively predictable manner." Id. Second, because of the nature of DUI 
investigations, "some delay between the time of the arrest . . . and the time of the test is 
inevitable regardless of whether police officers are required to obtain a warrant." Id. Third, 
advances in technology and the streamlining of warrant procedures have led to more expeditious 
2 To the extent the State relied on Idaho's implied consent law to conduct the warrantless forced 
blood draw, such reliance is misplaced and does not justify the warrantless search. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized in McNeely, "all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that 
require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC 
testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense." 
McNeely, 2013 WL 1628934, at *12 (citation omitted). Further, in the McNeely case itself, the 
defendant was read the standard implied consent form, and was informed that a refusal to submit 
voluntarily to the test would result in the "immediate revocation of his driver's license for one 
year and could be used against him in a future prosecution." Id. at *3. Despite the implied 
consent law, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless blood draw violated the defendant's 
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment. See 
id. at *14. 
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" ' 
processing of warrant applications. See id. at *8-9. 
Thus, although "natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of 
exigency in a specific case, ... it does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test 
of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of 
the circumstances." Id. at *9. 
Here, as the officers' reports make clear, Mr. Townsend objected to and denied 
permission for a blood draw. Despite the clear lack of consent for the blood draw, the officers 
forcibly drew Mr. Townsend's blood. There is no indication that the officers sought to obtain a 
warrant before forcibly drawing Mr. Townsend's blood, or that there was anything that would 
have prevented them from doing so within a reasonable amount of time. There was, in sum, no 
exigency in this case justifying the warrantless blood draw. Accordingly, the forced physical 
intrusion beneath Mr. Townsend's skin and into his veins to obtain a sample of his blood for use 
as evidence in a criminal investigation violated Mr. Townsend's rights to be free from an 
unreasonable search protected by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, 
§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. See McNeely, 2013 WL 1628934, at *14 (Apr. 17, 2013) 
(warrantless blood test of drunk-driving suspect unreasonable without showing of exigent 
circumstances, and natural dissipation of alcohol, without more, insufficient to justify 
warrantless blood test). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Townsend's right to be free from unre8:sonable searches and seizures protected by the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution were 
violated by the warrantless and unlawful search of Mr. Townsend. All evidence, physical and 
testimonial, obtained or derived from, through, or as a result of law enforcement's unlawful 
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search of Mr. Townsend must therefore be suppressed and excluded. 
DATED this .2:!:L. day of April, 2013. 
Nicole Owens 
Deputy Ada County Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this~ day of April 2013, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the: ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail and by facsimile. 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Robert M. Bleazard 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
FIL§o P.M. ___ _ 
APR 3 0 2013 
' . 
CHRISTOt'HER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN 
DEPUTY 
Magistrate Division, 200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Thomas Townsend, 
Defendant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CRMD20130004110 
STATE'S ADDENDUM TO 
DISCOVERY RESPONSE 
TO COURT 
________________ ) 
Comes now, Robert M. Bleazard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Ada County, 
State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has submitted an Addendum to Response to 
Discovery. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _3?2_ day of April 2013. 
CRMD20130004110 (Thomas Townsend) 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Wkobert M. Bleazard 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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,~v. _ __,,CX),-----,F.,...IL=ED ___ _ A.M.lD~ P.M. ___ _ 
MAY O 1 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DJ.~~iJ 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY tff!' !PHER D. RICH, Clerk 
, IRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) M_.AGISTRA TE MINUTES / NOTICE OF HEARING 
) ~L MEMORANDUM 
) Plaintiff, 
~ Case Number: N\J:> - \?z? - H:\tb 
vs. ffirrro 0$ hn~d ~ 
--------------- ~ Judge: -lr--li--"'-"""-+1,""'°""+-- Clerk: ---D-..... E---___ _ ) 
---------------) Case Called: __________ ~ Chambers 
Defendant. ) ..-,::.-, ~ 
_______________ ) D Interpreter:----------------
~c o BC o EA o GC o MC __.1)_1+-~-----------'~ Private _.N-· ...... rn ..... ~~....__ _____ _ 
Defendan~nt D Not Present D In Custody D PD Appointed D PD Denied D Waived Attorney 
D Defendant failed to appear. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued. Bond $ _______ _ 
c£! AElviseEI ef Rights ~ot Guilty D Guilty Plea / PV Admit D Written Guilty Plea D No Contact Order 
D Bond $_______ D Pre-Trial Release Order D Provide _________ Evaluation 
L c) £\ea ~. 'DsRd \f\eAlf,,ne. 
------------------------ D Release Defendant, This Case Only 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
D Sentencing on _____________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge _______ _ 
D Court Trial Conference on _________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge _______ _ 
D Pre-Trial/ Jury Trial on at am/pm w/ Judge _______ _ 
cJlf )1\D}lDf\ on,2)11:1)£,ZiJ ZDJ3at 3:.;0 a~/Judge .-\:,tlv)):04 
D Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telephone (208)287-7'.oo. 
You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest, 
or default judgment may be entered if you are charged with an infraction. 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT ST., BOISE, ID 83702 
I hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Hand Delivered D Via Counsel D 
Defense Atty: Hand Deliverea,( 
Prosecutor: Hand Delivered D 
RISTOPHER D RICH, Clerk of the District Court 
l.. 
MAGISTRATE MINUTES [REV 11-2012] 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Robert M. Bleazard 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Magistrate Division, 200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
FILED NO. tc} A.M._.._.. __ P.M ___ _ 
MAY - 7 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. ~ICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE TONG 
O!!PUT'I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Thomas Townsend, 
Defendant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CRMD20130004110 
STATE'S SECOND 
ADDENDUM TO 
DISCOVERY RESPONSE 
TO COURT 
________________ ) 
Comes now, Robert M. Bleazard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Ada County, 
State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has submitted an Addendum to Response to 
Discovery. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _.1tJ. day of May 2013. 
CRMD20130004110 (Thomas Townsend) 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Robert M. Bleazard 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kale Gans 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
NO.-
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A.M-------
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D RICH Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS NELSON TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
.!~ Case No. CR-MD-2013-004)1'1u 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS AND BRIEF IN 
RESPONSE 
The defense moves to suppress the blood draw in this case citing Missouri v. McNeely, 
569 U.S. _; 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). The State objects, and offers the following brief in 
support of that objection. 
Factual and Procedural Background ·. 
On March 23, 2013, at approximately 01:34 a.m., Deputy Bill Weires observed the 
Defendant, Thomas Townsend, drive a silver Chevrolet Silverado to a stop in the westbound turn 
lane on West State Street. Ada Cnty. Sheriff's Office Probable Cause Alf, p. 2 (Exhibit #1). The 
truck was stopped on top of the lane's stop lines. See id. When the traffic signal turned green, the 
Defendant turned into the oncoming traffic lane on State Street, and proceeded to drive 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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westbound in the eastbound lane. Id Deputy Weires activated his overhead lights, and the 
Defendant turned into a nearby parking lot and came to a stop. 
The deputy approached the vehicle which contained the Defendant and two passengers. 
Ada Cnty. Sheriff's Office Narrative Report, p.1 (Exhibit #2). The deputy noticed a strong odor 
of alcohol coming from the Defendant, observed that the Defendant had red, watery, and glassy 
eyes, and. noted that he spoke with slurred speech. Ada Cnty. Sheriff's Office Probable Cause 
Aff., p. 2 (Exhibit #1). The Defendant also admitted to drinking prior to driving-first conceding 
that he drank four beers that night, and later revising that number to seven. Ada Cnty. Sheriff's 
Office Narrative Report, p. 1-2 (Exhibit #2). After speaking with the Defendant, the deputy 
requested another officer be sent to his location so he could perform a DUI investigation. Id. 
Upon Deputy Lakey's arrival, Deputy Weires performed the standardized field sobriety tests 
(SFSTs). Id The Defendant failed all three SFSTs. 
Following the failure of the SFSTs, the Defendant was arrested for DUI and placed in the 
back of Deputy Weires's patrol car. Id at 2. The deputy then attempted to perform a breath test. 
Id After the Defendant blew a quick and insufficient sample, the deputy explained to the 
Defendant the proper method of conducting the test. Id The Defendant then pretended to blow 
into the breathalyzer, and pretended to do so again. Id at 3. Finally, the Defendant refused to 
comply with the breath test and told Deputy Weires that he would "have to take his blood." Id at 
3. The deputy transported the Defendant to the Ada County Jail where he observed an Ada 
County paramedic supervisor draw the Defendant's blood without incident at approximately 
03 :00 a.m. Id The blood sample was then taken to Idaho State Police Forensic Services where 
Rachel Cutler, Forensic Scientist II, provided her opinions and interpretations of the analysis of 
the Defendant's blood in a report dated April 15, 2013. Idaho State Police Forensic Services, 
Laboratory Results (Exhibit #3). The Defendant's blood alcohol content result was 0.154. Id 
The Defendant filed a motion to suppress on April 24, 2013. The State now objects. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Drawing blood from a driver in a driving under the influence case is a seizure. It is 
settled that to do so, the State must either have a warrant, or the facts surrounding a blood draw 
must fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. As put by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and a 
search for evidence within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
2 
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States Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 
1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 908,917 (1966); State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470,472, 65 
P.3d 211, 213 (Ct.App.2002). Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant 
are presumptively unreasonable. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, 16 
L.Ed.2d at 919; State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 488, 680 P.2d 1383, 1388 
(Ct.App.1984). To overcome the presumption, the state bears the burden of 
establishing two prerequisites. First, the state must prove that a warrantless search 
fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). Second, the state must show that 
even if the search is permissible under an exception to the warrant requirement, it 
must still be reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding circumstances. Id. 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711-12, 184 P.3d 215, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2008). 
But there are a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. For example, "[s]uch an 
exception exists when the search or seizure is conducted with proper consent. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 
261, 264, 858 P.2d 800, 803 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 558, 560, 716 P.2d 
1328, 1330, 1332 (Ct.App.1986)." State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,410,973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct. 
App. 1999). Furthermore, the presence of exigent circumstances in another well-established 
exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208, 
1211 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The State submits that both of these exceptions apply in these circumstances. 
CONSENT 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Wheeler, 149 
Idaho 364, 370, 233 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Ct.App.2010) (citing Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 
742)). Idaho drivers, by driving on the public roadways, consent to evidentiary testing pursuant 
to I.C. § 18-8002 as follows: 
By terms of this statute, anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor 
vehicle upon Idaho's highways has thereby consented in advance to submit to a 
BAC test. McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 187, 804 P.2d 911, 916 
(Ct.App.1990). By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a driver to 
refuse an evidentiary test. Goerig v. State, 121 Idaho 26, 29, 822 P.2d 545, 548 
(Ct.App.1992). Hence, although an individual has the physical ability to prevent a 
test, there is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent. Woolery, 
116 Idaho at 372, 775 P.2d at 1214; State v. Burris, 125 Idaho 289,291, 869 P.2d 
1384, 1386 (Ct.App.1994). 
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State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,410,973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct. App. 1999). 
In light of this, in Diaz, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the blood draw at issue in the 
case "fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement," because Diaz had 
impliedly consented to the testing. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). 
Having found that an exception to the warrant requirement existed, the Court went on to perform 
the second step in the analysis: reviewing whether the search was "reasonable" in light of the 
circumstances. Id To do so, the Court considered whether the blood draw was done in a 
"medically acceptable manner," and whether it was done without unreasonable force. Id After 
noting that the test was administered by a qualified technician, that Diaz failed to perform a 
breath test, and that Diaz was not "manhandled" while transported to the test, the Court 
concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, the test was reasonable. Id,· see also State 
v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 65 P.3d 211 (Ct.App. 2002). 
Here, Mr. Townsend impliedly consented to the blood draw by driving on Idaho's public 
roadways, and further, the blood draw was reasonable under the circumstances: his blood was 
drawn by a trained professional in a medically acceptable manner, was done without 
unreasonable force. The Defendant argues that there was a "clear lack of consent" for the blood 
draw, but this contention misses the mark; while the Defendant may not have expressly 
consented to the blood draw, he impliedly consented by driving-and the Defendant makes no 
argument refuting his implied consent. Likewise, the Defendant does not claim, nor does the 
evidence indicate, that the Defendant ever revoked this implied consent. To the contrary, Deputy 
Weires's report states that the Defendant expressly requested a blood draw-the Deputy quotes 
Mr. Townsend as saying that the Deputy "would have to take [Townsend's] blood." Ada Cnty. 
Sheriff's Office Narrative Report, p. 1-2 (Exhibit #2). Thus, consent was given, both impliedly 
and expressly. 
Idaho's case law reaffirms this. As the Idaho Court of Appeals found in State v. Wheeler: 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 
Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. "Any person who drives or is in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle" in Idaho consents to be tested for alcohol at the 
request of a peace officer with reasonable grounds to believe the person drove 
under the influence. LC. § 18-8002(1); Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. 
In Diaz, the Court found that the defendant gave his consent to a blood draw by 
driving in Idaho, despite his repeated protests. Id at 302-03, 160 P.3d at 741-42. 
4 
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In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Diaz, we conclude that a protest to a 
blood draw does not invalidate consent created by a person's actions and statute. 
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 370, 233 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Ct. App. 2010). Thus, any potential 
protests to the blood draw in the current case would not invalidate the consent. And as 
mentioned, Deputy Weires's Narrative Report suggests that the Defendant did not protest the 
blood draw, but expressly encouraged it. But whether the Defendant protested the blood draw or 
not, implied consent by its very definition does not require an express showing of consent; it 
only requires that a defendant drive on Idaho's public roads. Indeed, any such driver takes 
advantage of the privilege of driving on the public roadways prior to being stopped-and having 
received the benefit of the bargain of implied consent, the driver may not simply claim that he 
revoked that consent absent some factual showing. 
The Defendant points to Missouri v. McNeely as the basis for his motion to suppress, but 
this would not affect the implied consent issue at hand. There, the Supreme Court identified the 
sole issue as, "whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se 
exigency that justifies an exception the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for 
nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 
_, __ ; 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013). Whatever bearing this narrow holding has on an 
exigent circumstances discussion, by its terms it does not implicate the issue of consent. 
There may be some argument that because the Supreme Court identified certain states as 
having implied consent laws with certain restrictions, the Court thereby endorsed those 
restrictions. However, the existence of implied consent laws at the state level was simply used 
by the Supreme Court to illustrate certain findings: 
[W]ide-spread state restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing provide further support 
for our recognition that compelled blood draws implicate a significant privacy interest. 
They also strongly suggest that our ruling today will not "severely hamper effective law 
enforcement." Garner, 471 U.S., at 19, 105 S.Ct. 1694. 
McNeely, 569 U.S._, __ ; 133 S. Ct. at 1567. Noting these statutes, for illustrative purposes, 
does not amount to a binding opinion of the Court on the restrictions listed in those various 
statutes. And while Missouri does have an implied consent statute, the Supreme Court did not 
examine that statute as a possible exception to the warrant requirement in this case. Further, 
Missouri's implied consent law has not historically provided for forced tests. Due to a recent 
statutory change, the question of whether it does now is a matter yet to be decided in the 
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Missouri courts. (See Missouri v. McNeely, 2011 WL 2455571 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 
2011).) In sum, the McNeely decision did not comment on the validity of implied consent laws 
in general. And accordingly, the dicta in McNeely does not change the status of the implied 
consent law in Idaho. 
The blood draw here was taken from a driver who was driving on Idaho's public 
roadways. Further, it was taken in a medically acceptable manner, without unnecessary force, 
and was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Consequently, the blood draw was 
done with the Defendant's implied consent, and was properly excepted from the warrant 
requirement. 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the presence of exigent 
circumstances. 
"[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person 
unless 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment." Brigham City, 547 U.S. at--, 126 S.Ct. at 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d at 
657 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 
L.Ed.2d 290, 301 (1978)). A warrantless search under this exception must be 
strictly circumscribed by the nature of the exigency that justifies the intrusion. 
State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807, 810 (Ct.App.2002). 
State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct. App. 2007). Exigent 
circumstances may justify warrantless search of the body through a blood draw. See Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). Recently, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the elimination of alcohol does not by itself create a per se rule of 
exigency in DUI cases. McNeely, 569 U.S._, __ ; 133 S. Ct. 1552. In so deciding, the Court 
reaffirmed its prior holdings that a totality of the circumstances analysis must be done in each 
case. Id. Consequently, "consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles, [] exigency in 
[the DUI] context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." 
Id. 
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless blood draw of the Defendant. It should first be noted that the Supreme Court opinion 
in McNeely is premised on the idea that blood alcohol is not a "now or never" proposition, 
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because the rate of alcohol elimination can be determined within a reasonable range. Id. The 
Supreme Court assumes that retrograde extrapolation is available to the State. 1 In other words, 
the majority opinion presumes that so long as some alcohol is in the defendant's system when the 
test is administered, there is a formulaic method by which the actual blood alcohol concentration 
at the time the defendant was driving can be determined. It is largely based on this premise that 
the Supreme Court concludes that "special facts" in addition to inevitable elimination of alcohol 
must be necessary to create an exigency. See id. 
However, in the State ofldaho, retrograde extrapolation is not permitted. In the event that 
an evidentiary test for blood alcohol reveals a result that is under .08, even if it is substantially 
after the defendant last drove, that person generally cannot be prosecuted.2 Idaho Code § 18-
8004(2) provides that, "[a]ny person having an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08, as 
defined in subsection ( 4) of this section, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, by a 
test requested by a police officer shall not be prosecuted for driving under the influence of 
alcohol except as provided in subsection (3) [drug DUI], subsection (l)(b) [commercial vehicle 
DUI]or subsection (l)(d) [underage DUI] of this section." The net effect is that in Idaho, passage 
of time does more than just destroy evidence-the cause of action itself erodes away with each 
minute. Thus, the very laws of the State of Idaho necessitate a much quicker process than that 
contemplated by the McNeely Court, and constitute just one of the "special facts" supporting a 
finding of exigency. 
Beyond the peculiarity of Idaho's statutes, particular features of this traffic stop further 
contribute to the exigent totality of the circumstances here. Deputy Weires had to contend not 
only with the Defendant, but with two passengers as well. He further had to wait for another 
officer to arrive on scene before administering the SFSTs. The Defendant's own conduct added 
to the delay, and the exigency: he failed to properly take the breath test, falsely acted like he was 
blowing into the breathalyzer, falsely so acted again, and finally refused to perform the test 
altogether, thus significantly delaying the deputy. Beyond this, the Defendant was driving 
1 This ignores the fact that intoxicants other than alcohol may be at issue as well. 
2 There is an exception for cases where the defendant fails to provide a valid sample on a breath test. "A shallow 
breath sample testing at below .08 does not inherently show that the individual's true breath alcohol concentration is 
less than .08. Consequently, it does not ipso facto bar prosecution by the terms of Section 18-8004(2)." 
State v. Turbyfill, 38579, 2012 WL 4465773 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012), review denied (Nov. 29, 2012). 
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erratically, and actually admitted to drinking seven beers before doing so. This is in stark 
contrast to the situation in McNeely, which the Court described as "unquestionably a routine 
DWI case" with "no factors" suggesting an emergency. McNeely, 569 U.S._, __ ; 133 S. Ct. 
at 1557. Here, the Defendant admitted to drinking, showed signs of intoxication, and was driving 
the wrong way on State Street, in a car with passengers, until the Deputy's intervention-hardly 
a "routine" traffic stop. 
The Deputy's Narrative Report further reflects that it was approximately 86 minutes 
from the time of the traffic stop to the time the defendant arrived at the jail, where the blood 
sample was eventually taken. During that time, alcohol was being eliminated from his system at 
a rate .estimated by the Supreme Court as .015 to .02 percent per hour. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 
__ ; 133 S. Ct. at 1575. Because of the wait for another officer, and then the Defendant's own 
failure to properly perform the breath test, the roadside portion of the investigation and transport 
took 86 minutes. Even assuming a more conservative reduction rate of .015 per hour, some 
hypothetical calculations show the exigency at hand here: Were one to factor in any additional 
time for obtaining a warrant, then a defendant who was driving well over the legal limit at .101 
would present at jail at much less than .08; in fact, those 86 minutes would bring that defendant 
to .795. And this would then bar prosecution in a case where the driver was per se in violation of 
the law at the time of the crime. In light of these circumstances, Deputy Weires correctly 
perceived that there was insufficient time to obtain a warrant, and that the circumstances 
necessarily were exigent. 
In addition, we know that law enforcement in Ada County booked 20 people into the Ada 
County Jail on the night Mr. Townsend was driving under the influence. Aff. of Cecily Willerton, 
p 1. Those arrests resulted in 9 driving under the influence charges; 45% of the total bookings 
that night. Id. Further, obtaining a warrant in t}J.ese cases, at that time, would take 1.5 hours to 
4.5 hours per case. Aff. of Joe Andreoli, p. 2. Accordingly, law enforcement would likely have 
been forced to spend between 13.5 to 40.5 additional man hours processing the same number of 
DUI cases that night. Such a number of hours of law enforcement's time is significant and could 
impact the availability of law enforcement to protect the community on a whole. Further, there 
is only one Judge on-call in Ada County at any given time. Aff. of Detective Joe Andreoli, p. 3. 
Thus a single magistrate could have to review, consider, and issue numerous warrants in a single 
night. This could considerably slow down the process even further. Consequently, the number of 
8 
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driving under the influence arrests on the night of March 22 significantly adds to the exigency in 
Townsend's case. 
It bears mentioning that the State is also in the untenable position of have an ethical 
obligation to preserve evidence that could be exculpatory while that evidence is in the body of an 
adversarial party. The State accordingly must avail itself of every opportunity to take a sample of 
the evidence for the benefit of accurate testing, regardless of which party the outcome benefits. 
Taking the totality of the circumstances here into consideration-the delays caused by the 
Defendant, the non-routine characteristics of the stop, and the demands upon law enforcement on 
that particular evening-the situation was more than exigent enough that the warrantless search 
was proper under the Fourth Amendment. 
REMEDY 
Even if the Court finds that there is no exception to the warrant requirement here, the 
State alternatively submits that the defendant is not deserving of a remedy. The Defendant 
registered 0.154 blood alcohol content at the time his blood was drawn, and by driving with such 
a significant blood alcohol level, he placed the general public at significant risk. Deputy Weires 
acted in good faith and in reliance on LC. § 18-8002, Diaz, and Wheeler, when he made the 
decision to have the Defendant's blood drawn. The public interest justifies admission of the 
results. 
If Deputy Weires had understood there to be a warrant requirement and had availed 
himself of that process, the defendant's blood alcohol was sufficient that he would have still been 
over the legal limit almost five hours after the traffic stop. Therefore, had the deputy understood 
a warrant to be necessary, the defendant's blood alcohol would still have been sufficient to 
pursue charges in this particular case. We thus ask the Court to consider whether there is a 
parallel between this case and the inevitable discovery doctrine in this regard: 
The Supreme Court's decision in Nix did not turn upon the fact that the search 
which would have led to discovery of the victim's body was completely 
independent of the unconstitutional interrogation. The Court reasoned that 
society's interests in deterring illegal police conduct and in having juries receive 
all probative evidence of a crime are best balanced by applying the exclusionary 
rule to put the government in the same, not a worse, position than it would have 
experienced absent the police misconduct. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44, 104 S.Ct. at 
2508-09, 81 L.Ed.2d at 386-87. This balancing of interests is at the heart of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine. It would not be advanced by a rule disallowing 
evidence solely because the alternate investigation was not entirely unrelated to 
9 
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the illegal one. Therefore, in our view, the inquiry should concentrate upon the 
inevitability of the discovery rather than the independence of the investigation. 
See Whitehorn, 829 F.2d at 1231 ("So long as it is clear that such evidence would 
inevitably have been discovered by lawful means, suppression is inappropriate.") 
Independence is strong evidence of inevitability, but is not always necessary in 
order to demonstrate the ineluctability of the discovery. We therefore hold that a 
wholly independent investigation, while certainly relevant to whether discovery 
was inevitable, is not a prerequisite to application of the inevitable discovery 
exception 
State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 102, 57 P.3d 807, 813 (Ct. App. 2002). Here, there was no 
police misconduct at all, and the discovery of the evidence likely would have been inevitable; 
thus, the weighing described in Buterbaugh tips in favor of admitting the evidence. 
The State submits that the exclusionary rule is not the proper remedy in this case. Rather, 
as the Supreme Court has stated: 
The exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal 
searches and seizures. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 
620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). As such, the rule does not "proscribe the introduction 
of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons," Stone v. 
Powell, supra, at 486, 96 S.Ct., at 3049, but applies only in contexts "where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served," United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 
433, 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3032, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) ("If ... the exclusionary 
rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant 
situation is unwarranted"). Moreover, because the rule is prudential rather than 
constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its 
deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs." United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S., at 907, 104 S.Ct., at 3412. 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019, 141 L. 
Ed. 2d 344 (1998). 
The exclusionary rule's sole purpose is to deter future Fourth Amendment 
violations, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 
L.Ed.2d 496, and its operation is limited to situations in which this purpose is 
"thought most efficaciously served," United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 
348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561. For exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence 
benefits of suppression must outweigh the rule's heavy costs. Under a line of 
cases beginning with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 
L.Ed.2d 677, the result of this cost-benefit analysis turns on the "flagrancy of the 
police misconduct" at issue. Id., at 909, 911, 104 S.Ct. 3405. When the police 
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exhibit "deliberate," "reckless," or "grossly negligent" disregard for Fourth 
Amendment rights, the benefits of exclusion tend to outweigh the costs. Herring, 
supra, at 144, 129 S.Ct. 695. But when the police act with an objectively 
reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct 
involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrent value of suppression is 
diminished, and exclusion cannot "pay its way." See Leon, supra, at 909, 919, 
908, n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 3405; Herring, supra, at 137, 129 S.Ct. 695. Pp. 2426-2428. 
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2422, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011). The State recognizes 
that the Idaho Supreme Court has declined to apply the Leon good faith exception to Idaho. State 
v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d 483 (2012). However, Deputy Weires acted within well-
authorized and common practices of the State, which had been explicitly authorized by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, Idaho Court of Appeals, and the Idaho State Legislature. Therefore, to now 
punish the officer and the public· by suppressing the evidence is not a proper application of the 
exclusionary rule. The State therefore submits that the exclusionary rule is not a proper remedy 
in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The State contends that the Court's inquiry need go no further than the implied consent 
statute. Mr. Townsend, by driving on the public roadways, consented to evidentiary testing. That 
testing was done in a medically sound manner, without unneeded force, and the results of the 
blood draw should therefore be admitted. Further, the blood draw results would also be 
admissible due to the exigent circumstances surrounding this investigation-that is, the factual 
and legal characteristics of this case created an exigency for the officer. In particular, delays 
caused by the Defendant, the dangerousness of his driving, and his admissions of drinking, all 
distinguish this incident from the "routine" traffic stop in McNeely. Moreover, because 
retrograde extrapolation is not available to the State, evidence showing the Defendant was above 
the legal limit of blood alcohol was dissipating as time passed. To get a warrant would require 
additional time, in which blood alcohol would be eliminated; the State could consequently be 
barred from prosecution if the driver fell below a .08 before the administration of the test. Thus, 
given the totality of the circumstances, the situation fell within the exigency exception to the 
warrant requirement as well. 
In the event that the Court finds that neither of these exceptions to the warrant 
requirement are satisfied, the State submits that the blood draw results should still be seen as 
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admissible. To rule otherwise is to invite a manifest injustice. This event and countless others 
like it involve a driver putting the public at great risk and an officer responding with the explicit 
authorization of the Courts and the legislature. Not only did the officer have good faith, the 
public policy and community protection interests at issue lean heavily in favor of admitting the 
evidence. The exclusionary rule does not require exclusion in these circumstances, where the 
officer was acting under the well-settled law of the State at the time he had the Defendant's 
blood drawn. 
DATEDthis ,~-P, dayofJune2013. 
GREG.BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
By: Kale D. Gans 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on then day of June 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to: Nicole Owens, Ada County Public Defender, by the 
method indicated below: 
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__ U.S. MAIL (Postage Prepaid) 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
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I , DR# 2013-94190 
I• 
IN THE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TOWNSEND, THOMAS N 
Defendant. 
DOB 
SSN 
DL# STATE 
State of Idaho ) 
ss. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ID ) 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF ARREST AND/OR 
REFUSAL TO TAKE TEST 
I, WEIRES, BILL , the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that: 
1. I am a peace officer employed by the Ada County. 
2. The defendant was arrested on 3/23/2013 at 1:54 AM hours for the crimes of: 
I. DUI 
3. Location of Occurrence: W STATE ST/ N GLENWOOD , Boise, Ada County, Idaho .. 
ST 
4. Identified the defendant as TOWNSEND, THOMAS N , by: 
------------'-----------
D State ID Card D Driver1s License 0 Verbal by defendant 0 Other INTERNATIONAL 
DRIVING 
PERMIT 
Witness identified defendant. 
5. The crime(s) was committed in my presence. D Yes 0 No If no, information was supplied to me by: 
(witness) 
VEIDCLE INFO: Color SIL Year 1998 Make CHEV 
Model SLVPK License No. State ID 
---------------
- -
6. (DUI): Actual physical control established by: 
0 Observation by affiant D Observation by Officer: 
D Admission of defendant to: 
D Statement of Witness D Other: 
------------
Two or more convictions in the last ten years? D Yes 0 No D Felony 0 Misdemeanor 
7. I believe there is probable cause that the defendant committed such crime(s) because of the 
following facts: 
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(Note: You must include the source of all information that you provide below. Include both what you observed and what you 
!_earned from someone else, identifying that person.) 
PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE STOP AND ARREST: 
On 03/23/13 at approximately O 134 hours, I was driving northbound on N. Glenwood St. in Boise, Idaho. 
I steered my Ada County Sheriffs Patrol Vehicle into the westbound turn lanes at the intersection with W. 
State St. In the lane directly in front of me I observed a silver Chevrolet Silverado Truck (1AUZ185) 
signaling to tum westbound onto State. The truck was stopped on top of the lane's stop lines. The traffic 
control light was red. The traffic control left turn signal changed to green and the truck proceeded to turn 
westbound. The truck drove on the south side of the raised median that divided the east and westbound 
traffic on State St. and continued westbound in the eastbound lane. I activated my patrol vehicle's 
emergency overhead lights and initiated my traffic stop. The vehicle turned into the parking lot of 
WALMART at 7319 W. State. St. and came to a stop. 
The driver of the truck, Thomas N. Townsend, provided me with an international driver's permit as 
identification. Thomas has lived in Middleton, Idaho for three years. Thomas immediately began to 
apologize for driving down the wrong way on State St. As Thomas spoke I could smell a heavy odor of an 
alcoholic beverage emanating from him. Thomas' eyes were extremely red, watery, and glassy. Thomas 
spoke with slurred speech. 
I conducted the standard battery of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, the Walle and Tum test, and the One 
Leg stand test. Thomas failed all three tests with scores of 6, 7, and 4 points respectively. Thomas then 
refused to provide a breath sample on scene and I transported him to the Ada County Jail where Ada 
County paramedic Supervisor C. Wolf conducted a involuntary blood draw at 0300 hours without incident. 
Thomas was then booked into the Ada County Jail for Driving Under The Influence.with Citation 
#472355. 
DUI NOTES 
Odor of alcoholic beverage 
Admitted drinking alcoholic beverage 
Slurred Speech 
Impaired Memory 
Glassy/Bloodshot eyes 
Other: 
Drugs Suspected D Yes @ No 
Urine Collected D Yes @ No 
Reason drugs are suspected 
Standardized Field Sobriety Test - Meets Decision Points? 
@ Yes D No Gaze Nystagmus @ Yes D No 
@ Yes D No Walle and Tum @ Yes D No 
@ Yes D No One Leg Stand @ Yes D No 
@ Yes D No Crashlnvolved D Yes @ No 
@ Yes D No Injury D Yes @ No 
Drug Recognition Evaluation performed 
Blood Collected 
D Yes @ No 
~ Yes D No 
Prior to being offered the test, the defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of refusal and 
failure of the test as required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code. 
Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The test(s) was/were 
peformed in compliance with Sections 18-8003 and 18-8004(4), Idaho Code and the standards and methods 
adopted by the Idaho State Police. 
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BreathBrAC by: Intoxilyzer 5000 Other 
Name of person administering the breath test Date certification expires: 
-------
0 Defendant refused the test as follows: 
( 
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By my signature and in the presen·ce of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of Idaho, I hereby 
solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and attached reports and documents that may 
be included herein is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. 
Dated: J/:tL[/(3 
-----------
Signed: 
Subscribed and sworn before me on ~ ~ 2 {-/ :3 
(Date) ,.,,,,,,,--7 ~ 
. (or) ,~ e~ 
_P_E_R_S_O_N_A_UT_H_O_RI_Z_E_D_T_O_AD_MIN __ I_S_T_ER NOTARY PUBLIC F~~:Q {! 
OATHS Residing at: ~ La C...t vt. 'f::c-cr= 
Title: My Commission Expires: 1 ,-z.. - 4 - I ~ 
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1. Incident Tonic 
DUI 
Failure to Purchase Drivers License 
13, Address 
1W STATE ST/ N GLENWOOD ST, BOISE 
5. Date Occurred 16. Time Occured 
03/23/2013 I 01:34 
Narrative: 
Ada County Sheriffs Offi __ 
Narrative Report 
2. Subiect/Victim's Name 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
14. Phone 
I 
17. Route To 
I COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
RD: 82 
~2013-94190 · 
(208) 000-0000 
Is. Division 
I PATROL 
On 03/23/13 at approximately 0134 hours, I was driving northbound on N. Glenwood St. in Boise, 
Idaho. I steered my Ada County Sheriffs Patrol Vehicle into the westbound turn lanes at the 
intersection with W. State St. In the lane directly in front ofme I observed a silver Chevrolet Silverado 
True~ (1AUZ185) signaling to turn westbound onto State. The vehicle was stopped on top of the 
lane's stop lines. The traffic control light was red. The traffic control left turn signal changed to green 
and the truck proceeded to turn westbound. The vehicle drove on the south side of the raised median 
that divided the east and westbound traffic on State St. The truck continued driving westbound in the 
eastbound lane. I activated my patrol vehicle's emergency overhead lights and initiated my traffic 
stop. The vehicle turned into the parking lot of WALMART at 7319 W. State. St. and came to a stop. 
The following is a synopsis of my interview and subsequent investigation: 
I approached the vehicle and observed a person sitting the driver's seat, a passenger in the front seat, 
and another passenger sitting in the rear seat. The window was rolled down and I could smell a 
strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from inside the truck. I identified myself to the 
occupants. The driver, Thomas N. Townsend, was identified by an intern.ational driver's permit. 
Thomas immediately began to apologize for driving down the wrong way on State. As Thomas spoke I 
could smell a heavy odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from him. Thomas' eyes were extremely 
red, watery, and glassy. Thomas spoke with slurred speech. The two occupants were identified by 
their Idaho Driver's license as Thomas N. Townsend Jr.  and Eugene E. Odell
Thomas stated the three of them just left Shorty's Saloon at 5467 N. Glenwood where they were 
drinking beer. Based on my observations of Thomas, I requested dispatch send an assist to my 
location for a DUI investigation. Deputy T. Lakey informed dispatch he was on his way to assist me. 
Once Deputy Lakey arrived, I had Thomas exit the Chevrolet truck. I had Thomas walk to the area 
between his truck and my patrol vehicle. Thomas told me he was not epileptic or diabetic. Thomas 
informed me he was not taking any type of medication. Thomas stated he did not have any type of 
medical issues or problems. Thomas has lived in Middleton, Idaho for three years and prior to that he 
lived in Boise. Thomas has never obtained an Idaho State Driver's License. Thomas told me the last 
thing he ate was chicken at 1800 hours on 03/22/13. Thomas and his two companions went to 
Shorty's at 2300 hours on 03/22/13. Thomas told me he drank four regular Bud Light draft beers, 
having the last one at 0115 hours on 03/23/13. I repeated to Thomas what he had told me about his 
!Admin 
Officer(s) Reporting 
BILLWEIRES 
Approved Supervisor 
Sgt. MATT STEELE 
Ada No. 
5176 
Ada No 
4201 
Approved Date 
03/24/2013 06:55 
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1. Incident Tonic 
DUI 
·~-. 
-- ' 
Failure to Purchase Drivers License 
3, Address 
W STATE ST/ N GLENWOOD ST, BOISE 
5. Date Occurred . 16. Time Occured 
03/23/2013 I 01:34 
Ada County Sheriff's Offii 
Narrative Report 
2. Sub;ect/Victim's Name 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
14. Phone 
I 
17. Route To 
I COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
RD: 82 
~2013-94190 
·• . 
(208) 000-0000 
Is. Division 
I PATROL 
evening stopping with the number of beers he drank. I asked Thomas how many beers he drank at 
Shorty's. Thomas' story changed and he told me he drank seven beers between 2100 hours and 0115 
hours. 
I had Thomas perform the SFST's (standardized field sobriety tests). The first test I had Thomas 
perform was the HGN (horizontal gaze nystagmus) test Thomas swayed back and forth as he was 
beginning the test. Thomas had lack of smooth pursuit in both of his eyes. Thomas had nystagmus at 
maximum deviation in both of his eyes. Thomas had nystagmus prior to 45 degrees in both of his 
eyes. I had to remind Thomas several times to ~eep his.head still during the test. Thomas failed the 
HGN test with a score of 6. 
The second test I had Thomas perform was the walk and turn test. I instructed Thomas on how to 
perform the test and I showed him a short sample. Thomas lost his balance on multiple occasions 
while standing in the proper position. Thomas started the test prior to me asking him to. Thomas 
missed touching heel to toe by more than half an inch on all the steps. Thomas missed touching heel 
to toe by more than four inches on some of the steps. Thomas stepped off line several times. Thomas 
held his hands from his side by ten to fifteen inches for most of the test. Thomas took the wrong 
number of steps and incorrectly conducted the appropriate turn. Thomas failed the walk and turn 
test with a score of 7. 
The last test I had Thomas perform was the one-leg stand test. I instructed Thomas on how to 
-perform the test and I showed him a short sample. Thomas told me he understood the test and was 
ready to begin. Thomas immediately started to sway back and forth. Thomas dropped his foot and 
raised his hands from his side by more than fifteen inches. Thomas hopped a few times and then 
nearly fell over during the test. I stopped the test at that time for Thomas' safety. Thomas failed the 
test with a score of 4 prior to me stopping the test. 
After Thomas failed all three of the SFST's, I arrested him for DUI. I placed handcuffs on him, checked 
for tightness, and l double locked them. I escorted Thomas to the back ofmy patrol car. I assisted 
him into the back seat. Once in the back seat, I checked his mouth for foreign objects and saw none. I 
played Thomas an audio recording of the ALS (administrative license suspension) form. Thomas told 
me he did not have any questions. I told Thomas he could not burp, belch, or vomit, during the 15-
minute wait. Thomas told me he understood. After the 15-minute wait was over, I had Thomas 
perform the breath test. I observed Thomas make a quick blow into the breathalyzer and then stop. 
The sample was insufficient. I explained to Thomas the proper way of conducting the test and told 
him if the he would not comply with this test a blood sample would be taken from him. Thomas 
!Admin I 
Officer(s) Reporting . Ada No. 
BILL WEIRES 5176 
Approved Supervisor Ada No 
Sgt. MATT STEELE 4201 
Approved Date 
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1. Incident Tonic 
DUI 
Failure to Purchase Drivers License 
3. Address 
W STATE ST/ N GLENWOOD ST, BOISE 
5. Date Occurred 16. Time Occured 
03/23/2013 I 01:34 
Ada County Sheriffs Offh.,e 
Narrative Report 
2. Sub;ectlVictim's Name 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
14, Phone 
I 
17. Route To 
I COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
RD: 82 ~2013-94190 
(208) 000-0000 
ls. Division 
I PATROL 
falsely acted like he was blowing into the breathalyzer on two more tests. Thomas then stated he 
refused to comply with this test and I would have to take his blood. 
/! 
' 
' 
I transported Thomas to the Ada County Jail where Ada County paramedic Supervisor C. Wolf 
conducted a involuntary blood draw at 0300 hours without inci~ent. Thomas was then booked into 
the Ada County Jail for DUI (citation# 472355). In booking I served Thomas with a citation# 472356 
for Failure to Purchase a Valid Driver's License. 
Disposition: 
This report will be forwarded to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office for review. 
!Admin 
Officer(s) Reporting 
BILLWEIRES 
Ada No. 
5176 
Approved Supervisor Ada No 
Sgt. MATT STEELE 4201 
Approved Date 
03/24/2013 06:55 
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. ' 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
KaleD. Gans 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Rm 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
AFFIDAVIT OF DETECTIVE 
JOE ANDREOLI 
_______________ ) 
The undersigned, Detective Joe Andreoli, of the Boise City Police Department, after 
being first sworn, states as follows: 
1. That your affiant is a detective with the Boise City Police Department currently 
serving in the B.A.N.D.I.T (drug) unit. 
2. That your affiant has been in law enforcement for approximately eleven years and 
has served as a detective with Boise Police Department for two years of that time. 
Additionally, two years a narcotics officer for City of Hamilton in Montana. 
3. That your affiant's assignment as a Narcotics Detective involves a great deal of 
work in area of searching homes, vehicles, and other property. Your affiant has 
sought and received numerous search warrants in Ada County Idaho over the last 
three years. Your affiant has been active part of the preparation of those affidavits. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DETECTIVE JOE ANDREOLI (TOWNSEND), Page 1 
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4. Your affiant knows that it takes your affiant, on average, 2 hours to draft an affidavit 
for a search warrant. Your affiant knows that the prosecutor's office then reviews 
the affidavit and prepares the warrant, which takes approximately an hour. The 
prosecutor and your affiant then have to contact a Judge, who will review the 
affidavit and sign the warrant. This process takes at least one-half hour, but may 
' take significantly longer depending on whether the magistrate Judges are on the 
bench or otherwise unavailable. Thus a daytime warrant will take approximately 3 
Yi, but may take as much as 4 Yi hours. 
5. Your affiant knows that in the middle of the night, when both the prosecutor and 
Judge are asleep and must be awakened to complete the warrant process, the process 
takes additional time. 
6. Your affiant knows that as of March of 2013, telephonic warrants were not in use in 
Ada County. 
7. Your affiant also knows that, although the time to prepare an affidavit in a DUI case 
may be shorter than the cases your affiant normally works, the time to get a warrant 
would be no less than approximately 1 Yi hours in the system as it existed in March 
of 2013. 
8. Your affiant knows that in the United State Supreme Court opinion Missouri v. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) the Court refers to mechanisms by which the 
warrant process has been streamlined to expedite warrants in Drunk Driving 
cases. Id. pg. 12. The Court refers to a search warrant forms used in drunk 
driving cases by the prosecutor's office in that jurisdiction. No such expedited 
forms were available in Ada County in March of 2013. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DETECTIVE JOE ANDREOLI (TOWNSEND), Page 2 
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J. 
9. Your affiant knows that at any given time there is only one Magistrate serving in 
an on-call capacity in Ada County. 
Further your affiant sayeth not. 
DATED, this J 2 71-1 day of June 2013. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / d'~ day of June 2013. 
Notary Public fP[1Id o 
Residing at DM St , Idaho 
Commission Expires: -~lR~· i~J~· l~K~---
AFFIDAVIT OF DETECTIVE JOE ANDREOLI (TOWNSEND), Page 3 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada Coilllty Prosecuting Attorney 
KaleD. Gans 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Rm 3191 
Boise, Idaho. 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS NELSON TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR MD 2013-0004110 
AFFIDAVIT OF CECILY ' 
WILLER TON 
________________ ) 
The undersigned, Cecily Willerton, after being first sworn, states as follows: 
1. That your affiant is currently employed as a planning analyst in the Planning and Research Department 
of the Ada County Sheriff's Office. 
2. That your affiant has sufficient access to the Ada CoW1ty Sheriff's Office jail management_ system to 
identify and document the number and type of arrests and subsequent bookings into the Ada CoW1ty Jail 
made during a given timefrarne. Your affiant is also able to research the number and type of charges 
that stem from the identified jail bookings. 
3. That your affiant has researched arrests between 6:33 p.m., March 22, and 5:55 a.m., March 23, 2013. 
4. That your affiant's research reveals that 20 people were arrested and booked in the identified timefrarne. 
Those 20 people resulted in 20 bookings. 
5. Your affiant knows that of those 20 bookings, 9 were driving under the influence (DUI) offenses. 
6. Your affiant knows that 45% of the bookings for the time identified were for DUL 
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Further your affiant sayeth not. 
DATED, this 1L day of June, 203. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this JL day of~ 20/J, before me, a Notary Public for Idaho, appeared f'.ecily llli i/erh,n 
known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she 
executed the same. 
Notary B fldaho 
Residing at: ~~::...l.:1l.lU..,~'J::-, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: -/L/-/'j' 
AFFIDAVIT of Cecily Willerton (MCDONALD), Page 2 
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Judge Hawley -- D. Finni::gan- 6/24/13 Courtroom206 
Time Speaker Note 
3:24: 19 PM j Motion to Suppress jThomas Townsend MD 13-4110 
3:24:33 PM i-states Atty [Kale Gans 
3:24:35 PM lPublic Defender \Nicole Owens 
3:24:56 PM !-states Atty icalls SW #1- Bill Weires-Sworn-Direct · 
1 l Examination of the Witness 
3:29:20 PM lwitness f Identifies Defendant 
3:36:14 PM iPublic Defender-Nicole icross Examination of the Witness 
!Owens I 
3:42:16 PM f-states Atty-Kale Gans !Redirct"Examination 
3:44:59 PM j jNothing further, witness steps down 
3:45:13 PM iPublic Defender-Nicole !calls DW #1-Thomas Townsend-Sworn-
! Owens l Direct Examination of the Witness 
3:47:50 PM I-states Atty-Kale Gans !cross Examination of the Witness 
3:50:03 PM i !Nothing further, witness steps down 
3:50:20 PM jPublic Defender-Nicole jArgues motion to suppress 
iOwens I 
.... 3:55·:·07 PM t-states.Atty-Kale.Gans ................. !Argumen( ................................. · ........ · ............... .. 
3:59:33 PM jPublic Defender-Nicole jRebuttal argument 
!Owens 1 
... :; ~~.;.; ~ .. :~ ... 1 Judge. Hawley ............................................. [~:kf:~~:~:~;d0~ii~;ment ................................................................... . 
4:02:38 PM iJudge Hawley imatter considered fully submitted 
: : 
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JUL 2 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk 
. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
THOMAS N. TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR MD 13-0004110 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
REGARDING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
APPEARANCES: Attorney for Plaintiff - Kale Gans 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
. · Attorney for Defendant - Nicole Owens 
Ada County Public Defender's Office 
This matter came before· the court on June 24, 2013 for hearing on the 
' 
Defenda~t·s Motion to Suppress Evidence. The court deemed the matter fully 
submitted and took this matter under advisement on June 24, 2013. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 23, 2013 at approximately 1:30 a.m., Detective Bill Weires of the Ada 
County Sheriff's Office was on patrol in n0rthwest Boise, Idaho. Weires testified that he 
was northbound on Glenwood following a Chevrolet pickup which was also northbound 
on Glenwood. The pickup truck which was driven by Defendant Thomas Townsend 
(hereafter 1'Townsend") turned left from Glenwood onto State Street. Townsend turned 
to the left of the concrete barrier on State Street and proceeded west bound in the east 
bound lanes of State Street. Townsend was traveling the wrong way into the oncoming 
east bound lanes. Weires turned on the overhead lights of his patrol vehicle. Townsend 
proceeded approximately another 40 feet before turning left into a Wal-Mart parking lot. 
?\) 
' ~t, \,~ 
c..s~ ... \-:+1'' , 1' \)~ 
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Weires testified that Townsend turned off.State Street at the first pull out after travelling 
less than a quarter of a mile in the wrong direction in the east bound lanes. 
Weires approached the pickup and identified the driver as the Defendant 
Townsend, who was seated in the driver's side position. There were two passengers in 
the pickup. Weires immediately detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from the cab 
of the truck. He also noted that Townsend had glassy, red eyes, that his speech was 
thick-tongued and slurred. Townsend told Weires that he had just left Shorty's Saloon 
on North Glenwood. · 
Because there were two passengers in the vehicle Weires called into dispatch for 
an officer to assist as backup. Townsend and the passengers remained in the truck 
until Deputy'Lakey, ACSO, arrived 10 minutes later. Weires continued his investigation 
of Townsend by having him exit his vehicle. During conversation Townsend admitted 
~ • I ' I 
that he had consumed four beers and later admitted that he had consumed seven beers 
l - ' ~ • 
while at Shorty's Saloon. Weires testified that Townsend performed poorly on the 
. 
standard field sobriety tests. Townsend failed all three field sobriety tests and was 
arrested for suspicion of Driving Under the Influence. 
Weires placed Townsend in the back seat of his patrol vehicle where he played 
the Administrative License· Suspension (ALS) audio that notifies suspects of the 
, t I , t 
potential penalties for refusing to· submit to evidentiary testing and waited 15 minutes 
befcfre requesting Townsend to submit to a breath test on the Lifeloc FC20. Weires 
dete~mined that Townsend had not burped, belched or vomited· during the 15 minute 
waiting period. J. j, Ii 
i • 
····'' 
I ' ~ • I l ,I I <I I, ••• 
·' ., I I ! . I 
• " I • 
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After receiving an explanation. of the test Townsend quickly blew into the 
instrument and then stopped on his first attempt on the Lifeloc rendering an insufficient 
sample. Weires again explained in detail how the test was conducted and what 
Townsend was required to do. Weires explained to Townsend that if he did not comply 
with the Lifeloc test that he would need to take a blood sample. Townsend then simply 
failed to exhale any air on his second attempt. Townsend stated that he was not going 
to comply with the test and that Weires would have to take his blood. Townsend was 
transported to the Ada County Jail to submit a blood sample. After arriving at the Ada 
County Jail, ·an Ada County paramedic drew blood samples from' Townsend. Weires 
testified that Townsend was polite and compliant and that he dicf hot physically resist 
the blood draw. ,': 
I 
Weires testified that he never informed Townsend that he could opt out of the 
. . 
blood draw. He simply· told Townsend that if he didn't comply with the breath test that 
he would do a blood draw. Townsend testified that he objected to the blood draw 
procedure a·nd protested that the procedure 'violated his constitutional rights. These 
objections were not voiced to Weires, but could have been· made to someone else at 
the Ada County Jail. Townsend further testified that jail staff told him that if he did not 
cooperate they would hold him down and take his blood. Townsend admitted that no 
! 
. one ever held him down. He stated that he never gave anyone permission to take his 
blood and that he did not physically resist the blood drawing. 
Ultimately Townsend was cited and· was charged with'· Driving Under the 
Influence a violation of Idaho' Code § 18-8004 and Failure to Purchase a Driver's 
·I, . ' I f i f l • 1 • 1 f ; , 1 i , ' • I ~ ' ' . . ~ ... .'l' 
I,,' • I 
' I I, 
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License, a violation of Idaho Code § 49-301. On April 25, 2013 Town send filed a motion 
to suppress evidence. 
Townsend seeks to suppress the blood draw evidence citing the recent case of 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 2013 WL 1628934 (Apr. 17, 2013). He argues 
that McNeely precludes the use of forced blood draw evidence without a warrant and 
nullifies the implied consent law in Idaho. 
The State filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on June 13, 2013. 
The State also submitted the affidavits of Detective Joe Andreoli and Cecily Willerton 
and the narrative report and probable cause affidavit of Detective Weires in opposition 
to the motion. Detective Andreoli's affidavit states that telephonic warrants were not in 
use in Ada County as of March 2013 and expedited se.arch wa~rants in drunk driving 
(DUI) cases were unavailable in March 2013.' Andreoli's affidavit further states that 
procuring a warrant during the daytime could take three and one half to four hours while 
nighttime warrants would take additional time. Andreoli's affidavit also indicates that 
obtaining a search warrant in a DUI would have taken a minimum r of one and one half 
hours in March 2013. 
I , 
Cecily Willerton's affidavit states that between 6:30 p.m. March 22 and 5:55 a.m. 
' 
on· March 23, 2013 20 individuals were arrested and booked at the Ada County Jail. 
Forty-five· percent of these bookings (or 9 cases) were for DUI. 
\; I. . 
· · DISCUSSION 
I 
. ,. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ·and Article I, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution prohibit "unreasonable searches ·and seizdres" of a person. A 
blood draw taken during a driving under the influence investigation' constitutes a seizure 
• • • ~ l 
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of the person and a search falling within the scope of both constitutions. Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 
302, 160 P.3d 739, 741. In this case, a warrant was not obtained before the blood draw 
took place. Therefore, the State must establish two preconditions to overcome the 
presumption that a warrantless search was unreasonable: (1) the search fell within an 
exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) it was "reasonable in the light of all the 
other surrounding circumstances." Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302; See U.S. v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471 (1973). This Court finds the State has met its burden. 
I.' · Implied consent was given as a matter of Idaho law, which qualifies as a 
valid exception to the warrant requirement. 
. . 
Consent is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. State v. 
• I ' :!I. 
LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 243 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Ct.App.2010). The defendant 
argues that the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 
• , I , 
1552, 2013 WL 1628934 (Apr. 17, 2013), stands for the proposition that implied 
. .. . ., ) 
statutory consent no longer qualifies as a valid exception to the warrant requirement. 
~ ' I • • • • ' ' 
~he defendant r~asons that the. Court recognized that all 50 sta~es, including Missouri, 
have impli~d consent laws, yet still found ~he defe~dan~'s Fourt~ Amendment right to 
have been violated. The · defendant's interpretation and application of the Supreme 
Court's holding,· however, fails to identify several factual and iegal distinctions that 
distinguish Missouri law and the holding in McNeely from the situatio1~ in Idaho and the 
case at hand. 
In McNeely,· Justice Sotomayor identified the narrow issue in the case to be 
"whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the 'bloodstream· presents a per se 
. , ' • I 
exigency that justifies an· exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for 
• i 
'•' 
'-·· 
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• • . -· .... '""""""°'' ~ .... - ~ •• - ....... ·~- ..... ,.. • •• 
nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." Id., 133 S.Ct. at 1556 
(emphasis added). Missouri's implied consent statute, like most other states', has been 
interpreted to allow a driver to withdraw statutorily implied consent by refusing to submit 
to evidentiary testing. See Riley v. Director of Revenue, 378 S.W.3d 432, 438 
(Mo.App.W.D.2012). The majority pointed out that implied consent laws "impose 
significant consequences when a motorist withdraws consent[.)" (emphasis added). 
Consensual blood testing was not addressed. Therefore, given the facts of the case and 
the interpretation of the law in Missouri, the holding in McNeely is most directly 
applicable to those states and circumstances where a driver has the ·ability to withdraw 
statutorily implied consent. . ' ' ~ 
In Idaho, statutorily implied consent cannot be withdrawn as a matter of law. See 
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410, 973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct.App.1999). Even if "an 
individual has the physical ability to prevent evidentiary testing, there is no legal right to 
withdraw the statutorily implied consent." Id. Idaho's implied consent statute provides 
th.at any person who drives in the state "shall be deemed to have g
1
iven his consent to 
evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol" so long as the· 'police officer has 
"reasonable grounds to believe" the person is under the influence.= I.C. § 18-8002(1). 
The evidentiary tests available to officers include blood testing, I.C. § 18-8002(9), and 
the specific test to be used is "of the officer's choosing." Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302. 
Because· a driver in Idaho is unable to withdraw implied consent, the evidentiary test 
used was· authorized by statute. No evidence has been introduced to suggest the 
officer did not have · reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was under the 
'I 
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influence, thus the blood draw fell within a valid exception to the warrant requirement. 
The evidence obtained from the blood draw is, therefore, admissible. 
II. The anticipated time delays in the warrant application process created a 
situation whereby given the "totality of the circumstances" a warrantless 
blood draw was justified under the exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
The exigency exception to the warrant requirement applies when the facts of the 
specific case "make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless 
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Ame~dm~nt." Kentucky v. King, 131 
S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 2011 WL 1832821 (2011); See State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 
'I ! • • • : • • 
512, 236 P.3d 1269, 1272 (2010). The Court in McNeely rejected a per se rule that 
alcohol metabolization is always an exigency that justifies an exception to the warrant 
. . ' 
requirement in all drunk-driving cases. ln .. summarizing their deci:~ion, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
lrf short, while the natural' dissipation of alcohol' in ttie blood may support a 
finding of exigency in a specific case, as it did in Schmerber, it does not do so 
categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is 
reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the 
' ! I 
circumstances: 
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1563.' 
· In rejecting a per se rule, the Court in McNeely made two general assumptions. 
, ' , I 
First, the court assumed the states' ability to use retrograde extrapolation. Id. Second, 
the court relied on advances in technology that allow police officers to'obtain warrants in 
an expedited manner. Id. However, neither of these assumptions can be accurately 
applied in_ this case. Based on the heightened importance of timely blood testing in 
,' • . l ' ! l 
I I ' r ' 
J, • f I • 
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Idaho, the anticipated delays in obtaining a warrant in March 20131 and the compelling 
interests of the State, a warrantless blood draw in this case was reasonable and fell 
within the exigent circumstances exception. 
A. Idaho law bars the state from extrapolating backwards to determine blood 
alcohol content, shortening the available time to gather evidence. 
An important assumption relied on by the majority in McNeely was that states 
have the ability to extrapolate backwards to determine the blood alcohol content of a 
defendant at the time of the stop. Id. With this ability, the. hours that may be needed to 
' : . 
obtain a warrant are insignificant, because the state could mathematically determine 
' .. i 
what the blood alcohol content of the defendant was at the time of arrest. However, this 
tool is not available in the State in Idaho, and therefore those extra hours are very 
significant. 
I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) makes it a per se violation ''for any person .... who has an 
• l. • 
alcohol concentration of 0.08 ... or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or 
breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state[.]" To 
provide incentive to drivers (believing their BACs to be below the limit) to cooperate with 
the police and submit to evidentiary testing, the Idaho legislature enacted I.C. § 18-
8004(2) .. As long as drug use' is not suspected, "[a]ny person having an alcohol 
concentration of less than 0.08 ... as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, by 
a test requested by a police officer shall not be prosecuted for driving under the 
influence of alcohol[.]" Thus if a defendant submits to evidentiary testing and the results 
't I 
1 Idaho Code Sections 19-4404 and 19-4406 provide a procedure for telephonic search warrants in 
Idaho. However, telephonic warrants were not available at1d yvere not in L!~e in Aqa County in March 
2013. Expedited search warrants were not available in drunk driving cases in Ada County in March 2013. 
(Affidavit Detective Joe Andreoli, filed June 13, 2013 at paragraphs 6, 8). 
• I • ' • 
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reveal a blood alcohol content of less than .08, the State is prohibited from prosecuting 
the individual. See State v. Daniel, 132 Idaho 701, 703, 979 P .2d 103, 105 (1999). This 
also means the State, contrary to the assumption made by the Court in McNeely, is 
precluded from using retrograde extrapolation, or else the incentive would be destroyed. 
Id., 132 Idaho at 703-704, 979 P.2d at 105-106. Without this tool, of which the majority 
in McNeely relied in rejecting a per se rule, alcohol dissipation is a greater threat to the 
availability of evidence in Idaho, as compared to elsewhere. Therefore, the argument is 
stronger in this case that law enforcement requires a shortened time frame for gathering 
blood evidence, and that the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream is more likely an 
exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw, objectively reasonable to preserve the 
evidence for the State. 
B. At the time of the arrest, the anticipated delay in obtaining a warrant 
justified a blood test without judicial authorization. 
The inability of law enforcement to obtain judicial authorization .in a timely matter 
can create an exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw. The Court in McNeely 
expressly acknowledged this by stating, "exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless 
' · .. 
blood sample may arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the 
~ • • .. • • • • 1 1- ' 
warrant application process." McNeely, ~ 33 S.Ct. at 1563. The _majority referenced 
advances in technology that streamlined the warrant application process: 
"Well over a majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for 
search warrants remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio 
communication, electronic communication s'uch as e-mail, and video 
conferencing. And in addition to technology-based developm~nts, jurisdictions 
have found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using 
standard-form warrant applications for drunk-drivi~g .investig~tions." 
Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1562. However, the detective in this case was not privy to these 
technological advances. 
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Detective Andreoli's affidavit states that in March 2013, telephonic warrants were 
not in use in Ada County, and expedited search warrants were unavailable in drunk 
driving cases. The anticipated time to obtain a search warrant for a DUI was, at the very 
minimum, one and one half hours. The process at night could have potentially taken a 
significantly greater amount of time. 
A number of circumstances in this case created a "totality" that justified a 
warrantless blood draw. First, the inability of the state to extrapolate blood results 
backwards makes the timeliness of when the blood is tested particularly important in 
Idaho. Second, perhaps unlike other jurisdicti'ons, the warrant application process in 
Ada County at the time was by no means streamlined and the anticipated delays from 
that process (likely well over two hours) threatened the availability of evidence. Third, 
the defendant was first· offered a less intrusive evidentiary' testing method (a breath 
test), but refused to submit to it. Finally, with the defendant driving the wrong direction 
down the street, admitting to having consumed seven beers, and failing all three field 
sobriety tests,' an excessive DUI could have reasonably been suspected by the officer, 
' . ! h 
carrying with that suspicion a greater interest in the State of prosecuting the violator. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the exigencies of the situation justified the 
warrantless blood draw. 
. .. 
Ill. In light of all the surrounding circumstances, the search was reasonable. 
A "reasonable" search in the context of a forced blood draw means "done in a 
medic'ally acceptable manner and without unreasonable force." Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 
t 
160 P.3d. at 742 (citing Schinerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S. Ct. at 1836 (1966)); State v. 
Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 371, 233 P.3d 1286, 1293 (Ct.App.2010). Although the 
I, 
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defendant has not presented evidence, nor argued, that the blood test failed either of 
these two criteria, the search still needs to have been reasonable. This Court finds it 
was. 
First, a blood draw was only performed after the defendant failed to submit to a 
less intrusive method of breath testing. Second, the blood draw was performed by a 
qualified Ada County paramedic, and no evidence was presented to suggest that the 
test fell below the "medically acceptable" standard. Finally, as the defendant testifies, he 
did not physically resist the blood draw and no one held him down. Further, Detective 
Weires testified that he was polite and compliant during the test. This Court finds, in 
light of all the surrounding circumstances, the blood draw was a reasonable search 
done in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force. 
Conclusion 
The Court denies the motion to· suppress and finds the blood draw evidence is 
admissible. IT IS SO ORDERED. 
., ' 
Dated thisQ(f' day of July 2013. 
'1 
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Ada County Public Defender's Office 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
~,b_~ eputy Court Clerk • 
• J I • ~ L • 
000062
AM.6!'1r' P.M. __ 
M_ .. aay, October 21, 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY: D FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
200 W. Front Street, Boise Idaho 83702 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110 
Thomas N Town send ) 
409 Rose Lake Drive ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
Middleton, ID 83644 ) 
Defendant. ) 
-------------------
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
AC Pretrial Conference .... Tuesday, November 05, 2013 .... 09:15 AM 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
Jury Trial. ... Wednesday, December 04, 2013 .... 08:15 AM 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE PERSONALLY PRESENT AT BOTH THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND/ OR THE 
JURY TRIAL. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT EITHER THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE OR THE JURY TRIAL WILL 
RESULT IN A BENCH WARRANT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the court 
and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Mailed --2(____ Hand ';jliv~red Signature 
Clerk~ Date \~~~(1 Phone..__ ......... _________ _ 
Heidi M Tolman 
200 W Front St Rm 1107 
Boise ID 83702 
Private Counsel: Mailed Hand Delivered Signature-----------
Clerk Date Phone 
------------
1 n t er de pa r!ro ENl ta I Mail -1._ ~ Ada D Boise D Eagle D G.C. D Meridian 
Clerk .). _tl_.. Date ...!!lf_Q Prosecutor: 
Public Defender: lnterdepartm!ntal Mail 'f 
Clerk :5 tf.. Date -.!r-=O....,..,( V3"°"""'""-
Other: ------------
Mailed Hand Delivered 
--- --
Signature __________ _ 
Clerk Date 
Dated: 10/21/2013 
------
Phone..___._ _________ __ 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the CL 
By: ~ • lw4f 6eputc1er1< 
Cite Pay Website: https://www.citepayusa.com/payments Supreme Court Repository: https://www.idcourts.us 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
000063
NO. '"2: 
l::i\ I JC.: FILED A.M:.f.t ~ p M. 
----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI~/ 0 5 2G13 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY@.fi1&(;)J»HER o. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FIN~GAN 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) ~~~~TE MINUTES/ NOTICE OF HEARINl.i 
) - AL MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiff, ) -
~ Case Number: ___.C.___..R--'---rn_D_-_J 3 ____ -_'-1_1_, _D __ _ 
vs. 
-111\ - ' ) h-.-\ 0 
--~~_.__v_Yn__...c.....;.Oi,:;........;:~--::n---'-o=W-=---n:_:.=Y.lryj:'-----''"'--- ) Event Scheduled: ___ ...... _r_ ________ _ 
) 
------------) Judge: ~AP~ Clerk: ---=D:;_f_:_ ___ _ ) 
--------------- ) Case Called: __________ )g71n Chambers 
Defendant. ) 
_______________ ) D Interpreter: _______________ _ 
~c D sc D EA D Gc D MC 
I 
/-1- e. ~k , :_ f ~ Private ___ ~ _ __,_\ .... b"'"") ...... Y'.bL...L..J"""<2:-:::'0:=-.:.--'------
Defendant: (g:J>resent D Not Present D In Custody D PD Appointed D PD Denied D Waived Attorney 
( 
D Defendant failed to appear_ Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued_ Bond $ _______ _ 
~ised of Rights D Not Guilty D Guilty Plea/ PV Admit D Written Guilty Plea D No Contact Order 
D Bond$ D Pre-Trial Release Order D Provide Evaluation 
Se.,,,- .ft. r- 6tt. 6. :b> bn±:0::: (<0 ~ \. \ cDh? ,-fl "o~ 
(?}v;\~ {) \Jut 
------------------------D Release Defendant, This Case Only 
D Court Trial Conference on _________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge _______ _ 
D Pre-Trial/ Jury Trial on at am/pm w/ Judge-.,....-------
~6,\j onW-< JD1;ri}3at~mw!Judge \:taw)~ 
D Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm_ 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telephone (208)28~-Jo. 
You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest, 
or default judgment may be entered if you are charged with an infracth;m. 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT ST., BOISE, ID 83702 
I hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Hand Delivered D Via CounselZl L 
Defense Atty: Hand Deliverea~ 
Prosecutor: 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court 
~.b·-~ 
Deputy Clerk 
MAGISTRATE MINUTES [REV 11-2012] 
000064
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, ADA COUNTY 
~ JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION D WITHHELD JUDGMENT 
~ PROBATION ORDER Expires---------
FILE-1+-:all+>'"+l--"'--...:AT fo;1D .M. 
ST~AHO vs. ~ } 
--\-ll l)Yil {l 2) ~[)» Yl s.000: :::~ 
CASE NO. trlD:) 3-z+) / 0 Digitals l oJ81 J 
Prosecuting Agency:~ ]J_BC gEc O GC O MC 
DEFENDANT having been charged with the following offenses: State's Attorney: )'.I.I ~ =-o-4 
Count1. Du\ X rg~~oo<(~\ Count3. ________ _ 
Count2. \yv\}Q li(A ~k t/:f- 3Pf Count4. ___________ _ 
DE~NDANT WAS: Jsl Present D I C tody D Not Present D Interpreter Present [81 Advised of all rights ~nyenalties per ICR 5, 11, IMCR 5(f) 
epresented by: .,. • CO.YRT ENTERS JUDGMENT AFTER: ~ol Guilty Plea O Trial - Found Guilty 
Defen ant Waived Righ · I Defenses~gainst Self-lncriminatiorCEfro Jury Trial .¢'o Confront and Cross Examine Accuser(s) DTo Counsel 
~ ORDERED: DEFENDANT'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED 865" . 9.§YS beginning ; or 
D CONSECUTIVE TO ANY CURRENT SUSPENSION j8fAbsolute Suspension ,'.? (.5 days D Interlock from to __ _ 
D ORDERED: DEFENDANT TO PAY TO THE CLERK: D Apply cash bond$ _____ _ 
Count1: Fine/Penalty$ 0:/JClJ W/$ /[!)tJtJ Suspended+CTCosts$ cc_ =$. ______ _ 
Count 2: Fine/Penalty$ / S-0 W/ $ ' Suspended+ CT Costs$ CC = $. ______ _ 
Count 3: Fine/Penalty$ ________ W/ $ Suspended+ CT Costs$ = $ ______ _ 
Count 4: Fine/Penalty$ W/ $ Suspended + CT Costs $ = $. ______ _ 
D Reimburse Public Defender$ D Workers' Comp ($.60/hr) $ TOTAL = $ ______ _ 
Defendant shall make dQ EQUAL MONTHLY PAYMENTS BEGINNING ONE MONTH FROM TODAY Restitution $ ______ _ 
)\ ORDERE~FENDANT ~E l~CARCERATED IN: D County Jail 
Count 1: p{g5_daysw/ 3~suspended-Credit_/ ___ Total = /~ 
Count2: ___ daysw/ ____ Suspended-Credit ____ Total = ___ _ 
Count 3: days w/ Suspended - Credit Total = ___ _ 
Count 4: days w/ Suspended - Credit Total = ___ _ 
D Juvenile Detention Cent~ 
TOTAL DAYS TO SERVE= /_ -+, _,_ ______ _ 
D Concurrent to Case number(s): -------
D Concurrent D Consecutive 
to all cases to any other cases 
D ___ days must be fully completed, with NO OPTIONS available. D ___ days must be fully completed, with INTERIM JAIL available. 
D Pay or Stay$ ___ _ D In-Custody ___ SAP ABC D Interlock Funds (after use of any cafeteria funds) 
D If approved by the Ada County Sheriffs Office, defendant is allowed to serve in __________ County at defendant's expense. 
~ THE FOLLOWING OP.tirs offered by the County Sheriff are available to the defendant only !E defendant meets requirements of the program. 
~ All Options / days; D If defendant is in custody, release and re-book for any options. 
D Any combo of the following Options: Wk Rls __ days; SLD __ days; SCS __ hours; Hs. Arr. (2/1) __ dai1 /1) dayy 
D PROBATION CONDITIONS: Supervised Probation Expires: /q.., Ja. IC Unsupervised Probation Expires: 1&@4i7i§i? 
0 IN CHAMBERS PER WRITTEN GUil TY PLEA 
/;!. ·/0,/.3 
DEFENDANT Date of Order 
D Release Defendant this case only 
[REV 11-1-2011] 
000065
• I 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Brian Naugle 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Magistrate Division, 200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
No. ~,;,.,vr,LED 
A.M.-J-1).,!.../-P.M.----
Oi:C 1 O 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
Boise, Idaho 83702 Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
'-.' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CR-2013-0004110 
) 
vs. ) AMENDED 
) COMPLAINT 
THOMAS TOWNSEND, ) 
•,,, ) 
Defendant. ) Defendant's DOB
) Defendant's SSN
~\ur 
PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this /(J day of~fo.emecr 2013, Brian 
Naugle, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State ofldaho, who, being first 
duly sworn, complains and says: that THOMAS TOWNSEND, on or about the 23rd of March 
2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did commit the crime of I. OPERATING A MOTOR 
VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL (SECOND WITHIN TEN 
... 
YEARS), MISD., I.C. §18-8004, 8005(4) and II. DRIVING WITHOUT OBTAINING A 
DRIVER'S LICENSE, MISD., I.C. §49-301, as follows: 
AMENDED COMPLAINT, (TOWNSEND), Page 1 
000066
} 
I. 
That the Defendant, THOMAS TOWNSEND, on or about the 23rd day of March, 2013, in 
the County of Ada, State ofldaho, did drive a motor vehicle, to-wit: a silver Chevrolet Pickup, on or 
about Glenwood and State Street, while under the influence of alcohol, or, in the alternative, did 
drive the above-described motor vehicle at the above-described location, with an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: .154 as shown by an analysis of his blood, and having pled 
guilty to or having been found guilty of a violation of a substantially conforming criminal violation 
§ 18-8004, within the previous ten years. 
IL 
That the Defendant, THOMAS TOWNSEND, on or about the 23rd day of March, 2013, in 
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did operate a motor vehicle, to-wit: a silver Chevrolet Pickup, at 
or about Glenwood and State Street, without a valid driver's license. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and against 
the peace and dignity of the State ofldaho. 
~p.l(e;rL 
SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this / 0 day ofN:cAember2013. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT, (TOWNSEND), Page 2 
000067
\. 
NO.~ ~- .,. _0 
\
r U t"'it.c;. A.M. ___ t ____ P.M.----
OEi; 1 0 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D1STRJ~11t0Ei~tHE1 D. PilCH, Clerk · 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA syoEiR~~;u~·iNEGAN 
'' . 
· IN THE MATTER OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE 
DRIVER'S LICENSE OF: 
Thomas N Townsend 
409 Rose Lake Drive 
Middleton, ID 83644 
Defendant. 
DOB:. 
DL or SSN: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
') 
) 
) 
_____ _________ ) 
CHatlon No: 472355 
Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110 
ORDER SUSP_ENDING DRIVER'S LICENSE 
FOR A PLEA OF GUil TY OR FINDING OF 
GUILTY Of OF.FENSE 
WJ Interlock Device _K_ 
Interlock start: /). · / Z ·Jf End: /J-, [J Is_ 
TO: THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT AND THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT 
' . 
• The Defendant having •the offense of Driving Under the Influence, i 
violation of Section 118-8004 M, ich auth es or equires the suspension of the driving privileges of the 
Defendant by the Court, and the Court having considered th~ same. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT 18 HEREBY ORDERED, that the drlylJtg prMleges and.driver's llcense of the above 
named Defendant is hereby suspended for a period of 3&,~ days commencing on · 
~ - ~. r ' 
)1( 1¢ · I Z, !.3 ; or ~ 
a at the end of _any current suspension. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED. that the expiration of the period of this suspension does not reinstate your 
driver's license and you must make application to the Idaho Transportation Department for reinstatement of 
your driver's license after the suspension period expires. 
Dated: /J.. · (O" Ll 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Is a true and correct cop the original O er Suspending Driver's LJcense 
For a Plea of GuiHy or Finding of Guilty of Offense entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further 
certify that copies of this Order '!ere setved as follows: 
Defendant: Thomas N Townsend Mailed Hand Delivere~ 
Department of Transportation. Boise: · Malled~ · .. Hand Delivered _ 
Dated: 1,~ J 1 DJ k3 
. t I C:tsSTOPHER D. RICH Cle fth~rt 
By: h~~ 
Deputy Clerk · ~~ 
000068
,I 
I NO.~~ , -, FILED A.M. __ ~,. ~L-P.M,,~---
DEC 1 0 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
SUPERVISED MISDEMEANOR PROBATION ORDER 
Defendant: Thomas N Townsend 
Address: 409 Rose Lake Drive 
Middleton, ID 83644 
Phone: 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
Date Ordered: 12/10/13 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney: Michael J. Guy 
Defense Attorney: Heidi M Tolman 
You have been sentenced to the following term of supervised probation: Two Years 
on December 10, 2013 and terminating on December 10, 2015 
, commencing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT you comply with the following terms and conditions of supervision: 
Initial Probation Contact: You understand that you MUST contact Ada County Misdemeanor Probation at the 
address below within one business day to schedule an appointment. Failure to do so may result in the issuance of 
a warrant for your arrest. You will bring all court paperwork with you to this appointment. 
Ada County Misdemeanor Probation 
8601 W. Emerald Suite 150, Boise, Idaho 83704 
Phone: 208-577-3380 I FAX: 208-577-3389 
Laws: You shall respect and obey all laws and comply with all terms of probation as ordered by the court or 
directed by a probation officer. You shall comply with all lawful requests of a probation officer. 
Compliance: You shall comply with all lawful direction given to you by a probation officer. 
Notification: You will notify your probation officer within 24 hours (or within one business day) following any 
contact with law enforcement, including but not limited to citations, arrests, or investigations. You will fully 
cooperate in a respectful manner with any law enforcement requests and advise them that you are on supervised 
probation and provide them with the name of your assigned probation officer. 
Residence/Contact: You shall notify your probation officer prior to making any changes to your residence, phone 
numbers or email addresses. You will submit any changes to your probation officer for approval. You must notify 
your probation officer within one business day of making any approved changes. You will maintain a contact 
phone with voice messaging. You are responsible for checking this phone number at least daily and complying 
with any instructions given by a probation officer. 
Reporting: You shall check in at the Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Office on a monthly basis, unless 
directed otherwise by a probation officer. You shall truthfully submit any written or oral reports requested by a 
probation officer: 
Attendance: Y.ou understand that failure to appear for any assigned/scheduled appointments with any service 
providers, drug testing service, or your probation officer may result in a probation violation being filed with the court 
or the imposition of discretionary jail time. 
-Page 1 [Rev. 1-2013] 
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Controlled Substances and Alcohol: You will not use, possess, or distribute any alcoholic beverages, controlled 
substances or intoxicants while on probation unless lawfully prescribed by a licensed physician. You shall submit 
to any testing of breath and bodily fluids for these substances as directed by the court, law enforcement, treatment 
providers or the probation officer. You shall be truthful in said testing and shall not ingest substances or take any 
actions in an attempt to mask or alter the test results. Any attempts shall be considered the same as a 
presumptive positive result. You shall pay all fees and costs of such testing. 
Employment/Education: You will obtain and maintain appropriate full-time employment and/or participate in an 
educational program as directed by a probation officer. 
Electronic Monitoring Device/Alcohol Monitoring Device/Interlock Device: You understand that you may be 
placed on electronic monitoring device/alcohol monitoring device/Interlock device as deemed necessary by the 
probation officer. You shall pay the daily monitoring costs and any costs associated with any damages or lost 
equipment. 
Court Fines and Restitution: You shall pay any and all court fines, restitution and other costs as ordered by the 
Court and defined in your fine agreement. 
Programs & Treatment: You shall cooperate and successfully complete any and all assessments and/or 
treatment programs ordered by the Court. You shall pay all costs and fees for the programs in a timely manner. 
Classes or Treatment: You shall comply, cooperate and successfully complete any assessments and/or 
treatment program required by the probatior:i officer. You shall pay all costs and fees for the programs in a timely 
manner. 
Review Hearings: You understand that you must appear before the Court as scheduled to review your 
compliance with the conditions of your probation. 
Costs of Supervision: You shall pay the costs of supervision on a prepaid monthly basis to Ada County 
Misdemeanor Probation in the amount of $75.00 per month, unless adjusted by the Court. 
Release of Information: You authorize the release and exchange of confidential information to and from your 
probation officer, including but not limited to evaluations, medical history, reports, and treatment records related to 
your probation. · 
Travel: You will_ not le.ave the state of Idaho withou~ first obtaining a travel permit from your probation officer. 
Additional Instructions: You will comply with any and all additional instructions given by a probation officer. 
Other: 
Defendant's Signature and Date 
Supervised Misdemeanor Probatior:i Order 
-Page 2 [Rev. 1-2013] 
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NO. l 1\' ~i3""""'"'1L::.J,------
A.M._ -U,,-J. __ P.:'.'.-· 
DEC 1 0 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
ADA CQUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Stre~t, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
~ f ' , ' 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STAT~ OF IDAHO, 
. ' 
PJaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No.CR-MD-2013-4110 
STIPULATION TO ENTER 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY 
T;HOMAS TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
The parties above-named, by and through undersigned counsel, come now and hereby 
stipulate fllld agree, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 1 l(a)(2), to the following: 
1) 
2) 
With approval of the Court, the defendant shall enter a <::onditional plea of 
"guilty'' in the above-named case number. 
The defendant's conditional plea of "guilty" shall reserve in writing the right, on 
appeal from judgment, to review the Court's adverse ruling on the defendant's 
Motion to Suppress (July 24, 2013). 
3) If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant shall be allowed to withdraw his 
conditional plea of "guilty'' pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 1 l(a)(2). 
DATED, this //}i"'day of December 2013. 
STIPULATION TO ENTER CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY 1 
000071
-Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
THOMA~ TOWNSEND 
Pdep.dant 
STIPULATION TO ENTER CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY 2 
000072
. ' 
.. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this __ day of December 2013, I hand delivered 
(serv~d) a true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
' 
Heidi Tolman 
STIPULATION TO ENTER CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUil,TY 3 
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NOTICE OF DEFEl\ 1"' '\NT'S RESPONSIBILITIES AFT''"'.R SENTENCING 
Defendant: Thomas N Townsend 
Address: 409 Rose Lake Drive 
Middleton, ID 83644 
Phone: 
Prosecuting Agency: Ada County Prosecutor 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
Date Ordered: 12/10/2013 
Judge: JOHN HAWLEY JR. 
HAVING PLEAD GUILTY TO OR BEEN FOUND GUILTY, I AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING TERMS OF SENTENCING: 
FOR ANY JAIL TIME ORDERED BY THE COURT. 
Within 48 hours (between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., Monday - Friday except holidays}, the defendant shall make 
immediate contact in person, pay any required fee, cooperate with, and follow all instructions of said agencies. 
Defendant shall not report to the Day Reporting Center with any trace of alcohol in his or her system. Failure to 
do so will result in the issuance of a warrant for your arrest. 
Sheriff Court Services OR Day Reporting Center 
200 W. Front Street is1 Floor 
(208) 287-7185 
7180 Barrister - Boise, Idaho 
(208) 577-3460 
For any Juvenile Detention/Community Service report to: 400 N. Benjamin, Suite 201. 
Juvenile Defendant to contact the shift Supervisor at 287-5632 or 287-5629, within 5 working days. 
Total Days to Serve = D Concurrent D Consecutive to any other cases. D All Options Offered 
D Juvenile Community Service hrs: _______ to be completed by------------
FOR ANY TERM OF PROBATION ORDERED BY THE COURT; 
UNSUPERVISED I 
~ Notify Court of change of address ~ Commit no crimes ~ Pay all fines, costs, restitution & reimbursements 
~ Enroll/complete court approved education or treatment program(s) as ordered ~ Refuse no evidentiary testing 
SUPERVISED- Contact Probation Services below within 24 hours. Take any and all court paperwork from your sentencing 
on this case. Failura io do so will Yesult in the issuance of a warrant for your arrest. 
Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Services - call within 24 hours, (208) 577-3380 
8601 W Emerald St. Suite 150 
Boise, ID 83704 
FOR ANY Al\lD ALL CLASSES ORDERED BY THE COURT; 
The defendant shall make immediate contact with the court-approved programs as chosen below, within 24 hours, 
pay any required fee, arrive at each class on time, and fully cooperate with program sponsors. Also, take all court 
paperwork from your sentencing on this case to each of the programs. Failure to complete these programs as ordered 
may result in the issuance of a warrant for your arrest for a violation of probation. 
D Alcohol/Drug Ed. hrs __ D Anger Management hrs D Tobacco Ed hrs D Driving School hrs 
. D Cog Self Change [g] Victim's Panel O Theft Classes hrs D Domestic Violence Treatment weeks 
cgj Other __ Eval within 90 Days __ 
Provider Chc1sen by defendant: (Place stickers here) 
Defendant' Signature Date 
_r ___ -- -- As~~-NT -- - - - --- ---, 
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES 
366 SW 5th Ave. Suite 100 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Phone 898-9755 Fax 898-2544 
'·~----- -- ---
RELEASE OF INFORMATION: I hereby request and authorize the Department of Veterans Affairs to release information regarding my 
completion of the programs specified on this Judgment to Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Services (if supervised probation was 
ordered) or to the prosucLiling agency as listed above (if defendant is ordered unsupervised probation) 
Defendant's Signaturn Last 4 - SSN Date 
[Rev. 8/121 
000074
FllEO P.M._. __ _ 
. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE.FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRicl":dr:iii1t1Ei ' 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNl¥IOISMmiER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ANNA MORGAN 
- DEPUTY 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
. . 
-Thomas N Townsend 
409 Rose Lake Drive 
Mfddfeton, ID 83644 
Defendant. 
... ) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
) 
Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110 
NOTIFICATION OF PENAL TIES FOR . 
SUBSEQUENT VIOlATION OF ,. 
DOB: DRMNG UNDER THE INFLUENCE (DUI) LC, 18-8004 
· DL or SSN: .
NOTICE: If ~u plead gulltyto or are found gulllyof driving under the Influence (DUI), Including whhheld Judgments, th 
penoHies will, be os follows; · · 
1. A FIRST DUI is a misdemeanor, and you: 
(a) Maybe jailed for up to six months; and fined up to $1000; and 
(b) Shall have your driving privileges suspended for up to 180 days. NOTICE: YOUR DRMNG PRIVILEGE 
WILL BE SUSPENDED FOR 30 DAYS. THIS ISANABSOLUTE SUSPENSION WTH NO DRIVING 
PRMLEGES. 
2 .. A SECOND DUI wihin 10 ~ars is a misdemeanor, and you:· · 
~ailed for at least 10 days and, up to 1 ~ar,withthe irst,4.8 hours to be seNed consecutively, an 
five (5) days of which must be seNed in jail, and maybe fined up to $2000; and 
(b) Shall have your driving privileges suspended for 1 ~ar following your release from jaft, with absolutely n, 
driving privileges of any kind • 
. (c) Shall only drive a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock swem following the the on 
(1) war mandatory license suspension period. 
3. ADUI IS A FELONY IF IT IS: (1) a third DUlwihin 10 ~ars; or(2) a subsequent DUI with a previous felony DUI, 
Aggravated DUI within 15 ~ars; or (3) a second DUI within 10 ~ars where in both cases there was an alcohol 
concentration of 0.20 or more; and you: · · 
(a) Shall be sentenced to the custody of the State Board of Corrections for up to 10 ~ars (but If the court 
imposes a jail sentence instead of the state penitentiary, it shall be for a minimum of30 day.;), the first ,t.: 
hours to be seNed consecutively. and ten (10) days of which must be served In lal and maybe tned up t 
$5000;and . · 
(b) Shall have your driving privileges suspended for at least 1 ~ar and up to 5 ~ars after release tom · 
custody, wfth absolutely no driving privileges of any kind. . 
(c) Shall onlvdrive a motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system following the one (1 
war mandatory license suspension period. · 
I HAVE READ THIS ENTIRE DOCUMENT; I HAVE HAD IT EXPLAINED TO ME; AND I HAVE RECEIVED A COP' 
r D~!~ 
Defendant 
• 
000075
FILED 
P.M----
DEC 1 2 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri< 
By AMY LANG 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DEPUTY 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-4110 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
THOMAS TOWNSEND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
______________ .) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF IDAHO, BY AND 
THROUGH THE ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-named Defendant-Appellant, 
Jaryn W~tt, appeals against the State of Idaho to the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District, State of Idaho, from the Memorandum Decision Denying the 
Defendant's Motion To Suppress, entered on the 24th day of June, 2013, in State 
v. Thomas Townsend, Case No. CR-MD-2013-4110. 
a. Title of the Action: State v. Thomas Townsend 
b. Title of Court that heard Proceedings Appealed from and Presiding 
Magistrate: Magistrate Division of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
State of Idaho, the Honorable Judge John Hawley Jr. presiding. 
c. Case Number: CR-MD-2013-4110 
d. Court to Which Appeal Taken: District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District, State of Idaho. 
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e. Date and Hea(Jing of Judgment, Decision, or Order from Which 
Appeal is Taken: Memorandum Decision Denying Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress, issued July 24, 2013. 
f. Statement as to Whether Appeal is Taken Upon Matters of Law, or 
Upon Matters of Fact, or Both: 
1. Appeal is taken upon all matters of law and fact. 
2. The Defendant-Appellant anticipates raising issues including but not 
limited to: Did the magistrate court err in denying the defendant's 
motion to suppress? . 
g. Statement as to Whether the Testimony and Proceedings in the 
Original Trial or Hearing Were Recorded or Reported; Identification 
of Method of Recording or Reporting; Transcript Request: 
1. The proceedings in the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
were recorded through the magistrate court's courtroom audio 
recording mechanism. 
2: The audio recording is in the possession of the Transcript Coordinator 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho. 
3. The Defendant-Appellant requests the following transcript: Transcript 
from the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, held on June 24, 
2013. . 
h. Certification: I certify the following: 
1. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the 
reporter through the Clerk of the Court through 
Interdepartmental Mail. 
2. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the 
opposing party through Interdepartmental Mail. 
3. That the Defendant-Appellant is exempt from paying the 
estimated transcript fee because he is an indigent person and is 
unable to pay said fee. · ' 
4. That the Defendant-Appellant is exempt from paying the 
estimated fee' for preparation of the record because he. is an . 
indigent person and is unable to pay said fee. 
5. That the Defendant-Appellant is exempt from paying the . 
appellant filing fee because he is indigent and is unable to pay 
said fee. 
1. Jurisdiction: That the Defendant-Appellant may appeal to the District 
Court, and the judgment described above is appealable under and pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.l(a). 
DATED this --11::: day of December, 2013. 
H"d"T~·,. i· 
e1 1 o man 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellaqt 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ;rday of December, 2013, I ~~iled a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the: 
ADA County Prosecuting Attorney 
Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho 
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, Page 3 . 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
:~,-.-f,1#10~1-+.'-1~F~l~~.t======= 
DEC 1 2 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LANG 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Criminal No. MD 13 4110 
MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION 
OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL 
----------------
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, THOMAS TOWNSEND, by 
and through his Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public 
Defender's Office, HEIDI TOLMAN, handling attorney,. and. hereby 
moves this Honorable Court for its Order staying the execution 
of the sentence pending appeal in the instant case pursuant.'· to 
I.C.R. 54.5 (a). 
DATED, this \1-- day of December, 2013. 
HEIDI T0~-40:. 
Attorney for Defendant 
.• ,•• ,•1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ~day of December, 2013, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the:. 
ADA County 
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
··, 
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AM. FILED P.M. 3 y D 
1...,.-day, January 06, 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY: AMY EDWARDS 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
_200 W. Front Street, Boise Idaho 83702 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No: CR-MD-2013-0004110 
Thomas N Townsend ) 
409 Rose Lake Drive ) NOTICE OF HEARING 
Middleton, ID 83644 ) 
Defendant. ) 
--------------------
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion Hearing .... Tuesday, January 07, 2014 .... 11 :45 AM 
Judge: Michael McLaughlin 
Motion for Stay!ng Execution of Sentence Pending Appeal 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the court 
and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this notice were served as follows: 
Public Defender: 
Heidi M Tolman 
Emailed X 
Prosecutor: 
Michael Guy EmailedX 
Dated: 1/6/2014 
. -.. ~ 
{,, 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
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Judge McLaughlin . 1-7 Kim Madsen Courtroom509 
Time Speaker Note 
11 :58:42 AM I !CR-MD-13-04110 State vs. Townsend Motion Hearing 
~ : 
11 :58:49 AM t \Abraham Wingrove present with the defendant; Michael Guy I !tor the State ' . 
...................................................................................... ,> ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
11 :59: 12 AM /Judge lMotion to stay the execution of sentence pending appeal, 
l l reads sentence. Should the judgment be stayed 
12:00:58 PM !Judge !we have contacted the state's attorney by email and phone. 
l jThe clerk called today. Their office has received notice. They I !are not here so we will proceed. 
12:01 :32 PM 1 !Prosecutor walks in- Michael Guy 
12:02:08 PM !Judge \Are you asking to stay the jail sentence or the entire 
l ljudgment? Has the defendant obtained an evaluation? 
12:03:01 PM }Mr. !He has not completed the evaluation yet, he is indigent and 
lWingrove /currently in custody 
................................................................................... , ... >., ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
12:03:23 PM /Judge /Did they order jail programming in this case? It looks like they 
l jwere waiting for the eval 
12:04:03 PM f Mr. [1 would ask to waive the jail sentence, but in the alternative the 
[Wingrove [entirety . 
................................................ 4, ...................................... , ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
12:04:19 PM !Judge !He had all options. When you do in with a judgment of this 
! !kind you make arrangements. Why is he in custody 
t : 
12:04:47 PM iMr. iHe went into custody last Saturday, he is telling me he was 
jWingrove !made to report on Saturday. All of the options require payment 
I pn advance. 
12:05:54 PM jJudge !1 can see he is receiving SSI benefits. So you reported and 
1 jhad no money so you were placed in custody? 
12:06:48 PM I Defendant !That is correct. 
i i 
: : 
: : 
................................................ 4, ...................................... , .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
12:06:56 PM !Judge !The focus seemed to be the warrantees blood draw. 
12:08: 17 PM l Mr. !Whether its likely to succeed on the merits. Missouri vs. 
!Wingrove lMcNealy makes it clear, police don;t have the authority to 
l !require a blood draw. Deputies could have obtained a warrant 
l )but they told Mr. Townsend they would hold him down and 
I !take his blood. 
12:09:47 PM jMr. Guy jThe state would submit that the likelihood of succeeds on 
l [appeal would not be good based on this defendant. We 
! /believe there was a stipulation signed, no agreement on how 
! !the defendant would serve his sentence. He should serve the I !time, it could move forward and go to trial. If the motion to 
! !suppress is. overturned it does not mean the case will 
I (disappear. · 
12:12:00 PM!Mr. !Response · .. · · .......... ·· ............. · .................................... . 
!Wingrove I 
1/7/2014 1 of 2 
000082
• I I a1 
Judge McLaughlin 1-7 Kim Madsen Courtroom509 
12: 12:06 PM /Judge Assuming the appeal is successful and the blood sample is 
lsuppressed, I have seen cases tried without the blood or 
(breath and it is more difficult, but does not fatally cripple the 
/state. It might have been the assumption that options would 
]be avialable, but he does not have the funding for that. I would 
!hope in the future that when such a plea is entered that if I !~Jl~~s ~~a~nderstanding there will be appeal that counsel 
· 12:·1 s: 16 PM iJudge !This is an issue of descretion to an appelate court. Let me 
! !inquire of Mr. Townsend. 
12: 15:40 PM 1Defendant [7 years. I have a home in Middleton. I am not going anywhere. 
/ / I am not able to work. Is the State aware of the defendant 
1 )ailing to appear in the past? 
12:16:40 PM iMr. Guy iNo FTA's that I can tell. This is a second DUI, original was in ! · !2005 out of Michigan. 
12: 17:24 PM f Judge [ 19-2601 Idaho Code. He has ties to the community that he 
I /has stated here. 
12:18:29 PMJMr. Guy jwe can take the defendant at his word 
12: 18:36 PM f Judge I He has a home here. He has been in good conduct. The court 
l [will stay the jail portion of the sentence. Just that portion. I 
1 /want you to get an evaluation as stated in your judgment. I will 
1 )stay the fines pending appeal. I want you to attend the victims I I panel. If you don't do these things it would be a violation of 
( [this order. 
12:20:25 PM f Mr. Guy f Nothing more to add. 
12:20:32 PM jJudge jvou need to prepare a new order for the that is more specific . 
.. 1.2:20:54 PM f Mr. [ Staying the jail portion and the fines.· Attend the victims· panei" .. 
)Wingrove jand get an evaluation. 
12:21: 1 O PM !Judge [Continue to report to your attorney and you cannot leave the 
1 /state of Idaho 
.. ; ;:;: :;~ -:~·l~:~:uy -i~:ed~~i~;.s license_ ___ ___ ___ _ ___ _ __ _ ____ _ 
12:21 :37 PM ]Defendant (1 am going to sell my vehicle. 
! ~ 
12:23:34 PM !Judge !That is a good idea. We will get an order of release for today. 
: : 
12:23:35 PMi !END OF CASE 
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STATE OF IDAHO;. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS N TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------+-> 
FILED 
Tuesday, January 07, 2014 at 12:07 PM 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
ORDER OF RELEASE 
Prosecuting Agency: 
D Ada County D Boise City D Eagle 
D Garden City D Meridian 
**** 
TO THE SHERIFF OF ADA COUN OF THE STATE OF IDAHO: 
IT IS HEREBY OROERED that the bove-named Defendant be released from custody 
' 
ORDER OF RELEASE [REV 11-201 O] 
000084
: .... -
7i·tv1/ /)ti .;: 
..___ . , .... 
NO--'"!!!!l,,~--=F1="=LE:::-D--~;;;-----
A.M. \S:) .. P.M....;;;;..........--ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (2 08) 2 87-7400 
Facsimile: {208) 287-7419 
f\ece,'1e.o 
J~t\ \ 7 2.0\~ 
Ada countY C\etK 
-FEa · 1 1' 2014 
, -~. ·'... ' 
CHRISTO.PHER D. RICH, Clerk --- .. 
· .... ·sy Arf',Y. ~QWARDS 
; · '- ··0EPUTY_1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Criminal No. MD 13 4110 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF 
) SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL 
THOMAS TOWNSEND, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
The above entitled matter, having come before thi~ Court, 
and good cause appearing therefrom; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the 
defendant's jail sentence and fines are stayed pending the 
appeal of the July 24th, 2013 Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
\• 
to Suppress. HOWEVER, the following conditions are still in 
effect: 
1. Probation is not stayed and the Defendant must 
maintain contact with supervised probation. 
2. The Defendant must maintain contact with his attorney. 
3. The Defendant cannot drive . 
.... 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF.SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL 
t' 
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4. The Defendant may not leave the State of Idaho. 
5. The Defendant must attend Victims Panel . 
. 6. The Defendant must obtain an ·Alcohol Evaluation. 
DATED, this day of 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL 
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... .-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of February, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Ada County Public Defender 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Interdepartmenal Mail 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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NO·---~~--,,.;.~~-A FILED _3 .!3fl-
.M ____ 1P.M. __ _ 
JUN 1 9 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RAE ANN NIXON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS TOWNSEND, 
Defendant/ Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CRMD-2013-0004110 
) 
) NOTICE OF PREPARATION 
) OFAPPEALTRANSCRIPT 
) 
A Notice of Appeal was filed in the above-entitled matter on December 12, 2013 and a copy of said 
Notice was received by the Transcription Department on June 19, 2014. I certify the estimated cost 
of preparation of the appeal transcript to be: 
Type of Hearing: Appeal 
Date of Hearing: June 24, 2013 Judge: John Hawley, Jr. 
42 Pages x $3.25 = $136.50 
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83(k)(l), the appellant must, unless otherwise 
ordered by a District Judge, pay the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript within 
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, and the appellant shall pay the balance of 
the fee, if any, for the transcript upon completion. · 
In this case, the Ada County Public Defender has agreed to pay for the cost of the transcript 
fee upon completion of the transcript. 
The Tr~scription Department will prepare the transcript and file it with the Clerk of the District 
Court within thirty-five (35) days from the date of this notice. The transcriber may make 
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT - Page 1 
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application to the District Judge for an extension of time in which to prepare the transcript. 
Dated this 19TH day of June, 2014. 
RAE ANN NIXON 
Ada County Transcript Coordinator 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this 19th day of June, 2014, a true and correct copy of the Notice of Preparation of 
Appeal Transcript was forwarded to Appellant or Appellant's attorney of record, by first class mail, 
at: 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 West Front Street Ste 1107 
Boise, ID 83 702 
HEIDI TOLMAN 
RAE ANN NIXON 
Ada County Transcript Coordinator 
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT - Page 2 
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r~ 
-----------, 
\. FILED 
Tuesday, June 24, 2014 at 10:34AM 
CHRISTOPHER D. R , CLERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
THOMAS N TOWNSEND 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN That the above-entitled case has been reassigned to the 
Honorable JUSTICE GERALD F. SCHROEDER. 
DATED Tuesday, June 24, 2014. 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT-Criminal 
HEIDI M TOLMAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
200 W FRONT ST RM 1107 
BOISE ID 83702 
000090
.. " • I NO. _______ .....,.._, -2~9--
FILED 9 ;!, A.M ____ P.M___., __ _ 
JUL 1 8 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RAE ANN NIXON , , , 
DEPUTY , ''. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
· THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
TH<;)MAS TOWNSEND, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
To: Kale Gans, 
To: Heidi Tolman, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CRMD-2013-00041.10 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
APPEAL TRANSCRIPT 
Attorney for Respondent. 
Attorney for Appellant. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT a transcript of the proceeding in this action was 
lodged with the Court on July 18, 2014. 
YOU ARE NOTIFIED that you may pick up a copy of said transcript at the 
District Clerk's Office, Ada County Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise, ID 83702. 
Unless objections to the content of the transcript are received within twenty-one 
(21) days from the date of mailing of this notice, such transcript shall be deemed settled. 
Date this 18TH day of July, 2014. 
RAEANN NIXON 
Deputy Clerk of the District Court 
NOTICE OF LODGING - 1 -
,. 
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I hereby certify that on this 18th day of July, 2014, a true and correct copy of the Notice 
of Lodging was sent via US Mail to: 
ADA CO. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
200 W. FRONT ST. STE. 3191 
BOISE, ID 83702 
KALE GANS 
ADA CO. PUBLIC DEFENDER 
200 W. FRONT ST. STE. 1107 
BOISE ID 83702 
HEIDI TOLMAN 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
RAE ANN NIXON 
Deputy Clerk of the District Court 
- 2 -
000092~ 
.-, 
JUL 3 1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RIC NELSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDHAO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
THOMAS TOWNSEND , 
Defendant/ Appellant 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
NOTICE OF FILING 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(p), the transcript of the proceedings dated June 241\ 2013, is now filed. 
Dated this 31 51, day of July, 2014. 
NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL- PAGE I 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 31 51, day of July, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPARTMENT 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL- PAGE 2 
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; 
\ NO. ~ 
AM,~~~ij[., ==~Fll.Et>i'i:nP.M:::::: 
JUL 3 1 2014 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clark 
By RIC NELSON 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFDEPUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS TOWNSEND, 
Defendant/A. 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE 
ON APPEAL 
Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all 
the testimony of the original trial or hearing has been ordered and the estimated cost of 
said transcript having already been paid OR Ada County having agreed to pay the costs 
of said transcript upon completion; 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the filing of the 
transcript. 
2) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within 28 days after service 
of appellant's brief. 
3) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within 21 days after 
service of respondent's brief. 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 1 
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I 
\ 
4) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument in writing after all 
briefs are filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither 
party does so notice for oral argument, the Court may deem oral argument waived and 
decide the case on the briefs and the record. 
Dated this 31 51, day of July, 2014. 
GERALD F. SCHROEDER 
Senior District Judge 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 2 
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{ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 31 5\ day of July, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPARTMENT 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 3 
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. .., 
.,.-; 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
NO.- FILED ~ ;;:---
"'--:---~~,P.M.~~--,~r---~~ 
AUG - 4 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SHERRI BOUCHER 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS TOWNSEND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________ ). 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-4110 
MOTION TO SUSPEND THE 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
COMES NOW, appellant, by and through the Ada County Public Defender's Office, and 
moves this Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 32(c), for an order suspending the briefing 
schedule in the above-entitled appeal until the remittitur has been issued in State v. Halseth, 
docket number 41169 .. The current case js an appeal from: a judgment of conviction resulting 
from a conditional guilty. plea challenging Mr. Townsend's warrantless blood draw. This exact 
issue is pending in Halseth. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has already begun suspending cases involving this 
issue. See June 10, 2014 Order in State v. Burrill, docket number 41151, a copy of which is 
attached to this motion. Suspending the briefing schedule now will permit the parties to address 
Halseth in their initial briefing rather than through supplemental briefing, which is in the interest 
of judicial economy. 
/MOTION TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE, Page 1 
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,, 
,. 
.\_ 
; 
Counsel for the respondent has not been contacted in regard to the instant motion. 
DATED this j day of August, 2013. 
Heidi Toln/an 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this l{,rL day of August, 2013, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State ofldaho 
by depositing the same in the Interdepartment 
MOTION TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE, Page 2 
000099
·~ 
In the Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,) 
v. 
JONATHON PATRICK BURRILL, 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross 
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER 
No. 41151 
Upon review of the briefs and the issues raised on appeal, this Court has decided to 
suspend proceedings in this appeal pending issuance of a Remittitur in State v. Halseth, Supreme 
Court Docket No. 41169; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal shall be SUSPENDED PENDING THE 
ISSUANCE OF A REMITIITUR in State v. Halseth, Supreme Court Docket No. 41169, at 
which time proceedings in this appeal shall proceed accordingly. 
DATED this /lf<.day of June 2014. 
ATTEST: 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
000100
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
- \ : 
:..., 
NO·---,![aj--,.,.~,,__ 
A.M. ____ FllED_,P.M 1,0"2-= 
AUG 2 0 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RIC NELSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS N. TOWNSEND, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Criminal No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
ORDER SUSPENDING 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
The above entitled matter, having come before this Court, and good cause appearing 
therefrom; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the briefing schedule 
on the above-entitled appeal is suspended until the remittitur has been issued in State v. Halseth, 
docket number 41169. 
DATED, this 2b day of f/eA..JLA..Sf- , 2014. 
ORDER SUSPENDING BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
CR-MD-2013-0004110 
GERALD SCHROEDER 
District Judge 
000101
NO. (Y 4 J\IT FILED 
A.M. ~ ·~ ' P.M----
MAR 2 0 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RIC NELSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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'.-~ I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
.~ -
Nature of the Case 
Thomas Townsend (hereinafter "Townse:nd") Vii~.s arrested for Driving Under the 
Influence (hereinafter "DUI''), a violation of Idaho Cod·~-§ 18-8004. A blood draw took 
: ' .,. 
place after Townsend was in custody for DUI. A M.otion to Suppress was filed to 
: •, 
exclude evidence derived from the warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw that was 
obtained from Townsend. A hearing was held and the court denied the defendant's 
motion to suppress. Townsend appeals from the Court's denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence and its finding that the blood draw evidence obtained in the case is 
admissible. 
Townsend raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the implied consent 
that was given as a matter of Idaho law, qualifies as a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement; and (2) whether given the "totality of the circumstances" a warrantless 
blood draw was justified under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
. -· . 
Having come on for hearing on defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and 
. " 
Supporting Memorandum on June 24, 2013, the following facts were established: This 
case began on March 23, 2013·, at approximate.iy 1 :30 a.m., when Townsend was pull~d 
over by Detective B(II Weires in the Wal-Mart p~rking 161: on State Street and Glenwood 
in Garden City, Idaho, because he was driving down the wrong side of the road on the 
opposite side of the· raised median, after making a' u-turn. There were two other 
passengers inside the vehicle. (6/24/2013 Tr. p." 5-6, Ls. 1-16). Once Detective Weires 
approached the vehicle, he could smell a strong odor··of alcohol and noticed signs of 
Brief of Appellant - 2 
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\ 
•f.·· ', , 
intoxication. (6/24/2013, Tr. p. 8, Ls. 17-23). Townsend said he had been to Shorty's 
Saloon on Glenwood in Garden City and had consumed approximately seven beers 
with food in between. (6/24/2013 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-25). After Townsend failed all three 
' .. 
field sobriety tests, Detective Weires arrested him for driving under the influence. 
. ' 
(6/24/2013, Tr. p. 10, Ls. 7-14). It took less than10 minutes for Deputy Lakey to arrive 
to assist with the arrest. (6/24/2013 Tr. p. 10, Ls. 15-21 ). After that, Detective Wei res 
had him perform a breath test with the LifeLoc in the back of his patrol car, the results of 
which were insufficient because Townsend did not have his mouth sealed around the 
machine properly. (6/24/2013 Tr. p. 11, Ls. 1-25). 
After the insufficient blow, Detective \/Veires explained to Townsend that he 
' ' 
would be having his blood drawn at the Ada County JaH. (6/24/2013 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 2-6). 
Detective Weires admitted that he never told Townsend that he had the option to ·opt ;ut 
of taking the blood draw. Detective Weires then acknowledged that he had· written ·a 
. .. 
statement of probable cause that the param~dics conducted "an involuntary blood 
draw," and that he characterized the blood dra~~ as i~~ioluntary. (6/24/2013 Tr., p. 18, 
Ls.16-23; p. 19-20). ·Townsend testified that when Detective Weires told him he was 
'' 
going to have to take his blood, he responded, "I guess you're gonna have to take it. 
I'm not gonna, I wasn't gonna fight him .... This is totally against my constitutional right; I 
don't believe in taking my blood. Besides, I'm 71 years old, I don't want to have a 
coronary fight'n ya." Then, when asked if he gave police permission to take his blood, 
he responded "No," and that it was involuntary on ti1i~ part. He further testified th~t 
. . .: 
officers told him that if he did not submit to a blood draw they would hold him down. To 
·", . .:I :, 
this, he replied, "I'm not going to resist you, but I'm totally against this." (6/24/2013 Tr. p 
25, Ls. 5-25; p. 26, Ls. 1-11). 
Brief of Appellant - 3 
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Townsend's Motion to Suppress was denied on July 24, 2013. And he was 
sentenced on December 10, 2013. Townse~d timely appeals from the denial of his 
. .. 
Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Does Idaho's Implied Consent Stat1;.Jte Create a Valid Exception to 
the'Warrant Requirement When Consent was Revoked?· 
·.:2. Under the "Totality of the Circumstances" standard, 
.; was the Warrantless and Nonconsensual Blood Draw 
Justified under the Exigency Exception to the 
Warrant Requirement? 
ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho's Implied Consent Statute Does Not' Create a Valid Exception to the 
Warrant Requirement When Consent is Revoked. 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho's impliea consent statute provides that any person who drives on Idaho 
roads "shall be d~emed to·;- have .. given h.~~ con:~ent to evidentiary testi~g for 
concentration of al~o.hol" so long as the police officer has "reasonable grounds to 
• • I , , •• ':. 
believe" the person· is under .the infiuence 1.c: § 18:8002(1). The evidentiary tests 
: , • ..r-:, • .. 
available to officers ihclude blood testing. I.C. § 18-8002(9). 
Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is a search and seizure 
' ' 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 17 
of the Idaho Constitution. "Like the Fourth Ame8dment, the purpose of Art. I, section 17 
. ' . 
is to protect Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against arbitrary 
governmental intrusion." State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575 at 577, citing Schmerber v. 
Brief of Appellant - 4 
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California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); State v. Diaz,. 
144 Idaho 300, 302,.160 P.3d 739,741 (2007), and .State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 
503, 975 P.2d 789, 791 (1999). 
The Idaho legislature has acknowledged a driver's physical ability to refuse to 
submit to an evidentiary test, but it did not· create a statutory right for a driver :to 
withdraw his previously given consent to an evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol, 
drugs or other intoxicating substances." State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 372, 775 
P.2d 1210, 1214 (1989). Thus, the court has held in Idaho a person cannot revoke his 
consent; any evidence an officer obtains from a blood test, even when that person 
resists or withdraws consent, will be admitted based on statutory implied consent. 
.. 
Because Idaho does not recognize a driver's right to revoke his implied consent, Idaho 
has a per se exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Wulff, 337 P .3d 575 at 582. 
However, the court in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 
2d 696 (2013), placed new limits on the ability of officers to conduct warrantless blood 
tests. The court reasoned that allowing warrantless .-blood draws based on Idaho's 
implied consent statute would act as a per se· exception to the warrant requirement, 
which contradicted McNeely's language that warrantless blood draws should be 
examined case by case. State· V. Wulff, 337 P .3d 575 at 577. 
The court in Wulff held that because McNeely p~ohibits per se exceptions to tl~e 
warrant requirement and the district court corr~ctly understood Idaho's implied consent 
. .. 
statute operated as a per se exception, Idaho's implied consent statute does not fall 
under the consent: exception to the Fourt'h Ame:ridment of the United States 
Constitution. Therefore, the court overruled Diaz and ·woolery to the extent that they 
. . 
applied Idaho's implied consent statute as an irrevocable per se rule that constitutionally 
Brief of Appellant - 5 
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allowed forced warrantless blood draws. The court held that the district court properly 
concluded that Idaho's implied consent statute was not a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement, and affirmed the district court's grant of W~lff's motion to suppress. 
In State v. Wulff, the issue was whether the . .-United States Supreme Court's 
holding in McNeely i~ narrow and limited to the exig~r{cy exception, or is br~ader and 
applies to all per se exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id at 579. The Wulff court 
. ' 
held that McNeely's overall discussion suggests a broader reading: that implied consent 
is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception to the warrant 
requirement because the Court repeatedly expressed disapproval for categorical rules. 
Id at 580. 
"McNeely proscribed what it labeled categoricai or per se rules for warrantless 
blood testing, emphasizing over and over again that' .the reasonableness of a search 
must be judged based on the totality of the ~ircumstances presented in each case." 
Wulff at 581, citing State v. Weems, 434 S.W. 3d at 665. Irrevocable implied consent 
operates as a per s~ · rule that cannot fit unde(the consent exception because it do(,7s 
- . ' 
not always analyze the voluntariness of that consent. Voluntariness has always been 
analyzed under the totality of the circumstanc.es app.roach: "Whether a consent to. a 
search was in fact 'voluntary' ... is a question of fact to b·e determined from the totality°of 
the circumstances." Wulff at 581, citing Schneckloth v. ·Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 
93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). 
Idaho's implied· consent statute must jump two hurdles to qualify as voluntary: (1) 
drivers give their initial consent voluntarily, and (2) drivers must continue to gi•Je 
. . . 
voluntary consent. Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary testing by 
.. 
driving on Idaho roads volunta'rily. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 
' 
Brief of Appellant - 6 
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742 (2007). Because consent is implied based on drjving on Idaho's roads, a further 
issues is whether th~ consent exception to the Fourth Amendment can apply after a 
driver attempts to revoke his consent to a blood draw. Wulff at 582. 
In State v. Halseth, 339 P.3d 368, the c9urt help that an implied consent. statute 
such as Washington's and Idaho's does not jµstify a warrantless blood draw from . .a 
driver who refuses to consent, as did Aviles, or objects to the blood draw, as did 
Defendant in .this case. Consent to a search must be voluntary. · Halseth at 371, citing 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 
(1973). Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person 
to withdraw that consent. Id. at 371, citing McNeely, 569 U.S. at 133 S. Ct. at 1566. By 
l 
objecting to the blood draw, Defendant withdrew his implied consent. Therefore the 
district court did not err in granting the motion to suppress. 
'· In the matter at hand, as the officers' reports make clear, Townsend objected to 
and denied permission for a blood draw. Despite the clear lack of consent for the blood 
draw, the officers forcibly drew Townsend's blood. Hence, he effectively revoked his 
implied consent under the statute and his blood draw was involuntary and therefore 
illegal and unconstitutional. 
B. Under · the Totality of the Circumst.ances, the Warrantless an·d 
Nonconsensual Blood Draw was Not Justified Under the Exigency Exception to 
the Warrant Requirement. · · · 
ARGUMENT 
A search with?,_ut a w~rrant is presumpti~ely inv~lid, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978), and a "warrantless search of.the person is reason~ble only if 
·: '~ ' : . ' 
it falls within a recognized exception" to the warrant requirement, Missouri v. McNeely at 
l , ,11, ... 
Brief of Appellant - 7 •,' ···. 
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1558. Exigent circumstances is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requireme~t. 
and is presumably t_he exception· on which the· State· relied in conducting the force·d 
blood dr_aw. Exigent circumstances exist "when the exigencies of the situation make the 
needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively 
reasonable." Id at 1558. 
In Missouri v. McNeely, the court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in th·e 
bloodstream does not establish a per se exigency that suffices on its own to justify an 
exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving 
investigations. Id. at 1558. That court held that each case of alleged exigency must be 
evaluated based "on its own facts and circumstances." To determine whether a law 
enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant require'd 
the Court to look to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1559. 
In fact, as far back as Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) was decided, 
. ... •' 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Schmerber directs lower courts to engage in 
a totality of the circumstances analysis when determining whether exigency permits a 
. ·. . .. 
nonconsensual, warrantless blood draw." McNeely at 1'557, citing Schmerber, 358 S.W. 
3d, at 69, 74. The c~urt further concluded the Schmerber "requires more than the mere 
dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence to support.a warrantless blood draw in an alcohoi-
related case." Id. at .1557. The reason for the "totality ·of the circumstances" test, rather 
than a per se exigency exception ··to the w~rrant requirement is that a motorist~· 
diminished expectation of privacy does not dim111ish their privacy interest in preventing 'a 
government agent from piercing their skin. Any compelled intrusion into the human 
body implicates significant, constitutionally protected · privacy interests. McNeely at 
1555. The importance of requiring authorization by a 'neutral and detached magistrate' 
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before allowing an officer to "invade another's body i~ search of evidence of guilt is 
indisputable and great." Id. at 1558, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-
14 (1948)). 
Blood Alcohol Content ("BAC") evidence naturally dissipates in a gradual and 
relatively predictable manner. Moreover, because an officer must typically take a DWI 
suspect to a medical facility and obtain a trained medical professional's assistance 
before having a blood test conducted, some delay between the time of the arrest or 
accident and time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether a warrant is obtained. 
Id. at 1555. In evaluating exigency under the "totality of the circumstances" test, the 
court looks at factors that may cause an investigatory delay, such as whether an officer 
was delayed by the need to investigate an accident and transport an injured suspect to 
the hospital as was the case in Schmerber. 
In McNeely, the court found that the case was "unquestionably a routine DUI 
', . 
case" in which no factors other than the natural dissipation of blood-alcohol suggested 
that there was an emergency. McNeely at 1557. As in McNeely (and unlike 
Schmerber), Townsend was not involved in an accident, was cooperative, and his 
passengers were cooperative and did not requfre any additional attention other than a 
back-up officer who arrived ·in less than 10 minutes to assist Detective Wei res. 
Moreover, as in McNeely, the ·officers.did not attempt fo secure a warrant. Id. at 1557. 
A delay could not have been determined because an attempt to acquire a warrant was 
~ . . 
never made. There were two officers at the scene in this case. One could have made 
an attempt to get a warrant for the blood draw while the other was handling this very 
routine DUI investigation. 
Brief of Appellant - 9 
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,. 
There is no indication that the· officers sought to obtain a warrant before forcibly 
drawing Townsend's blood, or that there was anything that would have prevented them 
from doing so within a reasonable amount of time. There was no exigency in this case 
justifying the warrantless blood draw. Accordingly, the forced physical intrusion beneath 
Townsend's skin and into his veins to obtain a sample.of his blood for use as evidence 
i 
in a criminal investigation violated Townsend's rights to be free from an unreasonable 
search protected by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 17 
of the Idaho Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Townsend respectfully petitions this Honorable 
appellate court in view of his constitutional rights to vacate the judgment of conviction 
and reverse the court's denial of Townsend's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
DATED this Jl!!.day of April, 2015. 
Deputy Ada County Public Defender 
Brief of Appellant - 10 
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Statement of the Case 
On March 23, 2013, Thomas Townsend was arrested for violating Idaho Code§ 18-8004, 
Driving Under the Influence and §49-301, Failure to Purchase a Driver's License. After the 
Defendant did not provide a breath sample, a warrantless blood draw was conducted at the Ada 
County Jail. The defense filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the 
warrantless blood draw and the motion was argued before the Honorable Judge John Hawley Jr. 
on June 23, 2013. After taking the matter under advisement, Judge Hawley denied the motion on 
July 24, 2013. On December 10, 2013, the parties stipulated to entry of a conditional guilty plea 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule ll(a)(2), and the Defense filed notice of appeal two days later. 
On January 17, 2014, an order staying execution of the Defendant's sentence pending appeal was 
filed with the court, and on July 31, 2014, both a notice of filing transcript on appeal and order 
governing procedure on appeal were filed. On August 20, 2014, pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 32, the Honorable Judge Gerald Schroeder granted a Defense motion to suspend the 
briefing schedule until issuance of the remittitur in State v. Halseth, docket number 41169, 
finding good cause to do so. The remittitur in State v. Halseth was issued on January 5, 2014, the 
Appellant's brief was filed on April 20, 2014 and this appeal follows. 
I. Statement of Facts and Proceedings Relevant to this Appeal 1 
The facts relevant to this appeal were established on June 24, 2013 when the motion to 
suppress was heard by the court. The facts have been set forth in a transcript of the proceeding 
and the Honorable Judge John Hawley Jr. 's memorandum decision regarding the motion to 
suppress evidence. 
On March 23, 2013, Detective Bill Weires of the Ada County Sheriff's Office observed a 
vehicle tum left from Glenwood in Ada County onto State Street, and proceed westbound in the 
eastbound lanes of State Street into oncoming traffic. Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion 
to Suppress Evidence, Magistrate Judge John Hawley Jr. (July 24, 2013). Detective Weires 
. 
activated his overhead lights, initiated a traffic stop and was able to identify the driver as the 
Defendant, Thomas Townsend, in the driver's seat. Id. Upon contacting the Defendant in the 
vehicle, Detective Weires observed indicators of impairment including glassy, red eyes, thick-
1 The Defendant has not challenged the Magistrate's findings of fact 
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tongued, slurred speech and the odor of alcohol coming from the cab of the truck. Id. Because 
two passengers were in the vehicle, Detective Weires called dispatch for an officer to assist as 
back up and Deputy Lakey with the Ada County Sheriffs Office arrived ten minutes later. Id. 
The investigation continued once the Defendant stepped out of the vehicle, where he admitted to 
consuming four, then seven beers prior to driving. Id. The Defendant failed three field sobriety 
tests and was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence. Id. After Detective Weires 
placed the Defendant in a patrol vehicle, he played the Administrative License Suspension audio 
recording, which notifies suspects of the subsequent penalties for refusing to submit to 
evidentiary testing. Id. After waiting fifteen minutes, Detective Weires determined the Defendant 
had not burped, belched or vomited and provided an explanation of a breath test to the 
Defendant. Id. During the Defendant's first breath sample attempt on the Lifeloc instrument, he 
blew quickly and then stopped, rendering an insufficient sample result. Id. Detective Weires 
instructed the Defendant again on how the test was conducted, what was required of him, and 
also explained that a blood sample would be taken if he did not comply with the Lifeloc test. Id. 
On his second sample attempt, the Defendant failed to exhale any air and then stated he was not 
going to comply with the test and Detective Weires would have to take his blood. Id. After being 
transported to the Ada County Jail, an Ada County paramedic drew samples of the Defendant's 
blood. Id. According to Detective Weires, the Defendant was compliant, polite and did not 
physically resist the draw but was not informed that he could opt out of the draw. Id. The 
Defendant testified during the suppression hearing that he objected to the blood draw procedure 
and protested that the procedure violated his constitutional rights, but did not object or protest 
specifically to Detective Weires. Id. The Defendant testified that jail staff told him that he would 
be held down if he did not cooperate, but admitted that he was not held down and did not 
physically resist the blood draw. Id. 
The Court also considered affidavits from Joe Andreoli, a Detective with the Boise City 
Police Department and Cecily Willerton, a planning analyst in the Planning and Research 
Department of the Ada County Sheriffs Office. The affidavit of Detective Andreoli stated that 
telephonic warrants were not in use as of March 2013 in Ada County and expedited search 
warrants were also unavailable at that time. Andreoli Aff. 6, 8. Detective Andreoli also stated 
that at minimum, obtaining a search warrant in a driving under the influence case would take one 
and one half hours in March of 2013, with procuring a warrant during the daytime taking up to 
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three and one half to four hours and nighttime warrants taking additional time. Id at 4, 7. The 
affidavit of Cecily Willerton stated that twenty individuals were arrested and booked at the Ada 
County Jail between 6:30 pm on March 22 and 5:55 am on March 23, 2013 with forty-five 
percent being for driving under the influenced. Willerton Aff. 4-6. 
Defendant-Appellant, Thomas Townsend, appeals the trial court's denial of the motion to 
suppress in the Fourth Judicial District ofldaho. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the 
warrantless draw of the Defendant's blood, finding that implied consent was given as a matter of 
Idaho law and qualified as a valid exception to the warrant requirement to obtain a sample of his 
blood. The lower court also found the anticipated time delays in the warrant application process 
were sufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw based on exigency, another valid exception to 
the warrant requirement. Through this appeal, the Appellant advances two theories: (1) Idaho's 
implied consent statute does not create a valid exception to the warrant requirement when 
consent is revoked, and (2) when considered under the totality of the circumstances, the blood 
draw was not justified under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. Given the facts 
of this case and support for the trial court's finding that a warrant was not required due to the 
presence of an exception to the warrant requirement, the denial of the motion to suppress should 
be upheld. 
Argument 
I. Standard of Review on Appeal 
In reviewing a trial court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the 
standard of review is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, an 
appellate court will accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State 
v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, 
the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and 
draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 
897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 
1999). The Court must follow controlling precedent "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 576 
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(2014); State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) (quoting"Reyes v. Kit Mfg. 
Co., 131 l~aho 239,240, 953 P.2d 989,990 (1998)). 
II. The trial court correctly held that both the consent and exigency exceptions to the 
warrant requirement were present, allowing the warrantless draw of the 
Defendant's blood to be lawful and Constitutional under the circumstances 
Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test as part of an investigation for 
driving under the influence is a search and seizure of the person under both the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution, Art. I, §17. Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 
160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. I, §17 is to protect 
Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against arbitrary governmental intrusion. State 
v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 506, 975 P.2d 791, 796 (1999). Warrantless searches and seizures are 
presumptively unreasonable. Diaz at 302. To overcome the presumption of unreasonableness, the 
search must fall within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement and must be 
reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id.; See also U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471 (1973). A "reasonable" search in the context of a forced blood draw 
means "done in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force." Diaz at 301-
302 (citing Schmerber at 770); State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 371, 233 P.3d 1286, 1293 
(Ct.App. 2010). Exigency and consent are two well-recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed. 2d 865, 872 (2011); Diaz at 302. 
A. Sufficient exigency existed under a totality of the circumstances to require a 
blood draw of the Defendant without a warrant 
When the facts of a specific case make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the exigency 
exception to the warrant requirement applies. King at 1856. In filing the original motion to 
suppress, the Defendant relied heavily on the landmark case Missouri v. McNeely. Prior to 
McNeely, the U. S. Supreme Court had ruled that natural dissipation of alcohol in the 
bloodstream through metabolic processes provided an inherent exigency sufficient to justify a 
warrantless blood draw incident to a lawful arrest for driving under the influence. Schmerber at 
770-771; State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). In McNeely, the 
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Supreme Court took a different approach from prior holdings, providing that "the natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient 
to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1568, 
185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712 (2013). In addition, the court indicated the standard by which 
reasonableness of a warrantless search should be measured, "under the exigency exception, 
reasonableness must be evaluated case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." State 
v. Halseth, 339 P.3d 368, 369 (2014)(citing McNeely at 1560). The Court in McNeely rejected 
the State's contention that exigency necessarily exists in every instance when an officer has 
probable cause to believe an individual has been driving under the influence, specifically noting 
advances in expeditious processing of warrant applications. The majority discussed technological 
advances streamlining the warrant process: 
"Well over a majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to 
apply for search warrants remotely through various means, including telephonic 
or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video 
conferencing. And in addition to technology-based developments, jurisdictions 
have found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using 
standard-form warrant applications for drunk driving investigations." McNeely at 
1562. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court, in Missouri v. McNeely, exiled Idaho's use of a per se 
exigency exception to the warrant requirement for driving under the influence blood draws, the 
ruling does not purport to foreclose the exception's application altogether. The Court did not 
hold that natural dissipation of alcohol by the body can never provide an exigency exception to 
the warrant requirement but rather it cannot provide a per se exception, with metabolism of 
alcohol being one factor to consider. Wulff at 579; McNeely at 1558, n. 2. Additional factors to 
consider include the procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of magistrate 
judge, the presence of either may affect whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious 
way and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a warrantless search. Weems v. State, 
434 S.W. 3d 655, 662 (2014); McNeely at 1562. 
The trial court correctly found that the warrantless blood draw of the Defendant was both 
reasonable and within the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. The 
court's findings were twofold; first, the available timeframe for the State to gather evidence was 
shortened because Idaho law prevents the State from extrapolating backwards to determine blood 
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alcohol content. Second, the court determined that judicial authorization in the form of a warrant 
was not required, as the anticipated time delay in securing a warrant justified conducting a blood 
test without a warrant at the time of the Defendant's arrest. 
The trial court emphasized an important assumption relied upon by the majority in 
McNeely, which was the ability of the State to extrapolate backwards to determine blood alcohol 
content at the time of the stop. Memorandum Decision. With this ability, the State could 
mathematically calculate blood alcohol content of the Defendant at the time of arrest, rendering 
the hours required to obtain a warrant insignificant. Id. Idaho Code § 18-8004 makes it a per se 
violation.for "any person ... who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 ... or more, as shown by 
analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive a motor vehicle within Idaho. Id.; Idaho Code 
§18-8004(l)(a). Furthermore, to incentivize compliant with evidentiary testing, the Idaho 
legislature enacted Idaho Code § 18-8004(2), with precludes prosecution of individuals for 
driving under the influence having an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08, provided drug use 
is not suspected. Idaho Code § 18-8004(2). Dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream significantly 
hinders the State's ability to prosecute driving under the influence suspects, particularly when 
Idaho is unable to use retrograde extrapolation as an investigative tool. Without this ability, the 
timeframe for gathering evidence becomes of the utmost importance to preserving evidence. In 
March of 2013, the anticipated time required to obtain a search warrant for driving under the 
influence was, at minimum, one and one-half hours with the potential time frame increasing 
significantly at night, as was this case. Memorandum Decision; Andreloi Aff. 4, 7. Additionally, 
telephonic warrants were not in use in Ada County and expedited search warrants were not 
available in driving under the influence cases. Andreloi Aff. 6, 8. The anticipated time delay in 
the warrant application process was · a basis for justifying a blood test without judicial 
authorization. Memorandum Decision. 
The Defense posits that exigency is not present simply because law enforcement officers 
made no attempt to secure a warrant for the Defendant's blood, or established that they would 
have been prevented from doing so within a reasonable amount of time. Brief of Defendant-
Appellant at 10. This argument disregards the trial court's reliance on the anticipated delays for 
obtaining a search warrant specific to March of 2013, as well as other factors contributing to the 
totality of the circumstances. The warrant application process in Ada County at the time of the 
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Defendant's arrest was not streamlined and the likely delay of two or more hours threatened the 
availability of evidence. There was no standard search warrant form available for use in drunk 
driving cases at that time and the arrest took place after midnight. Furthermore, the Defendant 
contributed to the delay in that he was first offered a less intrusive evidentiary method in the 
form of a breath test but refused to comply. The trial court also emphasized the State's interest in 
prosecuting a potentially excessive alcohol content driver. Memorandum Decision. Given the 
Defendant's admission to consuming seven beers, driving the wrong direction down a public 
street and failing all three field sobriety tests, it was reasonable for an officer to suspect an 
excessive blood alcohol content, creating an even greater interest in prosecuting the potential 
offender. Id. In sum, the dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream, when combined with other 
factors present in Ada County at the time of arrest, created a sufficient exigency to justify a 
blood test without judicial authorization. 
B. Idaho's implied consent statute created a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement for a search and seizure of the Defendant's blood, as the facts do 
not establish the Defendant revoked his consent to evidentiary testing 
In addition to exigency, consent is a well-established exception to the warrant 
requirement. Implied consent was given by the Defendant as a matter of Idaho law, pursuant to 
Idaho's implied consent statute, §18-8002. This code section provides that a person gives 
implied consent to evidentiary testing, including blood testing, when that person drives on Idaho 
roads, so long as a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving 
or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation ofldaho's driving under the influence 
statute. Idaho Code §18-8002(1), (9). Idaho Code §18-8002(4) provides penalties for any driver 
who refuses to comply with testing, with implied consent to evidentiary testing including 
Breathalyzer tests and blood tests. Idaho Code § 18-8002(9). The specific evidentiary test 
employed is of the officer's choosing. Diaz at 302. In Idaho, statutory implied consent cannot be 
withdrawn as a matter of law. See State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410, 973 P.2d 758, 762 
(Ct.App. 1999). There is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent, even if the 
individual has the ability to physically prevent evidentiary testing. Id. In Missouri v. McNeely, 
Missouri's implied consent statute was at issue, which had been interpreted to allow a driver to 
withdraw statutorily implied consent by refusing to submit to evidentiary testing. Memorandum 
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Decision. Consensual blood testing was not addressed, with the majority specifically referencing 
scenarios when a motorist withdraws their consent. Id; McNeely at 1565-1566. 
Since the trial court's decision, case law has developed regarding the withdrawal of 
implied consent in Idaho. In State v. Halseth, the Defendant was arrested on suspicion of driving 
under the influence. After he refused field sobriety tests, law enforcement transported the 
Defendant to a nearby hospital for evidentiary testing of his blood. The Defendant explicitly 
protested the blood draw, stating, "You can't take my blood! I refused!" Halseth at 368. Blood 
was drawn despite his protests, without a search warrant. The Court affirmed granting of the 
motion to suppress, holding that an implied consent statute such as Idaho's does not justify a 
warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent, or objects to the blood draw, as did 
the Defendant. Halseth at 371. By objecting to the blood draw, the Defendant effectively 
withdrew his implied consent. Id Consent to a search must be voluntary, not the product of 
duress or coercion, and is a fact to be determined from the totality of all circumstances. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,229, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052 (1973); Halseth at 371. 
In State v. Eversole, the defendant refused to participate in a breath test for alcohol 
concentration, with a warrantless blood draw subsequently conducted. State v. Eversole, No. 
41063, 2015 Ida.App.LEXIS 25 (Ct. App. April 8, 2015) (case used solely for purposes of 
discussing the court's reasoning, courtesy copy attached). Although the facts did not include a 
reaction to the officer's demand for a blood draw, the court determined the absence of a second 
objection by the Defendant to the draw would be immaterial. Id at 9. By refusing to submit to a 
breath test, the Defendant had already withdrawn the statutorily implied consent. Id. 
It is significant to note that the lower court did not address or make a factual finding as to 
whether the Defendant revoked his implied consent. However, the facts of both Halseth and 
Eversole are distinguishable from the facts before this court. First, the Defendant was given the 
opportunity to submit to a less intrusive evidentiary test and specifically advised of the 
consequence if he did not comply. After failing to exhale on the second breath attempt, the 
Defendant stated he would not comply with the test and Detective Weires would have to take his 
blood. Although the Defendant testified at the suppression motion that he objected to the blood 
draw procedure and protested the potential violation of his constitutional rights, it is unclear to 
whom he voiced those concerns. Second, when the blood draw was actually conducted, he did 
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not physically resist and was not held down by anyone. Lastly, rather than explicitly protesting 
the draw, as the defendant in Halseth, the Defendant in this case stated he simply never gave 
anyone permission. The Defendant consented to a breath test, was unable to perform the test and 
acquiesced to a blood draw. Thus, the facts do not support a finding that the Defendant revoked 
his implied consent given as a matter of Idaho law, permitting a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement to be present based on consent. 
C. The blood draw performed on the Defendant was reasonable, as it was done 
without unreasonable force and in a medically acceptable manner by Ada 
County paramedics 
The trial court determined that the blood draw conducted was both without unreasonable 
force, and done in a medically acceptable manner. The Appellant alleges that the forced physical 
intrusion beneath the Defendant's skin and into his veins for the blood sample violated his right 
to be free from an unreasonable search. Appellant brief at 10. The defendant did not physically 
resist the blood draw and was not held down in the process of obtaining the sample. 
Memorandum Decision. The blood draw was conducted only after the Defendant did not perform 
a less intrusive evidentiary testing method, and he was polite and compliant throughout the test. 
Id. Lastly, qualified Ada County paramedics performed the blood draw, with no evidence of 
record suggesting the test was not conducted according to medically acceptable standards. Thus, 
the trial court did not err in concluding the blood draw was reasonable in light of all surrounding 
circumstances. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests this court uphold the denial of 
the Defendant's motion to suppress and conviction for Driving Under the Influence and Failure 
to Purchase a Driver's License. 
DATED this ( 3 day of May 2015. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ad 
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State v. Eversole 
Court of Appeals of Idaho 
April 8, 2015, Filed 
Docket No. 41063, 2015 Opinion No. 20 
Reporter 
2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 25 
Notice: PURSUANT TO RULE I 18 OF THE fJ)AHO 
APPR!.I.ATE RULES, THIS DECISION rs NOT FINAL 
UNTIL EXPIRATION OF THE 21 DAY PETITION FOR 
REHEARING PERIOD. 
Prior History: ['~II Appeal from the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bingham County. 
Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 
Disposition: Order denying motion to dismiss, affi1111ed; 
order denying motion to suppress evidence, vacated, and 
case remanded. 
Core Terms 
blood, implied consent, withdrawal, testing, breath test, 
alcohol, evidentiary, blood test, operable, suppression 
motion, district court, driver, warrantless, motion to dismiss, 
motor vehicle, statutorily, alcohol concentration, withdrew, 
revoked, refuse to provide, refuse to submit, stipulated facts, 
blood testing, breath sample, truck 
Case Summary 
Overview 
HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court did not err by denying 
defendant's motion to dismiss the charges under Idaho 
Code A1111. § 18-800:/(5 I because it correctly detennined that 
the fact-finder could sensibly conclude that defendant and 
his companions were capable of rendering the vehicle 
operational in a short period of time, even though the 
vehicle was stuck on the berm; [2]-The trial court erred by 
denying defendant's motion to suppress the test results of 
defendant's warrantless blood draw because it was 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and Ida/to 
Cons,. art. /, § 17, as he withdrew any implied consent 
created by Idaho Code Ann. § I 8-8002(1) by refusing to 
participate in a breath test for alcohol concentration and the 
State presented no evidence of defendant's consent to the 
subsequent blood draw. 
Outcome 
Order denying motion to dismiss was affinned, defendant's 
conviction was vacated. and the case was remanded. 
LexisN exis® Headnotes 
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Standards of Review> Abuse 
of Discretion > General Overview 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceedings> Pretrial 
Motions & Procedures > Dismissal 
HNI The Court of Appeals of Idaho reviews a district 
court's decision on a motion to dismiss a criminal action for 
an abuse of discretion. Idaho Crim. R. 48(a). When a trial 
court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court dete1111incs whether the lower court: (I) 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently 
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
before it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Vehicular Crimes > Driving 
Under the Influence > Elements 
HN2 See Idaho Code ,1nn. § l8-tW04(/J{a ). 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Vehicular Crimes > Driving 
Under the Influence > Elements 
HN3 "Actual physical control" is defined to mean being in 
the driver's position of the motor vehicle with the motor 
running or with the motor vehicle moving. Idaho CodcA!.!11.,. 
§ 78-8004(51. Interpreting this language, the Court of 
Appeals of Idaho has held that the "actual physical control" 
portion of the DUI statute presupposes the presence of a 
vehicle that can be controlled. The threat that is targeted by 
this part of the DUI statute is the danger that a parked 
vehicle will be put in motion by an intoxicated occupant and 
thereby pose a risk to the safety of the occupant and others. 
This targeted risk does not exist when the vehicle is not 
operable, nor subject to being readily made operable, nor in 
motion (whether by coasting or being pushed), nor at risk of 
coasting. If a vehicle cannot be moved it is not a motor 
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vehicle capable of being "controlled," and the reason for the 
statutory prohibition does not exist. Consequently, the 
statute is not violated when the vehicle is not in motion or 
susceptible of easily being placed in motion. 
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Vehicular Crimes> Driving 
Under the Influence > Elements 
HN4 For purposes of driving under the influence, when 
there is evidence from which a fact-finder could sensibly 
conclude that the vehicle was reasonably capable of being 
rendered operable, the issue is for the jury. 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & 
Seizure > Warrants 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless Searches > 
Consent to Search > Sufficiency & Voluntariness 
Evidence > Burdens of Proof > Preponderance of Evidence 
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Driving Under the Influence> 
Blood Alcohol & Field Sobtiety Testing > Admissibility 
HNS Requiring a person to submit to a blood draw for 
evidentiary testing is a search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Idaho 
C011st. art. I. § 17. Therefore, warrantless forced blood 
draws are generally violative of the state and federal 
constitutions. However, the warrant requirement does not 
apply if the person subjected to the search has consented. 
Consent must be voluntary and not the result of duress or 
coercion, either direct or implied. The voluntariness of an 
individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the 
circumstances. Mere acquiescence to a claim of authority by 
a law enforcement officer does not constitute consent. 
Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product 
of coercion, is a question of fact to be determined by all the 
surrounding circumstances. The State bears the burden to 
prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless Searches > 
Consent to Search > Sufficiency & Voluntariness 
HN6 Consent, once given, may also be revoked, for 
inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the 
right of the person to withdraw that consent. Thus, after a 
defendant has revoked consent, officers no longer may act 
pursuant to that initial voluntary consent. Of course, an 
individual may renew his consent after revoking it. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol & Field 
Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General Overview 
HN7 See Idaho Code Ann. §_J~-800@. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol & Field 
Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > Refusals to Submit 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless Searches > 
Cons~nt to Search > Sufficiency & Voluntariness 
HN8 A defendant's refusal, protest, or objection to alcohol 
concentration testing terminates the implied consent. An 
implied consent statute such as Idaho's, Idaho CMe A1111. § 
U/-8002(1 ), does not justify a warrantless blood draw from 
a driver who refuses to consent or objects to the blood draw. 
Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the 
right of the person to withdraw that consent. 
Counsel: Sara B. ThomaR, State Appellate Public Defender; 
Justin M. Cu1tis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, 
for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. 
Spencer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
Judges: LANSING, Judge. Chief Judge MELANSON 
CONCURS. Judge GRATTON, CONCURRING TN PART 
AND DISSENTING IN PART. 
Opinion by: LANSING 
Opinion 
LANSING, Judge 
Brant Lee Eversole entered a conditional guilty plea to a 
charge of operating a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, preserving his right to appeal orders denying a 
suppression motion and a motion to dismiss. He argues that 
evidence of his blood alcohol content should have been 
suppressed. He also contends that the charges should have 
been dismissed because his vehicle was not operational. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
An officer observed Eversole in the driver's seat of a truck 
located in front of a bar. The truck was high-centered on a 
two-foot tall ''brick berm," such that the rear wheels of the 
["'21 vehicle did not touch the ground. Two other men were 
providing help, trying to get the vehicle off of the berm by 
lifting the vehicle with a jack. In the officer's view, the jack 
strategy was unlikely to work and he described it as a 
"feeble" effort, but he also opined that their strategy might 
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work if the jack was positioned "a little bit differently."1 
The officer approached the individuals, and his observations 
led him to believe that Eversole was intoxicated. The officer 
began administering field sobriety tests. Eversole attempted 
to complete some of the field sobriety tests, but refused to 
complete them all. Because the attempted tests indicated 
intoxication, Eversole was arrested. Thereafter, Eversole 
additionally refused to submit to a breath alcohol 
concentration test. Eversole was then taken to a hospital and 
his blood was drawn. The blood test showed that 1*31 
Eversole had an alcohol concentration of .279 grams of 
alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood, 
well over the threshold required to prove "excessiveness" as 
defined in Idaho Code. § /8-8004C. Eversole was charged 
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol in violation of /.C. §§ 18-8004(1 Jfu), 18-8005(9). 
Eversole filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood 
draw. Rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing on the 
suppression motion, the parties stipulated to the facts to be 
considered by the district court, including the following: 
At the time of his arrest, Mr. Eversole refused to 
provide a breath sample for the purpose of 
determining his blood alcohol content. 
Upon the Defendant's refusal to provide a breath 
sample, Deputy Morgan transported the Defendant 
to Bingham Memorial Hospital where Tiffany 
Henderson, a technician in the lab, drew Mr. 
Eversole's blood pursuant to Deputy Morgan's 
request. 
Eversole conceded that under Idaho statutes, as applied in 
then-current Idaho case law, persons driving within the state 
gave implied consent to wa1Tantless blood draws. 
Nevertheless, he argued that the Idaho precedents regarding 
warrantless blood draws had been abrogated by a recent 
United States 1"'41 Supreme Court decision. The district 
court held that the Idaho precedents had not been overruled 
and that an objection to alcohol testing does not invalidate 
statutorily implied consent. Accordingly, it denied Eversole's 
suppression motion. 
Eversole also filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the 
State could not prove that the vehicle was operable at the 
time he was in it. The district court disagreed and held there 
was some evidence that Eversole and his companions could 
have moved the vehicle within a short time, rendering it 
operable. On this basis, it held that the question of operability 
should be submitted to the trier of fact. 
Following the denial of the suppression motion and the 
motion to dismiss, Eversole entered a conditional Alford2 
plea preserving his right to appeal the denial of these two 
motions. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
On- appeal, Eversole argues that the district court erred by 
denying his motion to dismiss and by denying his 
suppression motion. 
A. The District Court Properly Denied the Motion to 
Dismiss 
HNI This Cou1t reviews a district court's decision on a 
motion to dismiss a criminal action for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Martine?.-Grmzn/ez. 152 Idaho 775, 778, 
275 P.3d I. 4 (Cl. App. :!012); State 1•. Dixon. /40 Idaho 301. 
KM, 92 l~3d 55 {L 554 (Ct. Au/L1_004 /: see Idaho Crimi11al 
Rule 48(a). When a trial court's discretionary decision is 
["'51 reviewed on appeal, the Court determines whether the 
lower court: (I) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it; and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Jdulw 598, 600, 768 
P.2d 1331. 1333 (1989); State 1,: Pole. /39 Jdaho 370. 372, 
79 P.3d 729. 731 (Ct. App. 2003i. 
Below and on appeal, Eversole argues that the charges 
should have been dismissed because the truck was stuck on 
the berm and was therefore inoperable.3 Idaho Code section 
/8-80(J./.{l)(a) describes the offense of driving under the 
influence as follows: 
HN2 It is unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence of alcohol ... to drive or be in actual 
1 The officer believed that the most expedient means of moving the car would have been to pull the vehicle loose using a tow strap. 
The vehicle was eventually towed off by a tow truck. However, at the time the officer observed the vehicle, he did not see any other 
vehicles that could be used to tow the truck off of the berm. 
2 See Norrh Cmvlina v. Alf'onl. 400 U.S. '.!5. 91 S. Ct. 160.,_27 L. Ed. '.!d.162 (1970>. 
3 Because we conclude that the motion was properly denied on the merits. we need not detennine whether the motion amounted to an 
impermissible motion for summary judgment in a criminal case. See SJ.file•,~ l\llev. 1.55 Idaho 972. 981. 318 P.3d 962. 971 (2014). 
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physical control of a motor vehicle within this 
state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or 
upon public or private property open to the public. 
(emphasis added). The statute further defines HN3 "actual 
physical control" to mean "being in the driver's position of 
the motor vehicle with the motor rnnning or with the motor 
vehicle moving." /. C. § 18-800.f.(5). Interpreting this 
language, this Court has held: 
The "actual physical control" portion of the DUI 
statute presupposes the presence of a vehicle that 
can be controlled. The threat that is targeted by this 
part of the DUI statute 1*6.1 is the danger that a 
parked vehicle will be put in motion by an 
intoxicated occupant and thereby pose a risk to the 
safety of the occupant and others. This targeted 
risk does not exist when the vehicle is not operable, 
nor subject to being readily made operable, nor in 
motion (whether by coasting or being pushed), nor 
at risk of coasting. If a vehicle cannot be moved it 
is not a motor vehicle capable of being "controlled," 
a~d the reason for the statutory prohibition does 
not exist. Consequently, the statute is not violated 
when the vehicle is not in motion or susceptible of 
easily being placed in motion. 
State v. Adams, /42 Idaho 305. 308. 127 P.3d 208, 211 (Ct. 
Arm. 2005 ). Applying this rule, we held that HN4 "when 
there is evidence from which a fact-finder could sensibly 
conclude that the vehicle was reasonably capable of being 
rendered operable, the issue is for the jury." Id. 
Relying on Adams, Eversole argues that his vehicle was 
neither "in motion ln]or susceptible of easily being placed in 
motion." We disagree. The district court correctly determined 
that the fact-finder r*71 could "sensibly conclude" that 
Eversole and his companions were capable of rendering the 
vehicle operational in a short period of time. A finder of fact 
could have credited the officer's testimony that the jack 
strategy could have worked if the jack was positioned "a 
little bit differently." Therefore, the issue should be decided 
by the trier of fact and the order denying dismissal was 
proper. 
B. The Warrantless Blood Draw Was Unconstitutional 
and Test Results Must Be Suppressed 
HNS Requiring a person to submit to a blood draw for 
evidentiary testing is a search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Artic:/e I. 
Section 17 of the Jdaho Constitution. Schmaher I'. 
California, 384 U.S. 757. 767. R6 S. Ct. 1826. 16 L. Ed. 2d 
908 (1966); State v. \¥111[£ 157 Idaho 416, 4/R, 337 l~3d 
575, 577 (20/ .. /-). Therefore, warrantless forced blood draws 
are generally violative of the state and federal constitutions. 
Missouri v. McNeelv, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558, 
/85 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013); Wulff. 157 Idaho at .f.ft), 337 P3rl 
at 578. However, the warrant requirement does not apply if 
the person subjected to the search has consented. Sclmerkloth 
v. Busranwnte. 4 I 2 U.S. 218, 222. 93 S. Ct. 2041. 36 L. Ed. 
2d 854 (1973); State v. Domi11guez. 137 Idaho 681, 683, 52 
P.3d 325. 327 (Ct. Aap. 2002j. Consent must be voluntary 
and not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or 
implied. Schnecklorh, 412 U.S. at 248; Swte v. Whitelev, 
124 Idaho 261. 264, R58 P.2d 800. 803 (Ct. App. 1993). The 
voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light 
of all the circumstances. United States v. Mendenhall. 446 
U.S. 544. 557, 100 S. Ct. 1870. 6.f. L. Ed. 2d 497 (19801; 
Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 226-27; State , .. Hansel'J.,. 138.J.dJ.dw 
791. 796. 69 P.3d /052. 1057 <2003); Whitelev, 124 Idaho 
at 264. 858 l~2d at 803. Mere acquiescence to a claim of 
authority by a law enforcement officer does not constitute 
consent. Bumper v. Nonh Carolil!a, 39 l U.S. 543, 5.f.9. 88 S. 
Ct. 1788. 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968); State 1•. Smith, 144 Idaho 
4H2, 488, 163 /~3d JJ<J4, 1200 (2007); State 1•. :tietsorr, 145 
Idaho 112. 118, 175 P.3d ROI. 807 (Ct. App. 2007). Whether 
consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product of 
coercion, is a question 1*81 of fact to be determined by all 
the surrounding circumstances. Hansen. 13H Idaho at 796, 
69 P.3d at 1057. The State bears the burden to prove consent 
by a preponderance of the evidence. United Stares 1: 
Matl<)('k • .f.15 U.S. 16.f., 177 11. l .f., 9-1 S. Ct. 988, 39 L Ed. 2d 
242 (]<J74); Ilansen, 138 Ida/,() at 796, 69 P3d at 1057; 
Slate v. Kilhv, 130 Jdalzo 747. 7.f.9. 947 P2d 420, .f.22 (Ct. 
App. 19971. 
HN6 Consent, once given, may also be revoked, for 
"[i]nherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is 
the right of the person to withdraw that consent." State i: 
Halseth. 157 Idaho 643, 646. 339 P.3d 36.'1, __ 37 LJ20!.f.l. 
Thus, after a defendant has revoked consent, officers no 
longer may act pursuant to that initial voluntary consent. 
State, .. TI!ome, /41 Idaho 151, 15.f.. 106 P3d .f.77, 480 (Ct. 
Aw. '2004/. Of course, an individual may renew his consent 
after revoking it. Id. 
Below, both the State and the district court relied upon 
Idaho's implied consent statute, Idaho Code secrion 
/8-80021 I), which states that HN7 "any person who drives 
or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary 
testing for concentration of alcohol." At the time of the 
proceedings below, Idaho Supreme Court precedent held 
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that this statutorily implied consent satisfied the consent 
exception to the constitutional warrant requirement. State v. 
Diaz, 144 ldahp 300 .. 303. 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007), 
overruled by WullE 157 Idaho 41 n, 337 P.3d 575. 
Additionally, and in contravention of the general rule that 
consent may be withdrawn or revoked, our Supreme Court 
had held that actions or statements revoking implied consent 
were ineffective. Stare 1•. Woolerv. J 16 Idaho 368. 373, 775 
P.2d 12 JO, 12 J 5 (1989), overruled by \Vu![(, 157 Idaho 416. 
337 P.3d 575. These l.''9.1 points of law have recently 
changed, however. In a series of recent decisions, the Idaho 
Supreme Court reexamined its application ofldaho's implied 
consent statute in light of the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in McNeely, U.S. . 133 S. Ct. 1552 .... 185 L. Ed. 
2d 696. In Wulff. our Supreme Court concluded, "A holding 
that the consent implied by statute is irrevocable would be 
utterly inconsistent with the language in McNeely 
denouncing categorical rules that allow warrantless forced 
blood draws." Wulff. J 57 Idaho at ./22. 337 P.3d at 581. 
Accordingly, under current law, HN8 a defendant's refusal, 
protest, or objection to alcohol concentration testing 
terminates the implied consent: 
[A]n implied consent statute such as ... Idaho's 
does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a 
driver who refuses to consent ... or objects to the 
blood draw .... Inherent in the requirement that 
consent be voluntary is the right of the person to 
withdraw that consent. 
Halseth. 157 Idaho at 646, 339 1~3d at 371. See also State 
11. t1rrottu. 157 ldaho 773. 774. 339 P.3d 1177. 1178 (2014) 
(" A suspect can withdraw his or her statutorily implied 
consent to a test for the presence of alcohol."). 
In this case, Eversole refused to participate in a breath test 
for alcohol concentration. He thereby withdrew any implied 
consent created by /. C. § 18-8002(1 J. After this refusal of 
the breath test, he was taken to a hospital 1'*1111 where a 
blood sample was drawn for alcohol testing. Because 
Eversole's implied consent already had been revoked, the 
consent exception to the warrant requirement was 
inapplicable unless the State proved some subsequent action 
or statement by Eversole renewing his consent. The State 
did not do so. The stipulated facts include no information 
regarding Eversole's reaction to the officer's demand for a 
blood draw. Even if Eversole did not specifically object to 
the blood draw, that absence of a second objection would be 
immaterial, for by refusing to submit to a breath test he had 
already withdrawn the statutorily implied consent. Under 
the rule announced in Halseth, and elaborated in Wulf( and 
ArrQL(Q, this withdrawal was effective and terminated the 
operation of the "implied consent" imposed by statute. As 
the State presented no evidence of consent to the blood 
draw, that blood draw was an impermissible warrantless 
search, and the test results must be suppressed. 
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is vacated and this 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Chief Judge MELANSON CONCURS. 
Concur by: GRATTON (In Part) 
Dissent by: GRATTON (In Part) 
Dissent 
Judge ORATION, CONCURRING IN PART 1·~111 AND 
DISSENTING IN PART. 
I concur with the Court's conclusion regarding the motion 
to dismiss; however, 1 disagree with the Court's conclusion 
regarding the motion to suppress. Specifically, I disagree 
with the Court's finding, whether factual or as a matter of 
law, that Eversole's refusal to take the breath test was a 
withdrawal of his implied consent for all purposes including 
other evidentiary testing. 
The motion to suppress in this case was submitted on a 
stipulation of facts regarding defendant's motion to suppress. 
fn that stipulation, it is agreed that: 
3. At the time of his arrest, the Defendant refused 
to provide a breath sample for the purpose of 
determining the Defendant's blood alcohol content. 
4. Upon the Defendant's refusal to provide a 
breath sample, Deputy Morgan transported the 
Defendant to Bingham Memorial Hospital where 
Tiffany Henderson, a technician in the lab, drew 
his blood pursuant to Deputy Morgan's request. 
(Emphasis added.) The district court recited the statements 
in the stipulation verbatim as its findings of fact. The district 
court made no further findings regarding Eversole's refusal. 1 
Most assuredly, Eversole refused or objected and thereby 
withdrew his implied consent to evidentiary breath testing. 
1 Indeed, there is nothing to the contrnry in the record. In the officer's [•J 121 affidavit of probable cause, the officer reported that 
"[Eversole] stated he understood the form and would not consent to the breath test." 
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There is absolutely nothing in the stipulated facts, submitted 
and relied upon for the motion to suppress, which expressly 
relates to any objection, refusal, or withdrawal of implied 
consent by Eversole to submit to an evidentiary blood test. 
The record is completely devoid of any mention of protest 
to the blood test. One simply cannot read the stipulated facts 
to expressly include a refusal or withdrawal of implied 
consent to the blood test. Therefore, to the extent the Court 
is holding that the stipulated evidence of "refusal to provide 
a breath sample" is, as a matter of fact, also a refusal to 
submit to any further evidentiary testing, including blood 
testing, I cannot agree. 
Similarly, I cannot agree with the Court to the extent it is 
implying a refusal of blood testing from the refusal of breath 
testing. Certainly, most people would rather submit to the 
less intrusive breath test than a blood test. But, the refusal of 
a breath [*13] test does not support an implication that the 
person is also refusing a blood test, even though it is a more 
intrusive procedure. Any number of valid reasons exists for 
refusing a breath test but not a blood test. The blood test is 
more accurate (which could be exculpatory). An individual 
may know of, or be embarrassed by, a medical condition 
that would make the breath test difficult or impossible. See 
Hel{rich v. State, 131 Idaho 349. 351, 955 P.2d 1128. 1130 
(Ct. AmJ. 1998/ (''Helfrich sufficiently articulated a physical 
inability to complete the [breath test] so as to put the officer 
on notice that a different test should be utilized."). An 
individual may have had a prior experience with difficulties 
in performing breath testing. Whatever the potential reason, 
refusal of one test does not imply refusal of another. 2 Again, 
to the extent the Court is implying a refusal or withdrawal 
of implied consent to a blood test from refusal of a breath 
test, I cannot agree. 
So, without I" 141 an express or implied factual basis for 
finding withdrawal of implied consent by Eversole to blood 
testing, it seems apparent that the Court is holding that his 
refusal of the breath test operates, as a matter of law, as a 
refusal and withdrawal of consent to any and all evidentiary 
testing. Indeed, the Court states: "In this case, Eversole 
refused to participate in a breath test for alcohol 
concentration. He thereby withdrew any implied consent 
created by /.C. § 18-8002( //." On what basis this 
determination is made I cannot discern. The Court provides 
no analysis of what is required to withdraw all consent or, 
on a textual or policy basis., how refusal of the breath test 
operates to withdraw all implied consent. 
In State v. Arrotta. I 57 Idaho 773, 774. 339 P.3d II 77. JJ78 
(20 I 4 ), the Court held that: "A suspect can withdraw his or 
her statutorily implied consent to a test for the presence of 
alcohol." (Emphasis added.) That is exactly what happened 
here; under the stipulated facts, Eversole withdrew his 
implied consent to "a test," namely, a breath test. In Sf.ate .!'c 
Halseth. 157 Idaho 643, 339 P.3d 368 (20 I.//, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the implied consent statute does 
not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who 
objects to the blood draw and that "by objecting to the blood 
draw, Defendant withdrew [*15] his implied consent." Id. ar 
6./6, 339 P.3d at 371. Halseth protested the blood draw, 
stating: "You can't take my blood! I refused! How can you 
just take it without my permission?" Id. at_§£!:., 339 P.3d at 
369. Under present law, a driver may certainly withdraw his 
or her consent to an evidentiary test. I find no support for the 
conclusion that refusal as to one specific test is a withdrawal 
of statutorily implied consent to any evidentiary testing. In 
Helfrich. /31 Idaho at 351. 955 P2d at //30, we stated that 
"nothing in Helfrich's behavior suggested to the officer that 
she would refuse to submit to a different type of alcohol 
concentration test." If Helfrich's initial refusal operated to 
withdraw all implied consent, she would not need to "refuse 
to submit to a different type of alcohol concentration test." 
Id. 
In Mill$.. v. S\1'a11so11 1 93 Idaho 279. 280 • ./60 P.2d 704, 705 
(1969), the Supreme Court addressed whether a driver's 
silence when requested to submit to chemical testing of the 
blood constituted a refusal for purposes of an administrative 
license suspension. In that case, the Court detem1ined that 
where the driver had been in an accident, was bleeding, had 
lost numerous teeth, had sustained head injuries, a fracture 
of the periosteum, and was conscious but dazed, silence in 
response to a request for testing did not constitute a refusal 
["'161 for purposes of license suspension. Id. at 279-81, 460 
P.2d at 70./-06. The Court framed the question as whether 
the driver's silence in response to the request for a chemical 
test of the blood constituted "a withdrawal of the statutorily 
granted consent to such test." Id. at 280. 460 P.2d at 705. 
The Court analyzed what constitutes a refusal and withdrawal 
of consent. 
This court in the case of Stme v. Bock. 80 /d'1lu,1. 
296. 308. 328 P.2d /065, 1072 (19581, said: 
By operating a motor vehicle in this state 
the defendant is "deemed to have given 
his consent to a chemical test". The only 
2 Consider the opposite situation; the individual was first offered and refused blood testing and then was given a breath test, as to which 
there was no apparent protest. Would the Court, by implication, deem the refusal of the blood test to be a refusal of the less intrusive 
breath test? 
000139
Page 7 of 7 
2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 25, *16 
way he can withdraw that consent is to 
expressly refuse the test. So under our law 
if he neither refuses nor consents, 
expressly, the test may be made. 
In the case at bar, the respondent did not at any 
time expressly refuse to take the test. Expressly 
means in direct or unmistakable tenns. Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged); 
Black's Law Dictionary 692 (Revised 4 ed. 1968). 
Expressly means declared and not merely left to 
implication. Magone ~: Heller. 150 U .. 'i.,_]Q._1.1. 
S.Ct. 18. 37 L.Ed. JOO! (1883!; Citv & Coumv of 
San Francisco v. Wesrem Airlin.§ ..L Inc.. 204 
Cal.Apn.':!d 105. 22 Cal.Rvt1; 216 (1962). 
Mills. 93 Idaho ar 280, 460 P.2d at 705. The Mills Court 
concluded that where an individual has neither refused nor 
consented, it cannot be said that there was an express refusal 
to take the test. Id. 3 This holding is consistent with the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Halseth. 157 Idaho at 
646, 339 P.3d ar 37 l (requiring that the driver either consent 
[* 17] or object). Since a refusal and withdrawal of 
implied consent must be express and may not be "merely 
left to implication," ,Wills. 93 Idaho at 280. 460 P.2d nt 705, 
I cannot agree that, under the stipulated facts in this case, 
Eversole expressly refused or withdrew his implied consent 
to evidentiary blood testing. 
3 Note that both the Mills and Bock Courts repeatedly reference refusal the take "the test." In my view, these cases support the 
proposition that refusal must be test specific (or a clear and express refusal as to all evidentiary testing). 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR-MD-2013-0004110 
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vs. OPINION ON APPEAL 
THOMAS TOWNSEND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: ELIZABETH H. ESTESS 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: ABBY KOSTECKA 
Thomas Townsend appeals from the decision of the magistrate denying his 
motion to suppress. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The appellant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence, a violation of Idaho 
Code § 18-8004. A blood draw took place after he was in custody. The appellant moved 
to exclude evidence derived from the warrantless blood draw. The magistrate denied 
the motion to suppress following hearing. The appellant appeals from the denial of the 
motion to suppress evidence and the finding that the blood draw evidence obtained in 
the case was admissible. The appellant pied guilty conditioned on his ability to appeal 
the magistrate's denial of his suppression motion. See Stipulation to Enter Conditional 
Plea of Guilty (December 10, 2013). 
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The magistrate found the following facts: 
On March 23, 2013 at approximately 1:30 a.m., Detective Bill Weires of 
the Ada County Sheriff's Office was on patrol in northwest Boise, Idaho. 
Weires testified that he was northbound on Glenwood following a 
Chevrolet pickup which was also northbound on Glenwood. The pickup 
truck was driven by Defendant Thomas Townsend (hereafter 'Townsend') 
turned left from Glenwood onto State Street. Townsend turned to the left 
of the concrete barrier on State Street and proceeded west bound in the 
east bound lanes of State Street. Townsend was traveling the wrong way 
into the oncoming east bound lanes. Weires turned on the overhead lights 
of his patrol vehicle. Townsend proceeded approximately another 40 feet 
before turning left into a Wal-Mart parking lot. Weires testified that 
Townsend turned off State Street at the first pull out after traveling less 
than a quarter mile in the wrong direction in the east bound lanes. 
Weires approached the pickup and identified the driver as the Defendant 
Townsend, who was seated in the driver's side position. There were two 
passengers in the pickup. Wei res immediately detected a. strong odor of 
alcohol coming from the cab of the truck. He also noted that Townsend 
had glassy, red eyes, that his speech was thick-tongued and slurred. 
Townsend told Weires that he had just left Shorty's Saloon on North 
Glenwood. 
Because there were two passengers in the vehicle Weires called into 
dispatch for an officer to assist as backup. Townsend and the passengers 
remained in the truck until Deputy Lakey, ACSO, arrived 10 minutes later. 
Weires continued his investigation of Townsend by having him exit his 
vehicle. During conversation Townsend admitted that he had consumed 
four beers and later admitted that he had consumed seven beers while at 
Shorty's Saloons. Weires testified that Townsend performed poorly on the 
standard field sobriety tests. Townsend failed all three field sobriety tests 
and was arrested for suspicion of Driving Under the Influence. 
Wei res placed Townsend in the back seat of his patrol vehicle where he 
played the Administrative License Suspension (ALS) audio that notifies 
suspects of the potential penalties for refusing to submit to evidentiary 
testing and waited 15 minutes before requesting Townsend to submit to a 
breath test on the Lifeloc FC20. Weires determined that Townsend had 
not burped, belched or vomited during the 15 minute waiting period. 
After receiving an explanation of the test Townsend quickly blew into the 
instrument and then stopped on his first attempt on the Lifeloc rendering 
an insufficient. Weires again explained in detail how the test was 
conducted and what Townsend was required to do. Weires explained to 
Townsend that if he did not comply with the Lifeloc test that he would need 
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to take a blood sample. Townsend then simply failed to exhale any air on 
his second attempt. Townsend stated that he was not going to comply with 
the test and that Weires would have to take his blood. Townsend was 
transported to the Ada County Jail to submit a blood sample. After arriving 
at the Ada County Jail, an Ada County paramedic drew blood samples 
from Townsend. Weires testified that Townsend was polite and compliant 
and that he did not physically resist the blood draw. 
Weires testified that he never informed Townsend that he could opt out of 
the blood draw. He simply told Townsend that if didn't comply with the 
breath test that he would do a blood draw. Townsend testified that he 
objected to the blood draw procedure and protested that the procedure 
violated his constitutional rights. These objections were not voiced to 
Weires, but could have been made to someone else at the Ada County 
Jail. Townsend further testified that jail staff told him that if he did not 
cooperate they would hold him down and take his blood. Townsend 
admitted that no one ever held him down. He stated that he never gave 
anyone permission to take his blood and that he did not physically resist 
the blood drawing. 
Ultimately Townsend was cited and was charped with Driving Under the 
Influence a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004 and Failure to Purchase a 
Driver's License, a violation of Idaho Code § 49-301. On April 25, 2013 
Townsend filed a motion to suppress evidence ... 
The State ... submitted the affidavits of Detective Joe Andreoli and Cecily 
Willerton and the narrative report and probable cause affidavit of Detective 
Weires in opposition to the motion [to suppress]. Detective Andreoli's 
affidavit states that telephonic warrants were not in use in Ada County as 
of March 2013 and expedited search warrants in drunk driving (DUI) cases 
were unavailable in March 2013. Andreoli's affidavit further states that 
procuring a warrant during the daytime could take three and one half to 
four hours while nighttime warrants would take additional time. Andreoli's 
affidavit also indicates that obtaining a search warrant in a DUI would 
have taken a minimum of one and one half hours in March 2013. 
Cecily Willerton's affidavit states that between 6:30 p.m. March 22 and 
5:55 a.m. on March 23, 2013 20 individuals were arrested and booked at 
the Ada County Jail. Forty-five percent of these bookings (or 9 cases) 
were for DUI. Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress 
Evidence, at 1-3. 
1The amended complaint states Mr. Townsend had a "an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, to wit: .154 
as shown by an analysis of his blood .... " Amended Complaint, at 2. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving 
a trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. 
State v. ~enner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of 
law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 
134 Idaho 458,462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2007). 
"When reviewing 'seizure' issues, we defer to the trial court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous.2 We freely review, de novo, the trial court's legal 
determination of whether or not an illegal seizure occurred." State v. Schwarz, 133 
Idaho 463, 466, 988 P.2d 689, 692 (1999). 
ANALYSIS 
The appellant raises the following issues: (1) "[d]oes Idaho's implied consent 
statute create a valid exception to the warrant requirement when consent was 
revoked?" and (2) "[u]nder the 'totality of the circumstances' was the warrantless and 
nonconsensual blood draw justified under the exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement?" Brief of Appellant, at 4. 
2See also State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005) ("The Court accepts the trial 
court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence."). 
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1. Consent 
The first issue asserted by Mr. Townsend is his contention that the blood draw 
was unauthorized because he "objected to and denied permission for a blood draw. 
Despite the clear lack of consent for the blood draw, the officers forcibly drew 
Townsend's blood." Brief of Appellant, at 7. 
At the time of the magistrate's decision, which included his determination that the 
appellant impliedly consented to the blood draw,3 State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 
160 P.3~ 739, 742 (2007), which held that Idaho drivers have "given ... implied consent 
to evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho road [and they] also gave ... consent to a 
blood draw" had not been overruled. It now has. 
The Idaho Supreme Court now "hold[s] that an implied consent statute such as .. 
. Idaho's does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to consent 
... or objects to the blood draw ... Consent to a search must be voluntary. Inherent in 
the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that 
consent.'.' State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014). 
The magistrate did not specifically rule on the issue of whether or not the 
appellant consented to the blood draw, having decided that the blood draw was 
authorized due to implied consent and exigent circumstances. The court will, therefore, 
address the exigent circumstances issue first. See, e.g., MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 
669, 670, 889 P .2d 103, 104 (Ct. App.1995) ("[W]here a judgment of the trial court is 
based upon alternative grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no 
3Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 5-7 ("Implied consent was given as a 
matter of Idaho law, which qualifies as a valid exception to the warrant requirement."). 
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consequence and may be disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the 
other grounds."). 
2. Exigent Circumstances 
Mr. Townsend's second contention is "under the totality of the circumstances, the 
warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw was not justified under the exigency 
exception to the warrant requirement." Brief of Appellant, at 7. 
In Missouri v. McNeely, _U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 
(2013), the Supreme Court stated "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where police 
officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without 
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates 
that they do so." In other words, there is no per se exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement because of the dissipation of blood alcohol evidence. See McNeely, 133 
S.Ct. at' 1563 ("[W]hile the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a 
finding of exigency in a specific case ... it does not do so categorically. Whether a 
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined 
case by case based on the totality of the circumstances."). 
In this case, the magistrate found as fact, "telephonic warrants were not available 
and were not in use in Ada County in March 2013. Expedited search warrants were not 
available in drunk driving cases in Ada County in March 2013." Memorandum Decision 
Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 8 n. 1. 
The magistrate concluded exigent circumstances were present here because 
"Idaho law bars the state from extrapolating backwards to determine blood alcohol 
content, shortening the available time to gather evidence" (Memorandum Decision 
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Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 8) and because "[a]t the time of the arrest, 
the anticipated delay in obtaining a warrant justified a blood test without judicial 
authorization." Id., at 9. 
As noted by the magistrate, McNeely states "BAC [blood alcohol content] . 
evidence from a drunk-driving suspect naturally dissipates over time in a gradual and 
relatively predictable manner." 133 S.Ct. at 1561. "But technological developments4 that 
enable police officers to secure warrants more quickly, and do so without undermining 
the neutral' magistrate judge's essential role as a check on police discretion, are 
relevant to an assessment of exigency. That is particularly so in this context, where 
BAC evidence is lost gradually and relatively predictably." 133 S.Ct. at 1562-63. 
In Idaho dissipation of BAC evidence over time can result in a bar to prosecution, 
because a person cannot be prosecuted for having a BAC that is not at or above the 
statutory legal limit, when the testing does not demonstrate this. State v. Daniel, 132 
Idaho 701, 979 P .2d 103 (1999). As then Justice Silak noted, this means "if a suspected 
motorist can delay taking the BAC test long enough, the motorist will benefit from the 
statute's bar to prosecution." 132 Idaho at 705,979 P.2d at 107. Consequently, the U.S. 
Supreme Court's statement that dissipating BAC levels can be extrapolated backwards 
to the time the vehicle was being driven may have scientific validity, it is not applicable 
in Idaho to overcome the bar to prosecution when the testing does not demonstrate the 
necessary BAC level. 
4"Well over a majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants remotely 
through various means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as 
e-mail, and video conferencing. And in addition to technology-based developments, jurisdictions have 
found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using standard-form warrant applications 
for drunk-driving investigations." 133 S.Ct. at 1562. 
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In Idaho the consequence of the "gradual and relatively predictable" loss of BAC 
evidence is heightened because the driver must have a BAC level at or over the legal 
limit at the time of the test. 
The magistrate found "the detective in this case was not privy to these 
technological advances [that were set forth in McNeely]. Detective Andreoli's affidavit 
states that in March 2013, telephonic warrants were not in use in Ada County, and 
expedited search warrants were unavailable in drunk driving cases. The anticipated 
time to obtain a search warrant for a DUI was, at the very minimum, one and one half 
hours. The process at night could have potentially taken a significantly greater amount 
of time." Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 9-10. The 
traffic stop occurred at approximately 1 :34 a.m. The blood draw occurred at 3:00 a.m. In 
the intervening time, the traffic stop was conducted, the investigation was undertaken, 
field sobriety tests were conducted, and attempts were made to obtain a breath sample 
from Mr. Thompson. See Probable Cause Affidavit. The reasonable inference is that 
there was not a great deal of time elapsed between the time of the conclusion of the 
final attempt to get a breath sample from Mr. Thompson and the blood draw. 
The magistrate made the following analysis in determining exigency: 
A number of circumstances in this case created a "totality" that justified a 
warrantless blood draw. First, the inability of the state to extrapolate blood 
results backwards makes the timeliness of when the blood is tested 
particularly important in Idaho. Second, perhaps unlike other jurisdictions,· 
the warrant application process in Ada County at the time was by no 
means streamlined and the anticipated delays from the process (likely well 
over two hours) threatened the availability of evidence. Third, the 
defendant was first offered a less intrusive evidentiary testing method (a 
breath test), but refused to submit it. Finally, with the defendant driving the 
wrong direction down the street, admitting to having consumed seven 
beers, and failing all three field sobriety tests, an excessive DUI could 
have reasonably been suspected by the officer, carrying with that 
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suspicion a greater interest in the State of prosecuting the violator. Based 
on the totality of the circumstances, the exigencies of the situation justified 
the warrantless blood draw. 
Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress Evidence, at 10. 
Under the state of the law and the absence of immediate access to 
warrants. as the evidence indicates, the finding of exigent circumstances is 
appropriate. Under the existing law voiding the implied consent provisions and 
the current understanding that a warrant is necessary in short order it is likely the 
result would differ. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision denying the motion to suppress is affirmed. 
Dated this.& day of August 2015. 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1) The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named respondent to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final decision and order entered against 
him in the above-entitled action on August 27, 2015, the honorable Gerald F. 
Schroeder, District Judge, presiding. 
2) That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to IAR 11 (c)(1-11). 
3) A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any list of issues on appeal shall not 
prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal are: 
a) Does Idaho's Implied Consent Statute create a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement when consent is revoked? 
b) Under the "Totality of the circumstances" standard, was the 
warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw justified under the 
exigency exception to the warrant requirement? 
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4) Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the entire 
reporter's standard transcript as defined in IAR 25(d). The Appellant also 
requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's transcript: 
a) Oral argument on appeal July 30, 2015 (Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher. 
Estimated pages: less than 100). 
5) Clerk's Record. The Appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant 
to IAR 28(b)(2). The Appellant requests the following documents to be 
included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included 
under JAR 28(b)(2): 
a) Any and all written requested jury instructions, written jury instructions 
given by the court, modified or not given jury instructions, depositions, 
briefs, memoranda, statements or affidavits considered by the court, or 
considered on any motion made therein, and memorandum opinions or 
decisions of the court. 
b) Any exhibits, including but not limited to letters or victim impact 
statements, addenda to the PSI or other items offered at the 
sentencing hearing. 
c) Transcript Lodged July 21, 2015. 
d) Appellant's Brief April 20, 2015. 
e) Respondent's Brief May 13, 2015. 
6) I certify: 
a) That copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court 
Reporter(s) listed in paragraph 4 above. 
b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (IDAHO 
CODE§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, JAR 24(e)). 
c) That there is no appellant filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal 
case. (IDAHO CODE§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 23(a)(8)). 
d) That the Ada County Public Defender's office will be responsible for 
paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is indigent (lDAHO CODE 
§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, JAR 24(e)). 
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to !AR 20. 
DATED this / I~ day of September 2015. 
Eliz~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Tiffany sher, Official Court Reporter 
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Registered Professional Reporter 
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